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Teton County No. CV 07-376 
In Re: Application for a CUP Permit to 
Exceed 45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
Burns Holdings, LLC 
Petitioner/Appellant 
VS 
Teton County Board of Commissioners 
Respondents 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Kathy Spitzer 
89 N Main, #5 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
Attorney for Respondents 
Table of Contents 
Petition for Judicial Review, Filed December 11, 2007 
Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, filed January 15, 2008 
Motion to Augment Agency Record/Transcript and for Stay of 
Briefing Schedule, filed March 3, 2008 
Order Granting Leave to Augment Agency Record/Transcript 
And Staying of Briefing Schedule; Vacating Date of Hearing 
For Oral Argument 
Petitioner's Brief, filed July 11, 2008 
Respondent's Brief, filed August 05, 2008 
Petitioner's Reply Brief, filed August 25, 2008 
Minute Entry, filed October 21, 2008 
Order, filed October 30, 2008 
Amended Petition for Judicial Review, filed January 28, 2008 
Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, filed 
February 06, 2009 
Findings of Fact, filed February 10, 2009 
Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, filed May 26, 2009 
Administrative Order, filed June 11, 2009 
Respondent's Supplemental Brief, filed July 16, 2009 
Petitioner's Second Reply Brief, filed July 31, 2009 


















Decision on Review, filed September 29, 2009 Page 0176 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
filed October 13, 2009 Page 0192 
Order RE: Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 17, 2009 Page 0195 
Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, 
filed December 04, 2009 Page 0198 
Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, 
filed December 04, 2009 Page 0206 
Motion to Augment Agency Record, filed December 17, 2009 Page 0211 
Minute Entry, filed January 05, 2010 Page 0220 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
filed January 12, 2010 Page 0224 
Order Denying Motion to Augment, filed January 12, 2010 Page 0232 
Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, 
filed February 10, 2010 Page 0235 
Respondent's Reply Brief Second Amended Petition 
for Judicial Review, filed March 10, 2010 Page 0268 
Reply Brief in Support of Second Amended 
Petition for Judicial Review, filed March 24, 2010 Page 0313 
Minute Entry, filed April 20, 2010 Page 0327 
Third Decision on Review, filed June 10, 2010 Page 0331 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 24, 2010 Page 0350 
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
filed August 06, 2010 Page 0353 
ii 
Respondent's Reply Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion 
for Reconsideration, filed August 10, 2010 
Minute Entry, filed August 17, 2010 
Amended Third Decision on Review, filed October 1, 2010 
Notice of Appeal, flied November 10, 2010 
Final Judgment, filed November 30, 2010 
Certificate of Exhibits, dated December 30, 2010 
Clerks Certificate, dated December 30, 2010 











Administrative Order, filed June 11, 2009 0139 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
filed January 12, 2010 0224 
Amended Petition for Judicial Review, filed January 28, 2008 0100 
Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, filed 
February 06, 2009 0111 
Amended Third Decision on Review, filed October 1, 2010 0385 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
filed October 13, 2009 0192 
Brief in Support of second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, 
filed February 10, 2010 0235 
Certificate of Exhibits, dated December 30, 2010 0411 
Certificate of Service, dated December 30, 2010 415 
Clerk's Certificate, dated December 30, 2010 414 
Decision on Review, filed September 29, 2009 0176 
Final Judgment, filed November 30, 2010 0410 
Findings of Fact, filed February 10, 2009 0115 
Minute Entry, filed April 20, 2010 0327 
Minute Entry, filed August 8, 2009 0170 
Minute Entry, Filed August 16, 2010 0382 
Minute Entry, filed January 05, 2010 0220 
Index 
Minute Entry, filed October 21, 2008 0073 
Motion to Augment Agency Record, filed December 17, 2009 0211 
Motion to Augment Agency Record/Transcript and for Stay of 
Briefing Schedule, filed March 3, 2008 0011 
Notice of Appeal, filed November 10, 2010 0406 
Order Denying Motion to Augment, filed January 12, 2010 0232 
Order, filed October 30, 2008 0097 
Order Granting Leave to Augment Agency Record/Transcript and 
Staying of Briefing Schedule; Vacating Date of Hearing for 
Oral Argument 0014 
Order RE: Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 17, 2009 0195 
Petition for Judicial Review, filed December 11, 2007 0001 
Petitioner's Brief, filed July 11, 2008 0017 
Petitioner's Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, 
filed August 06, 2010 0353 
Petitioner's Motion of Reconsideration, filed June 24, 2010 0350 
Petitioner's Reply Brief, filed August 25, 2008 0073 
Petitioner's Second Reply Brief, filed July 31, 2009 0162 
Petitioner's Supplemental Brief, filed May 26, 2009 0122 
Reply Brief in Support of Second Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review, filed March 24, 2010 0313 
Respondent's Brief, filed August 05, 2008 0051 
Respondent's Reply Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for 
Reconsideration, filed August 10, 2010 0372 
Respondent's Reply Brief Second Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review, filed March 10, 2010 0268 
Index V 
Respondent's Supplemental Brief, filed July 16, 2009 
Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review, filed 
December 04, 2009 
Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, 
filed December 04, 2009 
Statement of Issues on Judicial Review, filed January 14, 2008 








·ime: 01 :05 PM 
>age 1 of 5 
Setf:,~th Judicial District - Teton County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000376 Current Judge: Gregory W Moeller 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
User: SHILL 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
)ate Code User Judge 
12/11/2007 NCOC PHYLLIS New Case Filed - Other Claims Jon J Shindurling 
PHYLLIS Filing: R2 - Appeals And Transfers For Judicial Jon J Shindurling 
Review To The District Court Paid by: Holden 
Kidwell Receipt number: 0035110 Dated: 
12/11/2007 Amount: $78.00 (Check) For: 
[NO~IE] 
BNDC PHYLLIS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35111 Dated Jon J Shindurling 
12/11/2007 for 100.00) 
BNDC PHYLLIS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35112 Dated Jon J Shindurling 
12/11/2007 for 100 00) 
1/14/2008 TRAN PHYLLIS Transcript Filed Jon J Shindurling 
1/15/2008 MISC GABBY Statement Of Issue On Judicial Review Jon J Shindurling 
1/18/2008 NOTC PHYLLIS Notice of Lodging of Transcript Jon J Shindurling 
2/15/2008 NOTC PHYLLIS Notice of Settling Transcript on Appeal and Notice Jon J Shindurling 
of Time for Hearing Oral Argument 
HRSC PHYLLIS Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 06/10/2008 03 :00 Jon J Shindurling 
PIVl) Oral Argument 
3/3/2008 MOTN GABBY Motion To Augment Agency Record/Transcript Jon J Shindurling 
And For Stay Of Briefing Schedule 
STIP GABBY Stipulation To Augment The Record Jon J Shindurling 
3/5/2008 ORDR PHYLLIS Order Granting Leave to Augment Agency Jon J Shindurling 
Record /Transcript and Staying of Briefing 
Schedule; Vacating Date of Hearing for Oral 
Argument 
HRVC PHYLLIS Hearing result for Hearing held on 06/10/2008 Jon J Shindurling 
03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Oral Argument 
5/13/2008 NOTC GABBY Notice Of lodging Transcript Jon J Shindurling 
5/28/2008 MOTN GABBY Petitioner's Motion For Extension Of Briefing Jon J Shindurling 
Schedule And Continuance Of Oral Argument 
6/20/2008 MOTN GABBY Motion To Reschedule Oral Argument Jon J Shindurling 
AFFD GABBY Affidavit Of Dale W. Storer In Support Of Motion Jon J Shindurling 
To Reschedule Oral Argument 
7/1/2008 HRSC PHYLLIS Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jon J Shindurling 
10/21/2008 02:00 PM) 
ORDR PHYLLIS Order Granting Motion to Reschedule Oral Jon J Shindurling 
Argument 
7/11/2008 MISC GABBY Petitioner's Brief Jon J Shindurling 
MISC GABBY Certificate Of Compliance Jon J Shindurling 
8/5/2008 MISC SHILL Respondents Brief Gregory W Moeller 
8/26/2008 RPLY PHYLLIS Petitioner's Reply Brief Jon J Shindurling 
10/21/2008 MINE PHYLLIS Minute Entry Hearing type: Hearing Hearing date: Jon J Shindurling 
10/21/2008 Time: 2:43 pm Court reporter: Nancy 
Marlow 
late: 1 2/28/2010 s . th Judicial District - Teton County User: SHILL 
·ime: 0 1 05 PM ROA Report 
'age 2 of 5 Case: CV-2007-0000376 Current Judge: Gregory W Moeller 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
)ate Code User Judge 
10/21/2008 DPHR PHYLLIS Hearing result for Hearing held on 10/21/2008 Jon J Shindurling 
02:00 PM: Disposition With Hearing Oral 
Argument 
10/30/2008 ORDR PHYLLIS Order Jon J Shindurling 
1/20/2009 MISC GABBY Amended Petition For Judicial Review Jon J Shindurling 
Z/6/2009 MISC GABBY Amended Statement Of Issues On Judicial Jon J Shindurling 
Review 
2/10/2009 MISC PHYLLIS Findings of Fact Jon J Shindurling 
5/26/2009 MISC PHYLLIS Request for Scheduling Order Jon J Shindurling 
MISC PHYLLIS Petitioner's Reply Brief Jon J Shindurling 
5/10/2009 ORDR PHYLLIS Order Governing Procedure on Appeal Gregory W Moeller 
6/11/2009 ORDR AGREEN Administrative Order Gregory W Moeller 
6/23/2009 NOTC GABBY Notice Of Non-Filing Of additional Brief Gregory W Moeller 
7/16/2009 MISC PHYLLIS Respondent's Supplemental Brief Gregory W Moeller 
7/31/2009 MISC PHYLLIS Petitioner's Second Reply Brief Gregory W Moeller 
NOTH PHYLLIS Notice Of Hearing Gregory W Moeller 
HRSC PHYLLIS Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/18/2009 02:00 Gregory W Moeller 
AM) Oral Argument 
8/12/2009 HRRS PHYLLIS Hearing Rescheduled (Hearing 08/18/2009 Gregory W Moeller 
11 :00 AM) Oral Argument 
8/13/2009 NOTH PHYLLIS Amended Notice Of Hearing Gregory W Moeller 
8/18/2009 MINE PHYLLIS Minute Entry Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing type: Motions 
Hearing date: 8/18/2009 
Time: 11 :21 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: David Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Dale Storer Atty for Applicant 
Dan Dansie - Atty for APplicant 
Kathy SPltzer - Attorney for County 
ADVS PHYLLIS Hearing result for Hearing held on 08/18/2009 Gregory W Moeller 
11:00 AM: Case Taken Under Advisement Oral 
Argument 
9/29/2009 MISC PHYLLIS Decision on Review Gregory W l\/loeller 
10/9/2009 MEMO PHYLLIS Memorandum of Costs Gregory W Moeller 
10/13/2009 MOTN PHYLLIS Motion for Reconsideration Gregory W Moeller 
MISC PHYLLIS Brief In Support of Motion for Reconsideration Gregory W Moeller 
11/6/2009 GABBY Miscellaneous Payment For Making Copy Of Any Gregory W Moeller 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Mike Polhamus Receipt number: 0042433 Dated: 
11/6/2009 Amount: $27.00 (Cash) 
11/13/2009 STIP STACEY Stipulation Regarding Motion for Reconsideration Gregory W Moeller 
Iate: 12/28/2010 
ime: 01: 05 PM 
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Order Re Motion for Reconsideration 
Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review 
Judge 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Second Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Gregory W Moeller 
Review 
Motion to Augment Agency Record 
Affidavit of Kurt Hibbert 
Notice Of Hearing 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 01/05/2010 02:00 Gregory W Moeller 
PM) 
Order Governing Procedure on Review 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion to Augment the Record 
Hearing date: 1/5/2010 
Time: 2:50 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: David Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Hearing result for Motions held on 01/05/2010 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: David Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: Less than 50 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion to AUgment Record 
Hearing date: 1/5/2010 
Time: 2: 19 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: David Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Dale Storer Attorney for Petitioner 
Kathy Spitzer Attorney for Respondent 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law 
Order Denying Motion to Augment 
Notice of Filing 
Breif in Support of Second Amended Petition for 
Judicial Review 
Respondent's Reply Brief Second Amended 
Petition For Judicial 
Review 
Notice Of Hearing 
Reply Brief In Support Of Second Amended 
Petition For Judicial Review 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 04/20/2010 02:00 
PM) 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
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Hearing type: Hearing 
Hearing date: 4/20/2010 
Time: 3:02 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Dale Storer Plaintiffs Attorney 
Kathy Spitzer Defendant's Attorney 
Hearing result for Hearing held on 04/20/2010 
02:00 PM: 
Court Reporter: 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: Less than 200 
Judge 
Gregory W Moeller 
Gregory W Moeller 
Case Taken Under Advisement Gregory W Moeller 
Third Decision on Review Gregory W Moeller 
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration Gregory W Moeller 
Notice Of Hearing Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/03/2010 02:00 Gregory W Moeller 
PM) 
Motion To Continue Gregory W Moeller 
Order to Continue Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing result for Motions held on 08/03/2010 
02:00 PM: Continued 
Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing Scheduled (Motions 08/17/2010 02:00 Gregory W Moeller 
PM) for Reconsideration 
Petitioner's Brief In Support Of Motion For Gregory W Moeller 
Reconsideration 
Respondent's Reply Brief In Opposition To Gregory W Moeller 
Petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration 
Minute Entry Gregory W Moeller 
Hearing type: Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 8/17/2010 
Time: 4:02 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: David Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Kathy SPltzer, Respondents Attorney 
Dale Storer, Plaintiffs Attorney 
Hearing result for Motions held on 08/17/2010 Gregory W Moeller 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated at: less than 100 
Amended Third Decision on Review Gregory W Moeller 
Iate: 12/28/2010 
ime: 01 :05 PM 
'age 5 of 5 
Se · th Judicial District - Teton County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2007-0000376 Current Judge: Gregory W Moeller 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
User: SHILL 
Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
)ate Code User Judge 
0/1/201 0 CDIS PHYLLIS Civil Disposition entered for: Board of County Gregory W Moeller 
Commissioners of Teton County, Defendant; 
Burns Holdings, LLC, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
10/1/2010 
CSCP ISC2 Case Status Closed But Pending: closed pending Gregory W Moeller 
clerk action 
11/10/2010 PHYLLIS Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Gregory W Moeller 
Supreme Court Paid by: Holden Kidwell 
Receipt number: 0045861 Dated: 11/10/2010 
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Burns Holdings, 
LLC (plaintiff) 
BI\JDC PHYLLIS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 45862 Dated Gregory W Moeller 
11/10/2010 for 200.00) 
NOTC PHYLLIS Notice of Appeal Gregory W Moeller 
11/24/2010 ORDR PHYLLIS Order Suspending Appeal Gregory W Moeller 
11/30/2010 JDMT PHYLLIS Final Judgment Gregory W Moeller 
\ 
Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KJDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-013 0 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. C· v o J -~, lq 
PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Fee Category: R.2 
Fee: $72.00 
Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial 
Review pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§§ 67-5270 and 67-6521 and Rule 84 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of such Petition, Petitioner alleges as 
follows: 
1. Petitioner is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business located in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
00·. 
2. Respondent, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners (the 
"Board"), is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Venue of this Petition is proper under the provisions of Idaho Code§ 67-
5272. 
4. On or about June 14, 2007, Petitioner filed an Application for a Conditional 
Use Permit ("CUP") with the City of Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission, seeking 
to obtain a conditional use permit allowing the Applicant to exceed the forty-five (45) 
foot height limit applicable with respect to the M-1 Zone, as established by the Zoning 
Ordinance of the City of Driggs, Idaho. The subject property was described as Lot lb, 
Block II, and the eastern 110' of Lot la, Teton Peaks View Subdivision and is located 
within the Area of Impact identified by the Teton County and City of Driggs Area of 
Impact Ordinances, Agreements and Map. Because the subject property was located 
within the Area of Impact, the application was brought pursuant to § 2, Chapter 4, of the 
Zoning Ordinance of the City of Driggs, which zoning ordinance was, by virtue of the 
Area oflmpact ordinances and agreement, made applicable to all properties located 
within the Area of Impact. 
5. The application was heard by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission 
on July 11, 2007, at the conclusion of which the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission 
granted the application. On or about July 23, 2007, Mr. John N. Bach, filed a" Notice of 
Appeal" of the decision of the Commission with the Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners. On or about September 13, 2007, the County Commissioners conducted 
2 - PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
00 
a hearing, at the conclusion of which it determined to hear the matter de nova, rather than 
as an appeal. 
6. On November 15, 2007, the Teton County Board of Commissioners 
conducted a hearing for the purpose of considering the CUP application, at the conclusion 
of which the Board denied the CUP application. 
7. The proceedings before the Commission and the Board were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the 
Teton County Board of County Commissioners and the Clerk of the Driggs Planning and 
Zoning Commission. 
8. Petitioner will file a Statement of the Issues for Judicial Review within 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Petition. 
9. Petitioner further requests that the Clerks of the Driggs Planning and 
Zoning Commission and the Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, 
exhibits and other documents filed in conjunction with the above-referenced proceedings, 
together with a transcript of the proceedings before the Commission and the Board, on 
July 11, September 13 and November 15, 2007. 
10. Petitioner further requests that it be awarded its reasonable attorneys fees 
and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. For judicial review of the Board's decisions in this matter, pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 67-6521. 
2. For an order reversing the decision of the Board issued on November 15, 
3 - PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ()11 'J '\._,.' 
2007, and remanding the matter to the Board for reconsideration consistent with the 
Court's direction. 
3. For an order awarding Petitioner its reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this _it day of December, 2007. 
Dale W. Storer, 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
4 - PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
CERTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, and that: 
1. That service of this Petition has been made upon the Teton County Planning 
and Zoning Commission and the Teton County Board of Commissioners, and or their 




Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Kurt Hibbert 
Teton County Planning 
& Zoning Administrator 
Teton County Courthouse 
89 N. Main 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Douglas Self 
Driggs Planning & Zoning Administrator 
City Hall 
P.O. Box48 
Driggs, ID 834 22 
( /)Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( ,,-}Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
(,/J Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
2. That the clerk of Teton County has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the transcripts requested above. 
3. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the agency record. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
G:\WPDATA\DWS\14688 -Bums Brothers\Petition for Judical Review\Petit)On for Judicial Review.wpd:sm 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SEVENTH JUDIC:IAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Bums Holding, LLC, and submits the following 
Statement of Issues for Judicial Review, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 84(d) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The issues for which Petitioner will seek Judicial Review include, without 




a. Did the Findings of Fact and Conclusions adopted by the Board 
comply with the provisions of Idaho Code§ 67-6535? 
b. Did the Board apply proper legal standards in considering 
Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use Permit allowing the 
construction of a structure exceeding the forty-five foot (45') height 
limit set forth within the Driggs Zoning Ordinance? 
c. Did the Board err in considering esthetic values when it denied the 
Conditional Use Permit, given that the subject property was located 
outside the scenic corridor adopted by Teton County and the City of 
Driggs? 
d. Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights in considering 
evidence outside the CUP hearing and in failing to make all ex parte 
contact with members of the Board a matter of public record? 
e. Did the Board err in ordering a de nova hearing to consider the CUP 
application, rather than considering the matter as an appeal of a final 
decision by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission? 
f. Did the Board have jurisdiction to set aside a final decision by the 
Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission to issue the CUP permit, in 
the absence of a timely filed appeal by the opponents of the ClJP? 
g. Did the Board err in using the Teton County Comprehensive Plan, 
and the broad goals articulated therein, as a standard for determining 
whether or not to issue the subject CUP? 
2 - STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 0006 
h. Does the use by the Driggs Zoning Ordinance of the Comprehensive 
Plan and the broad, general goals stated therein, as a criteria for 
evaluating and considering the issuance of conditional use permits, 
violate Petitioner's due process rights under the Idaho and United 
States Constitution? 
1. Did the Board use the appropriate Comprehensive Plan, in evaluating 
and considering Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use 
Permit? 
J. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the CUP 
permit? 
4 
DATED this l f day of January, 2008. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C. 
3 - STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 0009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing 
1L,. 




Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
( /}Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
v. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY 
RECORDffRANSCRIPT AND FOR 
STAY OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, and moves the Court for an 
order granting leave to augment the agency record and transcript in the above-entitled 
action. In particular, Petitioner seeks to augment the agency record and transcript with the 
agency record and transcript of the proceedings before the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission, Driggs City Council and Teton County Board of Commissioners, with 
0011 
ORIGINAL 
respect to the Petitioner's application for a rezoning of the subject property from C-3 to 
M-1. 
This Motion is made for the reason that the rezone proceedings were referred to 
numerous times during the course of the proceedings before the Board of County 
Commissioners regarding to the conditional use permit application and were expressly 
relied upon in their decision to deny the conditional use permit. This Motion is further 
based upon the Stipulation of the parties filed concurrently herewith. 
-{Z 
DATED this ~J; day of February, 2008. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing 




Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY 
RECORD/TRANSCRIPT AND FOR STAY OF 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
( _.)--Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
r:~ r'' f, 
L-., .. .._-,. 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
TETC1~,~ cc1., l[} 
~)lSTF~iGT COLiRT 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO 
AUGMENT AGENCY 
RECORDrfRANSCRIPT AND 
STAYING OF BRIEFING 
SCHEDULE; VACATING DATE OF 
HEARING FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
The Petitioner has filed a Motion seeking to augment the agency record and 
transcript in the above-entitled action with the record and transcript of the proceedings 
before the Board of County Commissioners for a related application for a rezone of the 
0014 · 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that the Petitioner be and hereby is given 
leave to augment the agency record and transcript as requested. Petitioner shall pay the 
initial costs of preparing the augmented agency record and transcript. 
Petitioners have further moved the Court for an order vacating the briefing 
schedule and the oral argument, pending the settlement of the augmented agency record. 
Good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW THEREFORE, it is further ordered that the briefing schedule and oral 
argument set for June 10, 2008, at 3:00 p.m., be and hereby is vacated, pending settlement 
of the augmented record ruy1 transcript. 
DATED this _± day of March, 2008. 
J 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
,J 
following this --=~-- day of March, 2008, by mailing, with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto. 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
( vfMail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( ) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( 
1  Courthouse Box 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, and submits the following 
memorandum brief in support of its Petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Rule 84 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Petitioner seeks judicial review of the verbal decision of the Teton County Board of 
Commissioners (the "Board") issued on November 15, 2007, denying Petitioner's application 
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for a conditional use permit to construct and operate a concrete batch processing plant 
located within the area of impact immediately adjacent to the City of Driggs, Idaho. 
Specifically, Petitioner sought a conditional use permit to construct a facility with a height 
in excess of forty five-feet, as allowed under the Driggs M-1 zone. The Board's verbal 
decision reversed an earlier determination by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission, 
granting the CUP application.1 The decision was also contrary to the recommendation of the 
Teton County Planning and Zoning Administrator who made extensive findings that the CUP 
application complied with the Comprehensive Plan and was compatible with other uses in 
the neighborhood. R. p. 92.2 
Earlier that year the Board had granted Burns' request to rezone the property from C-
3, commercial, to M-1, industrial. In that proceeding, the Board approved the rezone upon 
the condition that the rezone would automatically revert to the original C-3 zone, if Bums 
did not construct the concrete batch plant within a time certain. The same condition was 
carried into a Development Agreement between the parties executed later that summer. R. 
p. 76. The Development Agreement included numerous provisions regulating the manner 
in which the property was to be developed and the timing therefor. R. pp. 75 through 78. 
There were no provisions in the Agreement restricting the height of the proposed building. 
Ibid. 
1Because the subject property was located within the Driggs area of impact, the application was initially submitted to 
the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. Under the Driggs zoning ordinance, CUP applications are approved or denied at 
the Commission level only, without further review or approval by the Driggs City Council. 
2Because the official agency record filed with the Court was not paginated, Petitioner has attached a CD-ROM 
containing a "Bates-stamped" duplicate copy of the Agency Record as Appendix "A" to this Brief. The page references in this 
Brief correspond to the Bates numbering in such duplicate agency record 
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Concurrentlywith the negotiations regarding the Development Agreement, the Driggs 
Planning and Zoning Commission processed and heard Bums' CUP application. Following 
a public hearing on July 11, 2007, the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously 
approved Bums' application, including an express finding that the request met the CUP 
· provisions of the Driggs Zoning Ordinance, as well as the Driggs Comprehensive Plan. CUP 
Tr., Vol IV, pp. 27 through 28.3 
The first CUP hearing before the County Commissioners was scheduled on September 
13, 2007. That hearing was tabled in order to allow the County Prosecuting Attorney to 
research the question of whether the case should be heard as an "appeal" by one of the 
project's protagonists, a Mr. Grabow, or whether it should be heard as an original proceeding 
under the Driggs Zoning and Area oflmpact ordinances. The County Prosecuting Attorney 
ultimately determined the appeal was premature and that the CUP should be heard as an 
original proceeding pursuant to the Driggsff eton County Area oflmpact Ordinance and the 
Driggs Zoning Ordinance. A second evidentiary hearing before the Board was then held on 
November 15, 2007, under the Board's original jurisdiction. That hearing resulted in the 
denial of the CUP application. 
3
Petitioner will hereafter use the nomenclature of"CUP Tr." wiili reference to the CUP proceedings, and "Rezone Tr." 
with respect to the earlier rezone proceedings in February, 2007. As the Court's file will reflect, the Agency transcript was 
supplemented with the transcript of the earlier rezone proceedings, following the lodging of the CUP proceedings transcript in 
this action. The references "Vol I", "Vol II" and "Vol III" will refer respectively to the similarly numbered transcripts of the two 
CUP hearings which were recorded on three separate CD's. Vol. IV refers to the transcript of the July 11, 2007 CUP hearing 
before the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Board err in failing to adopt a written statement setting forth the factual 
basis for its decision and a reasoned statement explaining the Board's denial of Petitioner's 
CUP application, in violation ofl.C. § 67-6535? 
2. Did the Board err by failing to specify the reasoning, standards and criteria 
used to deny the CUP, in violation ofl.C. § 67-6519(4)? 
3. Did the Board err in using the Driggs CUP Application Form as the basis for 
its denial of the CUP, rather than the Driggs Zoning Ordinance? 
4. Did the Board err in using the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, as a regulatory 
measure for determining whether or not to issue the subject CUP? 
5. Did the Board incorrectly deny Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use 
Permit on the mistaken assumption that the February, 2007, rezone did not allow construction 
of a structure exceeding forty-five feet (45') in height? 
6. Did the Board's use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and the broad, visionary 
goals stated therein, as criteria for evaluating and considering the issuance of conditional use 
permits, violate Petitioner's due process rights under the Idaho and United States 
Constitution? Did the Board's failure to specify the standards and criteria it used in denying 
the permit also violate Petitioner's due process rights? 
7. Did the Board fail to comply with the Driggs Zoning Ordinance by failing to 
set appropriate conditions governing the proposed conditional use and by failing to make a 
finding that Petitioner was unable to meet those conditions. 
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8. Was the Board's decision in the rezone proceeding res judicata as to its 
subsequent effort to reconsider the compatibility of the conditional uses permitted in the M-1 
zone, with the Comprehensive Plan? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Proceedings Regarding the Conditional Use Permit. 
In the proceedings before the Teton County Board of Commissioners (the "Board"), 
Burns sought a conditional use permit to operate a concrete batch plant having a height in 
excess of forty-five (45) feet. The subject property is located in Teton County, but within 
the area of impact designated pursuant to the Teton County/Driggs Area of Impact 
Agreement. See Appendix A. Pursuant to the Area of Impact Agreement between the City 
of Driggs and Teton County, a hearing on the CUP Application was conducted before the 
Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission on July 11, 2007, at the conclusion of which the 
Commission unanimously recommended approval of the permit. CUP Tr. Vol., IV,pp 27-28. 
On November 15, 2007, the CUP Application was heard by the Board, at the conclusion of 
which the Board issued a verbal denial of the CUP. No written findings or reasoned 
statement of the reasons or basis for denial was ever issued by the Board. 
Location of Property and Surrounding Land Uses. 
The property is located at 175 N. and 185 N., on State Highway 33, north of the City 
of Driggs, Idaho. R. p. 125. The parcel in question consists of approximately 6.5 acres and 
was zoned M-1, (Light Industrial) at the time of the CUP hearing. R p. 125. The property 
is located immediately north of the airport, on the east side of State Highway 33; north of 
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Rite-Way Road and south of and adjacent to Casper Drive. R. p. 46. The subject property 
is located adjacent to M-1, ("Light Industrial") property across State Highway 33 on the 
west; C-3 ("Service and Highway Commercial") on the south; M-1 on the east; and C-3 on 
the north. R. p. 13. The property sits approximately 320 feet east of State Highway 33. R. 
p. 91; CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 3, L 14. 
Zoning and Comprehensive Plan Designation. 
The Driggs Comprehensive Plan states that manufacturing and industrial uses should 
be confined to an area north of the airport.4 See Appendix "C", p. 87. Petitioner proposed 
to construct and operate a ready-mix concrete batch facility, which use is a permitted use 
under the Driggs Zoning Ordinance No. 267-06, section 13 - M-1 (Light Industrial), 
paragraph A (Uses Allowed), subparagraph 1- "Manufacturing." See Appendix "B", p. 25. 
Consistent with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, the Board of County Commissioners had 
previously rezoned the subject property from C-3, (Service and Highway Commercial) to 
M-1 (Light Industrial) on February 26, 2007. See Rezone Tr., p. 36, LL. 20 through 22. 
Description of Proposed Buildings. 
A site plan reflecting the locations of the main plant, truck wash, water processing 
facility and storm water retention pond was attached as Exhibit "B" to Petitioner's CUP 
application. R. p. 7. Renderings of the proposed main building were also attached as Exhibit 
"C". R. p. 8. An illustrative photograph of a similar temporary batch plant facility was also 
4Toe Driggs!feton County area of impact ordinance (Ord. No. 242) specifies that the Driggs Comprehensive Plan is to 
be applied within the area of impact. See Appendix "D", at Section 1-3. 
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attached as Exhibit "D" to the application. R. p. 9. Elevation views of the facility as 
enclosed by a proposed wall and landscaping were also attached as Exhibit "E". R. p. 10. 
Description of Plant Structure. 
The proposed concrete plant contemplated an enclosed building in order to facilitate 
production of concrete on a year-round basis. R. p. 126. The concrete plant was also 
designed to operate in an energy efficient manner using state-of-the-art dust control systems. 
Ibid. The enclosed building was intended to mitigate sound, dust and vibration, as well as 
provide a pleasant, harmonious and attractive exterior. Ibid. 
The portion of the proposed building that exceeded forty-five (45) feet would have 
comprised only eighteen (18) percent of the floor space of the entire building. R. p. 127. 
This taller section of the building was necessary in order to enclose the cement storage area 
and dust collection systems. Ibid. Equipment necessary for the storage area and dust 
collection systems required construction of the exterior enclosure at a of height slightly less 
than seventy-five (75) feet. Ibid. If the building height was limited to forty-five (45) feet, 
the plant would not be able to operate on an energy efficient basis and would require 
extended operating hours in order to meet the local demands for concrete. Ibid. In the 
absence of such equipment, the plant would be able to operate only as a transport plant which 
would have increased noise and dust emanating from the site. CUP Tr. Vol II, p. 10, LL. 18 
through 25. Such height limitation would also have reduced the production capabilities of 
the plant, thereby creating the likelihood that concrete would need to be brought in from 
elsewhere within the Valley. Such scenario would have increased truck noise, vibration and 
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congestion on an already crowded State Highway 33 corridor. Ibid. Construction of the 
plant as proposed would have reduced truck exhaust emissions since concrete would be 
mixed in the plant, not by individual trucks. CUP Tr. Vol III, p. 14 LL. 14 through 24. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Teton County Failed to Issue Written Findings of Fact or a Written Statement 
Explaining the Criteria and Standards Used to Evaluate the Application, as Required 
by Idaho Code§ 67-6535. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6535 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
67-6535. Approval or Denial of An Application to Be Based 
upon Standards and to Be in Writing. 
* * * * 
(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this 
chapter shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned 
statement that explains the criteria and standards considered 
relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and 
explains the rationale for the decision based on the applicable 
provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and 
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and 
factual information contained in the record. 
See Idaho Code§ 67-6535. See also Cooperv. Ada County Board a/County Commissioners, 
101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (S. Ct. 1980 ). Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) also requires the 
governing board to specify the ordinance and standards used in evaluating an application for 
a permit and the reasons for approval or denial thereof. 
As agency record reflects, the Board of Commissioners failed to issue written findings 
of fact or to set forth a reasoned statement of its reasons and criteria used to deny the CUP. 
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Instead the Board merely ruled verbally that the application did not comply with the 
Comprehensive Plan, notwithstanding the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission's finding 
to the contrary. CUP Tr., Vol III, pp. 27 through 33. The Board also ruled that the 
application did not comply with the conditions imposed upon the earlier rezoning from C-3 
to M-1. CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 32, LL. 1 through 7. Interestingly, the County Planning and 
Zoning Administrator found that the application did comply with the goals, policies and 
objectives of the Comprehensive Plan and was compatible with other uses in the 
neighborhood. R. p. 92. Notwithstanding the Administrator's findings, the Board verbally 
found that the application did not satisfy two criteria allegedly contained in the 
Comprehensive Plan, without explaining its reasoning or the facts upon which it relied in 
reaching that conclusion. Ibid. 
Based upon the County's failure to adopt written findings and failure to issue a 
reasoned statement explaining the basis for its denial, the Board's decision should be 
reversed and the matter should be remanded to the County Commissioners with an order 
directing them to make such findings and reasoned statement. 
II. 
The Board of Commissioners Erred in Using the Driggs CUP Application Form 
as the Basis for Denying Petitioner's Application for a Conditional Use Permit. 
Section 67-6512( a) of the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act provides as follows: 
(a) As part of a zoning ordinance each governing board may 
provide by ordinance adopted, amended, or repealed in 
accordance with the notice and hearing procedures provided 
under section 67-6509, Idaho Code, for the processing of 
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applications for special or conditional use permits. A special use 
permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to 
conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, ... 
See Idaho Code§ 67-6512 (italics added). 
Contrary to the Local Planning Act, the Board based its decision upon two numbered 
criteria set forth in the Driggs CUP Application Form, rather than the criteria set forth in the 
Driggs Zoning Ordinance. Atthe conclusion of the CUP hearing, the County Commissioners 
engaged in a colloquy regarding the appropriate criteria to be used in evaluating the CUP 
application. After some discussion, Commissioner Stevenson asked the county attorney, Bart 
Birch, to clarify the appropriate criteria to be used: 
Commissioner Stevenson: I want to make sure we get a motion that works. 
Mr. Birch: Yeah. Like I say, I know the criteria for a county granting a 
conditional use permit as far as the county code criteria. As far as the City 
criteria, I think you're basing it based upon what you understand the 
comprehensive plan and the goals of the City to be. 
Commissioner Stevenson: Well, I read some of it. The criteria are here. It's 
just a matter of being able to match it up to everything in your comp plan. I'm 
not familiar enough with it to do that. Here are the ... 
Mr. Birch: Well, I wouldn't worry about that so much. I ... you have the 
criteria, look at those criteria, and say, in looking at the criteria provided by the 
City of Driggs ordinance. 
CUP Tr., Vol. III, p. 25, LL. 1 through 17. (Italics added). Contrary to Mr. Birch's advice, 
Commissioner Stevenson then referenced criteria numbers 2 and 3 of the Driggs CUP 
Application Form which she had identified earlier during the proceeding: 
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Commissioner Stevenson: I read two of about five of them, but I don't know 
if you are happy with your motion or not. 
Mr. Chairman: Were those in your packet? 
Commissioner Stevenson: Yeah. I'm just trying to find which sticky note it is. 
They were labeled. I have to get through them all. Okay. Here it is. This is 
on the form that says, "Application for Conditional Use Permit and the 
Commission Evaluation." The planning and zoning commission shall review 
the particular facts and circumstances of each proposed conditional use in 
terms of the following standards and shall find adequate evidence showing that 
such use at the proposed location -- and then it has six things of which I only 
read from two of them earlier. 
Mr. Chairman: Well, number one is: Will in fact constitute conditional use as 
established in the district regulations for the zoning district involved, will be 
harmonious with and in accordance with the general objective or with any 
specific objective of the comprehensive plan or the zoning ordinance. So the 
motion could include the Driggs Ordinances Criteria No. 2 and Criteria No. 3, 
which will be designed, constructed, operated ... 
CUP Tr., Vol. III, p. 25, L. 18 through p. 26, L. 18. (Italics added). A copy of the CUP 
Application Form quoted by Commissioner Stevenson is contained in the Agency Record. 
R.p. 5. 
At that point, Commissioner Trupp questioned why Commissioner Stevenson was 
referring to the Driggs CUP Application Form, rather than the Driggs Zoning Ordinance: 
"Commissioner Trupp: This is [an] application, not [an] ordinance. These are 
applications. 
Mr. Chairman: I think these are the criteria. 
Commissioner Stevenson: It's from the ordinance. It's their criteria just like 
we have to do that. 
Mr. Chairman: These are from the ordinances the criteria for granting of a 
conditional use permit. No. 3, will be designed, constructed, operated, and 
maintained to be harmonious and appropriate in appearance with the existing 
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or intended character of the general vicinity and that such use will not change 
the essential character of the same area. So that -
Commissioner Stevenson: Those are the ones I read before. 
Mr. Chairman: The motion can say, in accordance with Driggs ordinances for 
the evaluation of the conditional use permit Nos. 2 and 3. 
Commissioner Stevenson: I would just like to, again, ask Bart, make sure 
we're getting this motion okay, because I know this is controversial. Maybe 
ifwe could read it back once more, and if you have any final comments for us. 
* * * * 
The Clerk: The motion will be: "Deny the CUP due to lack of conformance to Driggs' 
ordinances for evaluation of a CUP, particularly Criteria No. 2 and No. 3." 
CUP Tr., Vol. III, p. 26, L. 19, through p. 28, L. 2. 
As Mr. Trupp correctly pointed out, Commissioner Stevenson's and Young's motion 
was based, not upon the Driggs Zoning Ordinance, rather it was based upon "Criteria Nos. 
2 and 3" of the CUP Application Form. As can be seen from the application in the agency 
record, the criteria quoted by Commissioners Young and Stevenson are identical to the 
numbered items 2 and 3 of the CUP Application Form. R. p. 5. More importantly, Criteria 
No. 3, in the CUP Application Form is nowhere to be found in the Driggs Zoning Ordinance. 
See Appendix "B", p. 47. 
As noted above,§ 67-6512 of the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act specifically 
requires that the grant or denial of a conditional use permit be based on "terms of the 
ordinance . .. " Clearly then, basing denial upon criterion in the CUP Application Form that 
was not included in the Zoning Ordinance is wholly inappropriate and inconsistent with § 
67-6512 of the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act. ("LLUPA") The Board's denial of 
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Petitioner's CUP application was erroneous as a matter of law and its decision should 
therefore be reversed. 
III. 
The Board's Use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan to Deny the CUP Application 
UnlawfuHy Elevated the Comprehensive Plan to the Level of Legally Controlling 
Zoning Law. 
As noted above, the County Commissioners relied upon two criteria for that portion 
of its denial alleging a lack of compliance with the Driggs Zoning Ordinance. One of those 
criteria was nowhere to be found within the Driggs Zoning Ordinance. The remaining 
criteria used to deny the CUP permit was "Criteria No. 2" in the CUP application form, 
which stated that the conditional use must "be harmonious with and in accordance with the 
general objective (sic) or with any specific objective of the Comprehensive Plan and/or the 
Zoning Ordinance." See CUP Tr., Vol. III, p. 26,LL. 9 through 15 and p. 27, LL. 24 through 
p. 28, L. 2. Criteria No. 3, being nowhere found within the Driggs Zoning Ordinance, is 
certainly not an appropriate criteria upon which to premise denial and the net result is that 
the Board's denial was based solely upon an alleged failure to be "harmonious ... with the 
general objective (sic) or with any specific objective of the Comprehensive Plan." 
In Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (S. Ct. 2000), the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered whether it was appropriate to deny a subdivision application based 
on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
use of the Comprehensive Plan as the sole basis for denying an application, was improper: 
The Act indicates that a comprehensive plan and a zoning 
ordinance are distinct concepts serving different purposes. A 
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comprehensive plan reflects the "desirable goals and objectives, 
or desirable future situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. 
LC. § 67-6508. This Court has held that a comprehensive plan 
does not operate as a legally controlling zoning law, but rather 
serves to guide and advise governmental agencies responsible 
for making decisions. 
* * * * 
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree 
with all provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more 
specific analysis, resulting in denial of a subdivision application 
based solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan 
elevates the plan to the level of legally controlling zoning law. 
Such a result affords the board unbounded discretion in 
examining a subdivision application and allows the board to 
effectively rezone land based on the general language in the 
comprehensive plan. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho at 358, 2 P.2d at 743. (Italics added) 
The Supreme Court considered the same issue in the case of Sanders Orchard v. Gem 
County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (S. Ct. 2000). The Court there held that a 
comprehensive plan is not an appropriate instrument to be used in approving or denying a 
specific development application: 
The governing board cannot, however, deny a use that is 
specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground 
that such use would conflict with the comprehensive plan. 
[Citing case]. "A comprehensive plan reflects the desirable 
goals and objectives, or desirable future situations for the land 
within a jurisdiction ... but it does not operate as a legally 
controlling zoning law." 
Orchard v. Gem County, supra, 52 P.3d at 699, at 844, 137 Idaho at 699. See also Bone v. 
City o/Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844,693 P.2d 1046 (S. Ct. 1984); Giltner Dairy, LLCv. Jerome 
County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (S. Ct. 2008). 
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The use of a comprehensive plan to approve or disapprove a specific application or 
development permit under the LLUPA was also addressed in Evans v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (S. Ct. 2003). In that case, the appellants asserted that approval of the 
Teton Springs PUD violated various provisions of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan. 
In response, the respondent, Teton Springs, countered that the comprehensive plan was not 
to be used as a zoning ordinance or regulatory measure and was singularly inappropriate for 
use as a basis to deny a PUD application. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed: 
The appellants assert that the Teton Springs PUD violates 
several important policies of the comprehensive plan. The 
respondent counters that the Comprehensive Plan is not a zoning 
ordinance that regulates project compliance. 
The discussion in part III.B above applies to this claim. 
While the Board of Commissioners may not disregard the 
Comprehensive Plan, it is not a zoning ordinance by which a 
development project's compliance is measured. Rather, the 
Comprehensive Plan provides guidance to the local agency 
charged with making zoning decisions. The appellants may or 
may not be correct in their concern that the Teton Springs PUD 
will adversely effect the present life style and alter the character 
of the area in violation of the policies of the Comprehensive 
Plan. That point was heavily debated during the approval 
process. Similarly, the fear of the "Jacksonization" of the Teton 
Valley, as the billionaires force the millionaires over Teton Pass 
into Driggs and Victor, may be well founded. However, 
regardless of the wisdom, or lack thereof, in approving Teton 
Spring's PUD application, the Comprehensive Plan does not 
provide a legal basis for this court to reverse the Board of 
Commissioner's decision to approve the application. 
Evans v. Teton Springs, supra, 139 Idaho at 79, 73 P.3d at 92. (Italics added). 
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The Board's denial of Petitioner's CUP application in this case resulted in the exact 
evil foreseen in Urrutia, supra. Specifically, the Board's resort to the Comprehensive Plan, 
and all of its broad, visionary goals and objectives, afforded the Board "unbounded 
discretion," thereby allowing it to effectively rezone Petitioner's land and deny a use that was 
expressly permitted under the M-1 zone in question. The Driggs M-1 light industrial zone 
specifically allowed "manufacturing, assembling, fabricating, processing, packing, repairing 
or other uses ... " See Driggs Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 2, Section 13. See Appendix "B", 
p. 26. The Driggs Zoning Ordinance also expressly allowed buildings with heights in excess 
of forty five-feet, provided a conditional use permit was first secured.5 See Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance, Chapter 2, Section 13. Appendix "B", p. 27. By resorting to the Comprehensive 
Plan as its basis for the denial, the Board denied Bums the right to make use of its property 
in a manner that was expressly permitted in the M-1 zone. Effectively, by this artifice the 
Board acted directly contrary to its earlier decision in which it granted Petitioner's 
application to rezone the property from C-3 to M-1. See Rezone Tr., p. 37, L. 5 though 6, 
Necessarily, in making that finding, the Commissioners were required to "rezone in 
accordance with the comprehensive plan." See Idaho Code § 67-6511. By resorting to the 
broad, visionary goals and objectives in the Comprehensive Plan, without specifying which 
specific provision was inconsistent with the CUP permit, the Board in effect reversed its own 
earlier finding that the M-1 zone, which permitted the use of buildings in excess of forty-five 
5 
A conditional use, like its cousin, an unconditional use, is considered as a permitted use under a zoning ordinance, the 
only difference being that under the latter, the Board has no authority to condition the use, whereas under the former, the use may 
be conditioned in order to assure compatibility and harmony with the surrounding uses. In either event, both are considered as 
permitted uses. 
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feet, was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. By using the Comprehensive Plan and its 
broad, visionary goals and general policy objectives as a basis for denying a specific project, 
without making factual findings or citing to specific provisions in the Plan, the Board 
exercised "unbounded discretion," because it disapproved of a use that was expressly 
permitted by the Driggs Zoning Ordinance. Effectively, by the "mumbo jumbo" ofresorting 
to the Comprehensive Plan and then failing to make specific factual findings setting forth the 
manner in which Petitioner's application was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan, the 
Commissioners denied a manufacturing use that it had expressly approved only three months 
earlier. The exact evils of such unbounded discretion, as foreseen in Urrutia and the Teton 
Springs cases noted above, have now materialized in the form of the decision issued by the 
County Commissioners here. That unbounded discretion also allowed the County 
Commissioners here to ignore a favorable recommendation by the Driggs Planning and 
Zoning Commission, a body which was, unlike the Board here, acutely familiar with the 
Driggs zoning ordinance and who had in fact found the CUP permit was in conformity with 
its own ordinance. See e.g. CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 29, L. 16 through p. 30, L. 10. 
In sum, the Board's resort to the Comprehensive Plan as controlling regulatory law, 
violated the holdings of Urrutia and the other cases cited above and as such should be 
reversed. 
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IV. 
The Board Violated Idaho Code§ 67-6519 by Failing to Specify the Standards 
Used to Evaluate the CUP Permit, its Reasons for the Denial and the Actions Burns 
Could Take to Obtain a Permit. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6519 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
67-6519. Permit Granting Process. 
* * * * 
( 4) Whenever a governing board or planning and zoning 
commission grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: 
(a) the ordinance and standards used in evaluating the 
application; 
(b) the reasons for approval or denial; and 
( c) the actions, if any, that the applicant could talce to 
obtain a permit. 
In this case, the Board's motion to deny the CUP was as follows: 
"Mr. Chairman: All in favor? 
The Clerk: Can I read it back to you again? 
Mr. Chairman: Please. 
Commissioner Stevenson: Yeah. Sure. One more time. 
The Clerk: Chairman Young motioned to deny the CUP due to a lack of conformance 
to Driggs' standards for condition evaluation of a CUP criteria No. 2 and No. 3, and 
the fact that the M-1 zone change was granted based on a specific proposal that had 
no mention of a 75-foot high building, and, in fact, clearly indicated a 45-foot 
maximum height. 
* * * * 
Mr. Birch: Is that your motion, Larry? 
Mr. Chairman: Yes. That motion has been seconded. And I called for those in favor. 
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Commissioner Stevenson: Aye. 
Mr. Chairman: Aye. Opposed? 
Commissioner Trupp: Aye. 
Mr. Chainnan: Motion carries. The conditional use permit is denied ... " 
CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 31, L. 21 through p. 33, L. 4. 
As is evident from the discussion quoted above, the Board of Commissioners did not 
give any reason for its denial other than pointing to two criteria having broad reference to the 
Comprehensive Plan. More importantly, the Board failed to state i) the facts upon which it 
based its conclusion that Petitioner's application was inconsistent with Comprehensive Plan, 
ii) the specific provisions in the Comprehensive Plan deemed inconsistent with Bums' CUP 
application, iii) its reasoning for the denial, and iv) what actions Burns could take in order 
to obtain a permit. Consequently, Burns was deprived of any means to resolve the Board's 
concerns with the CUP permit. Effectively, by referring to the Comprehensive Plan in only 
a very general fashion, the Commissioners exercised "unbridled discretion," without 
providing Petitioner any inkling whatsoever of why its application was denied and what 
would be required to obtain the permit. 
The Driggs Comprehensive Plan is a ninety-seven (97) page document, comprised of 
fifteen (15) chapters addressing numerous topics, including among other things, protection 
of private property rights, population, economic development, transportation, recreation and 
land use policies and goals. See Appendix "C" attached hereto. One is only left to guess 
which, among the numerous goals and objectives stated in the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, 
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were not satisfied by Petitioner's application. Simply stated, the Board's general reference 
to a ninety-seven (97) page document (i.e. the Comprehensive Plan) provides no basis 
whatsoever for this Court to review the Board's actions. Effectively, the Board's failure to 
comply with Idaho Code § 67-6519 allowed the Board to act arbitrarily and capriciously. 
The Board's decision should be reversed and the Board should be compelled to use 
appropriate ordinance-based standards and to state reasons for its denial of the permit. 
Further, it should be ordered to advise Bums of any actions it could take to obtain the 
permit, if it again denies the permit . 
V. 
The Board Incorrectly Premised its Denial of the CUP Permit upon the Basis 
That the Previous Zone Change Limited the Height of Petitioner's Building to Forty 
Five Feet. 
Commissioner Young's motion denying Petitioner's CUP application was as follows: 
The Clerk: Chairman Young motioned to deny the CUP due to a lack of conformance 
to Driggs' standards for condition evaluation of a CUP criteria No. 2 and No. 3, and 
the fact that the M-1 zone change was granted based on a specific proposal that had 
no mention of a 75-foot high building, and, in fact, clearly indicated a 45-foot 
maximum height. 
Commissioner Stevenson: I wouldn't put the maximum in there. The 45-foot height 
is what was discussed. 
The Clerk: Just take maximum out? 
Commissioner Stevenson: Because if you're trying to say it clearly said that -the 45 
feet height is what was discussed. That was the major thing we heard, but its not-
it wasn't listed as being necessarily maximum. 
The Clerk: Based on a specific proposal that had no mention of a 75-foot high 
building and, in fact, clearly indicated a 45-foot height. 
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Commissioner Stevenson: Okay. 
Mr. Birch: Is that your motion, Larry? 
Mr. Chairman: Yes. That motion has been seconded. And I called for those in favor. 
Commissioner Stevenson: Aye. 
Mr. Chairman: Aye. Opposed? 
Commissioner Trupp: Aye. 
CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 32, L. 1, through p. 33, L. 4. (Italics added). 
However, contrary to Chairman Young's motion, the Board's decision motion 
granting the rezoning in February, 2007, did not include such limitation. In fact, the motion 
granting such rezoning was as follows: 
Commissioner Stevenson: I wasn't sure if you already had. Okay. 
I'd like to make a motion that we approve this zone change from C-3 to M-1 as 
requested do we need to go through all - okay-with the condition that- conditions 
that the development agreement to be worked out with City and County Planning and 
Zoning Administrators address issues, such as noise, dust, truck traffic, landscaping, 
downlighting, hours of operation, building design, access improvements to perhaps 
include the road on the east side, and, also, that this zone change is specifically for the 
proposed Concrete Batch Plant. And, so, that if this project does not come to fruition, 
it would revert to C-3. 
Rezone Tr., p. 36, L. 18 through p. 37, L. 7.6 Commissioner Stevenson's motion was in 
apparent reference to a like condition imposed by the Driggs City Council, to the effect that 
the zone change would revert back to C-3 if the concrete batch plant was not constructed 
6 Although Bums did not appeal such "conditional" zoning, It should be briefly noted that such condition was ultra 
vires for several reasons. First, such reversionary "conditional" zoning would violate the notice and hearing requirements ofl.C. 
§ 67-6511. Secondly, by limiting the rezoning to concrete batch plants only, the Board violated the Driggs Zoning Ordinance 
which allowed other manufacturing and industrial uses in the zone. Effectively the Board unlawfully amended its zoning 
ordinance by creating a new "sub-zone" comprised of concrete batch plants only an action that was clearly not allowed without 
compliance with the LLUP A notice and hearing provisions for zoning ordinance amendments. 
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within a time certain. Rezone Tr., p. 4, L. 3 through L. 9. Further this condition was carried 
fonvard into the Development Agreement signed by the County. R p. 78. Interestingly, no 
mention of a 45 foot height restriction was made in that Agreement as well. 
Clearly then, the earlier rezoning was not made conditional upon a height limitation 
of forty-five (45) feet. Rather, the only "condition" imposed upon the rezoning was that it 
would revert to C-3 if the batch plant was not constructed within a certain amount of time. 
Nowhere was a forty-five (45) foot height limitation imposed. 
Furthermore, had such height limit been imposed in that proceeding, it would also 
have been ultra vires and in violation of the Driggs Zoning ordinance which expressly allows 
building heights in excess of forty-five (45) feet, as a conditional use. See Appendix B, 
Driggs Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 2, Section 13(C). Bum's CUP Application was not 
before the Board during the February, 2007, hearing and the Board could not impose such 
condition without conducting a separate CUP hearing, as required under the Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance and as required by I. C. § 67-6512. As noted above, a rezone that limits use of 
property to only one of many permitted uses in the zone, is a violation of the use provisions 
of that zone. When a government agency rezones property, it should examine the 
Comprehensive Plan in light of all uses allowed under the zone in question, rather than 
merely looking at an applicant's contemplated use - a use that could well change the next 
day. Although the Teton County Commissioners may have erroneously thought they were 
approving a concrete batch plant only, such is clearly not the product of a proper rezone 
under the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act. 
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In sum, Commissioner Young's motion to deny the CUP permit on the basis that the 
earlier rezoning had imposed a forty-five ( 45) foot height limitation, was premised upon an 
incorrect recollection of the Board's earlier motion. The earlier rezoning was not made 
conditional upon a forty-five (45) foot height limitation, rather the only condition was that 
the rezoning would revert to the original C-3 zone, if Bums' concrete batch plant was not 
constructed within a time certain. Commissioner Young's use of that premise to deny Bum's 
application is simply not supported by the record in the earlier rezone proceedings. 
VI. 
The Board Failed to Follow the Driggs Zoning Ordinance in Denying Petitioner's 
CUP Application and it Violated the Appeal Period Set Forth in I. C. § 67-652l(d). 
The portion of the Driggs Zoning Ordinance dealing with conditional uses provides 
as follows: 
ZONING ORDINANCE 281.07 
Chapter Four, Administrative Procedures 
* * * * 
Section 2. Conditional Use Permit Procedures. 
A. The Following Provisions Shall Apply to Conditional 
Use Permits: 
1. 
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The Planning Commission may, . . . permit 
conditional uses where the uses are not in conflict 
with the comprehensive plan nor the zoning 
ordinance. If the proposed conditional use cannot 
adequately meet the conditions necessary to 
assure protection and compatibility with the 
surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood, 
0039 
the Planning Commission will not approve the 
proposed use. 
2. Upon the granting of a conditional use permit, 
conditions may be attached including, but not 
limited to, those: 
a. Minimizing adverse impact on other 
development; 
b. Controlling the sequence and 
timing of development; 
c. Controlling the duration of development; 
d. Assuring the development is maintained 
properly; 
e. Designating the exact location and nature 
of development; 
f. Requiring the provision for on-site 
facilities or services; and 
g. Requiring mor restrictive standards than 
those generally required in this ordinance. 
See Appendix "B", Driggs Zoning Ordinance, Ch. 4, § 2, at p. 4 7. (Italics added). In this 
case, the Board did not impose any of the conditions listed in subsection (2), much less make 
a finding that Bums was unable to "meet the conditions necessary to assure protection and 
compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood ... "7 There was no 
discussion or findings whatsoever of an inability on Bums' part to meet such conditions. 
Rather the Board premised its denial upon a mistaken recollection of the earlier rezone 
hearing and an unsupported conclusion that the application did not meet "Criteria 2 and 3" 
in the CUP Application Form. 
7Presumably those "conditions" referred to the conditions set forth in subsection 2(A)(2) of Chapter 4. 
24 - PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
0040 
The question of whether or not buildings having a height in excess of forty-five ( 45) 
feet are compatible with the Comprehensive Plan map for the area, was a question that was 
resolved when Burns'property was rezoned to M-1, since such use was expressly permitted 
in that zone. 8 Thus, instead of granting the permitted use, subject to appropriate conditions 
necessary to assure compatibility with neighboring uses, the Board summarily denied the 
application without even bothering to explore in what manner conditions could be fashioned 
to assure compatibility of the proposed taller building with adjoining uses ( e.g. enhanced set 
backs, landscaping or structural buffers, facade design or color coordination schemes, or 
operational limitations, etc.). They made no finding, as required by the Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance, that Bums was unable to meet any of those conditions. They simply ignored the 
Driggs Zoning Ordinance and conjured up several transparent and incorrect conclusions 
about their previous action and about Petitioner's compliance with the Comprehensive Plan, 
wholly independent of the criteria and conditions listed in the Driggs CUP ordinance. 
VII. 
The Driggs CUP Ordinance and the Board's Failure to Employ Specific 
Standards in Considering the CUP Permit Violated Petitioner's Due Process Rights. 
Due process requirements under the Idaho and federal constitutions are applicable to 
land use and zoning actions. Gay v. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 
628,651, P.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1982); Chambers v. Kootenai County Board o/Comm 'rs, 
125 Idaho 115, 118, 868 P.2d 989, 992 (1994). 
8
Toe Comprehensive Plan compatibility issue should have been resjudicata since the appeal period on that issue had 
expired at the time the CUP hearing was held. The Board's decision to re-open the issue was in effect a violation of the 28 day 
appeal period in I. C. § 67-652l(d). 
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The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides as follows: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law ... 
U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, Section 1. Similarly, the Idaho Constitution states: 
No person shall be ... deprived life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
Idaho Constitution, Article 1, § 13. Laws are unconstitutional where men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning: 
It is a general principle of statutory law that a statute must be 
definite to be valid. It has been recognized that a statute is so 
vague as to violate the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution where its language does not convey sufficiently 
definite warnings as to the proscribed conduct when measured 
by common understanding and practices or stated otherwise, 
where its language is such that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning. 
16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 818, p. 988. The "void for vagueness" doctrine 
incorporates the due process notions of fair notice or warning and mandates that lawmakers 
set reasonably fair guidelines for triers of fact in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Smithv. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 39L. Ed. 2nd 605 (1974). The 
"void for vagueness" doctrine applies equally to civil statutes. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 727 
F. 2d 364 (5 th Cir. 1984). A civil or non-criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if 
persons of reasonable intelligence can derive core meaning from it. Cotton States Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Anderson, 749 F.2d 663 (11 th Cir. 1984). When evaluating a constitutional challenge 
to a statute on the basis of void-for-vagueness, the court must consider both the essential 
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fairness of the law and the impracticability of drafting legislation with greater specificity. 
DuPont v. Idaho State Land Board of Commissioners, 134 Idaho 618, 7 P.3d 1095 (S. Ct. 
2000). An ordinance that provides for exceptions to the general rule, but provides no 
standards for granting of those exceptions, thus leaving them to the "unbridled discretion" 
of the city council, is void. Messer/iv. Monarch Memory Gardens, Inc., 88 Idaho 88,397 
P.2d 34 (1964). 
Facial challenges to the constitutionality of a statute must establish that the enactment 
is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186 (1982). Conversely, when the 
challenge to a statute is on an "as applied" basis, the challenger's burden is less daunting. 
Specifically, the court is only required to consider the facts of the specific case giving rise 
to the action and determine if the governmental agency failed to accord due process in the 
processing of the permit or application. Under that analysis, only the process is examined, 
and the statute or ordinance is not stricken down. There is no need under an "as-applied" 
analysis to show the ordinance is invalid in all of its applications. See e.g. United States v. 
National Dairy Products Corporation, 372 U.S. 29, 83 S. Ct. 594, 9 L. Ed. 2nd 561 (1963); 
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974). 
As was noted in Urrutia, supra, use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory 
measure to approve or disapprove of a development application "affords the Board 
unbounded discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows the Board to 
effectively rezone land based on the general language in the Comprehensive Plan." Urrutia 
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v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho at 358, 2 P.3d at 743. Although the Urrutia court did not 
premise its reversal on constitutional grounds, the same "unbounded discretion" gives rise 
to a parallel argument under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. In this case, the Board 
premised its denial upon the assertion that the application did not meet "Criteria 2 or 3" as 
set forth in the Application Form. As noted above, Criteria 3 was nowhere referenced in the 
Driggs Zoning Ordinance, and Criteria 2 referred apparently to section 2(A)(l) of the CUP 
ordinance which references a requirement that "the uses are not in conflict with the 
comprehensive plan nor the zoning ordinance." Importantly, the Board failed to state any 
factual basis for its conclusion that the proposed conditional use was inconsistent with the 
goals or objectives contained within the Comprehensive Plan nor did it identify components 
in the Plan that were not satisfied by Bum's application. 
The Driggs Comprehensive Plan, like most comprehensive plans, is a planning 
document, which states numerous goals, objectives and community values. The following 
illustrate some of those goals and objectives: 
• A city made up of a collection of connected 
neighborhoods that are stable, safe, attractive and 
reflective of the diverse character of its residents. 
• An attractive revitalized downtown, diversified in its 
character to meet and merge opportunities and a business 
and industry leadership that supports the very needs of 
the city. 
• Leadership committed to city improvement and progress 
to the incorporation of smart growth principles. 
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See Appendix "C", at p. 3. Following the statement of the Driggs "Community Vision", the 
Comprehensive Plan then sets forth an extensive recitation of various community values, 
policies, restrictions, conditions and goals is necessary to implement that "vision." See 
Appendix "C", pp. 7 though 97 inclusive. Although these broad, visionary goals and 
objectives might well serve as a "guide" for community leaders in establishing appropriate 
zones within their jurisdiction, such broad, visionary goals and objectives have no place as 
a regulatory standard for granting or denying CUP permits. They are simply too broad, vague 
and general to meet the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine. Specifically, these broad visionary 
goals simply do not afford enough guidance or information, sufficient to enable an applicant 
to structure his or her application in a fashion that meets the terms and conditions of the 
ordinance. Such is the function of a more specific zoning ordinance or subdivision ordinance. 
More importantly, the visionary nature of these goals and objectives allowed the 
Board in this case to be arbitrary and capricious in its decision-making process, because 
there were no definable, objective standards by which to gauge regulatory compliance. By 
resorting to the Comprehensive Plan in this case, the County Commissioners were effectively 
able to reverse their rezoning decision of February of 2007, without reference to any 
particular component of the Comprehensive Plan and without stating its reasoning or the 
factual basis therefore. Such cavalier failure to specify specific standards or reasoning and 
the Board's use of a vague, visionary planning document, effectively denied Petitioner due 
process of law, on a facial basis, and on an "as applied" basis. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the Court should find the Driggs CUP Ordinance 
unconstitutional, both on its face, and as applied in this particular case. 
VIII. 
Petitioner Should Be Awarded its Reasonable Attorneys Fees Pursuant to I.C. 
§ 12-117. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides in pertinent part as follows: 
12-117. Attorneys fees, witness fees and expenses awarded 
in certain instances. - (1) Unless otherwise provided by 
statute, in any administrative or civil judicial proceedings 
involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city ... , the court 
shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the 
party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. 
See Idaho Code § 12-117. (Italics added). Idaho Code § 12-117 is not discretionary, rather 
the court must award attorneys fees if the court finds in favor of the person and that the state 
agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah 
County, 144 Idaho 806, 809, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (S. Ct. 2007); Reardon v. Magic Valley 
Sand and Gravel, 140 Idaho 115, 120, 190 P.3d 340, 345 (2004). Idaho Code§ 12-117 
serves dual purposes: ( 1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency actions; and 
(2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne an unfair and unjustified financial 
burden attempting to correct mistakes that should never have been made. Ralph Naylor 
Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho at 809, 172 P.3d at 1084. See also Fischer v. City 
of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (S. Ct. 2004). Where an agency acts 
30 - PETITIONER'S BRIEF 001~ 
without authority, it is acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Fischer v. City of 
Ketchum, supra; Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, 140 Idaho at 120, 90 P.3d at 345. 
In University of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Board of Com 'rs., 143 Idaho 808, 153 P .3d 
1154 (2007), the Supreme Court awarded attorney fees against the County when there were 
clear statutory procedures which the County had failed to follow in denying an application 
for medical indigency. Specifically, there were no facts indicating a good faith attempt to 
interpret the applicable statutes nor was there any reasonable confusion about the County's 
duties. In the case of Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P .3d 191 (2005), the 
court awarded attorneys fees under section 12-117 because the City had "ignored the plain 
language of the ordinance that a certification ... [was] required before granting a CUP." Id., 
141 Idaho at 356, 109 P.3d at 198. In Naylor Farms, supra, the Court articulated the test as 
follows: 
In considering whether Naylor Farms is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees, we must determine whether the County was faced 
with an ambiguous or unclear statute that would excuse a 
reasonable but erroneous interpretation, in the absence of 
applicable case. 
Naylor Farms, LLCv. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806,810, 172 P.3d 1081, 1085 (S Ct 2007) 
The Court further noted that, "Where an agency has no authority to take a particular action, 
it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 
Idaho at 356, 172 P.3d at 1098, citing Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Commission, 117 
Idaho 949,954, 793 P.2d 181, 186 (1990). 
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The actions of the Board in this case contravene well-established case law and a clear 
and ambiguous statute. The requirement of written findings of fact and a reasoned statement 
explaining the basis for an agency decision has been in place since the Cooper v. Ada County 
Commissioners case was issued in 1980. The requirement to adopt a written decision is also 
clearly set forth in Idaho Code§ 67-6535 and6519(4). Similarly, Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) 
clearly requires conditional use permits be evaluated and based upon standards set forth by 
ordinance, and reliance upon an administrative application form clearly contravenes that 
statute. Likewise, use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory measure has been 
disavowed and deemed inappropriate since the Supreme Court's Urrutia decision in 2000. 
The Board's failure to specify the standards it used in evaluating the permit and the reasons 
for this denial and the actions Bums could take to obtain a permit also clearly violates Idaho 
Code§ 67-6519. The Board's repeated failures to follow the plain language of the Driggs 
Zoning Ordinance and the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act, as well as its failure to follow 
well-established case precedent, are clearly actions that "never should have been taken." 
CONCLUSION 
The Board failed miserably in performing its duty to comply with the Idaho Local 
Land Use Planning Act in this case. Its failure to adopt written findings, failure to state the 
standards upon which it relied, failure to set forth a reasoned statement supporting its 
decision, and failure to provide Bums with guidance on how it might comply with the CUP 
Ordinance, reflects a most cavalier process and attitude towards the Idaho Local Land Use 
Planning Act - one that deprived Petitioner of any fundamental fairness or due process. For 
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the reasons set forth above, the Board's decision should be reversed and remanded for a new 
hearing. 
4' 
DATED this (0 day of July, 2008. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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CONIES NOW, the Respondent, Teton County Board of Commissioners, and submits the 
following memorandum brief in response to Petitioner's Brief in support of its Petition for 
Judicial Review, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This brief is in response to Petitioner's brief in Support of Judicial Review of the decision 
of the Teton County Board of Commissioners ("the Board"). Petitioner applied for and was 
granted a rezoning that would allow it to build a concrete batch plant. On August 31, 2007, Teton 
County and Petitioner entered into a Developer's Agreement that outlined the provisions for 
building the concrete batch plant according to the application presented to the Board. R. p. 75.1 
Specifically, that Petitioner would comply with all building provisions set forth for an M-1 Light 
Industrial zone. In this document, Petitioner agreed to "comply with all federal, state, county 
and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property." R. p. 79. One of 
those local regulations required that "any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter 
erected shall not exceed forty-five ( 45) feet in height unless approved by conditional use 
permit." (Emphasis added) Driggs City Ordinance 281-07, § 13(C). This provision does not 
guarantee the approval of a Conditional Use Permit ("CUP"), but rather the consideration of 
granting the CUP by the authoritative body. Petitioner then applied for a CUP and claimed that 
the tower on the batch plant needed an additional 30', placing the height of the batch plant at 75'. 
This application would have enabled Petitioner to circumvent the 45' height restriction outlined 
in Driggs City Ordinance 281-07. This was the proper course of action for Petitioner to have 
taken, but application for a CUP neither guarantees nor necessitates the approval of the CUP. On 
November 15, 2007, the Board denied Petitioner's application for a conditional use permit for 
the 75' height allowance. The Board denied the granting of the additional 30' of height, not the 
right for Petitioner to build a concrete batch plant on the rezoned land. Petitioner claims that this 
1 Respondent is referencing the same pagination sequence as set forth by Petitioner is in its attached 
agency record. 
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decision by the Board was a reversal of the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission ("Driggs P 
& Z"). However, according to the City of Driggs Area of Impact Ordinance, the boundary 
definitions require the applications to first go through Driggs P & Z. If Driggs P & Z 
recommends the application be approved, it will then be sent to the Board for a final decision. 
The Board retains the right to approve, deny or remand any application. Driggs City Ordinance, 
"Comprehensive Plans and Ordinances", 7-1-3(C). This authority to approve, disapprove or 
remand CUP applications is also granted in Teton County Ordinance 8-6-1-B. The Board is not 
obligated to approve any and every application that the city recommends for approval. 
Petitioner also contends in its Statement of the Case that the Board's decision was in 
violation of the staff report prepared by Teton County. The purpose of the Staff Report is to 
recommend certain actions to the Board, but it is not the definitive authority on the acceptance or 
denial of the application. The findings in the staff report were provided to the Board for their 
consideration of the application. R. p. 98. Thus, when the Board made its decision on the CUP 
application, it took the recommendations of the City and the Staff report, as well as the impact 
zone agreement, county ordinances, and the county Comprehensive Plan into consideration. The 
staff report, like the county comprehensive plan, does not bind the Board into a specific course of 
action. 
Ultimately, the Board acted within its jurisdiction as the final issuing authority when it 
denied Petitioner's CUP application. By taking other legislative provisions into account in the 
decision-making process, the Board acted responsibly and in accordance with both Driggs and 
Teton County ordinances. Considering the facts of this case and the issues under review, the 
Board's decision to deny the CUP application should be upheld. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the Board's verbal and recorded statements setting forth in the meeting 
minutes as the basis for its denial of the conditional use permit an acceptable factual basis and 
reasoned statement under I.C. § 67-6535? 
2. Was the Board's reference and use of Criteria #2 and #3 as the reasoning and 
basis for denying the CUP acceptable under I.C. § 67-6514? 
3. Did the Board correctly take the Driggs Comprehensive Plan under advisement 
when making its decision about whether or not to issue the CUP to Petitioner? 
4. Was the Board correct in using the CUP Application in its decision to deny the 
CUP, where the application form has been based upon Driggs' zoning ordinance? 
5. Was the Board correct when it upheld ordinances with a 45' height restriction? 
Was the Board within its jurisdiction to allow, deny, remand, or allow with conditions when it 
denied Petitioner's CUP application for an additional 30' height allowance? 
6. Was the Board within its authority to approve, deny, remand, or approve with 
conditions when it denied Petitioner's CUP application? 
7. Was the consideration of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and other criteria as set 
forth in the CUP application and Driggs City Ordinances by the Board in its decision appropriate 
under due process regulations guaranteed by the Idaho and United States Constitution? 
8. Did the Board take impacting factors, such as compatibility with the 
comprehensive plan, into consideration in determining whether to approve or deny Petitioner's 
CUP application? 
9. Is Petitioner eligible to receive attorney's fees? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner first applied for a zone change to build a concrete batch plant at 185 N. 
Highway 33 in the Driggs impact zone. When this zone change was authorized in February 
2007, Petitioner was granted a special rezoning of a C-3 Commercial zone to an M-1 Light 
Industrial Z(?ne, on the condition that the zoning would revert to C-3 commercial if Petitioner did 
not build the proposed concrete batch plant granted in the application. Thus it was approved by 
the Board according to the application and the provisions outlined in the Driggs city ordinances 
for M-1 Light Industrial zones. One of the restrictions on buildings within an M-1 Light 
Industrial is that buildings are not to exceed 45' in height. 
On August 31, 2007, Teton County and Petitioner entered into a Developer's Agreement 
that outlined the provisions for building the concrete batch plant according to the application 
presented to the Board. R p. 75. Specifically, that Petitioner would comply with all building 
provisions set forth for an M-1 Light Industrial zone. In this document, Petitioner agreed to 
"comply with all federal, state, county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to 
the subject property." R p. 79. One local regulation required is that "any building or structure 
or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height unless approved 
by conditional use permit." Driggs City Ordinance 281-07, § 13 (C). 
After the rezoning, Petitioner applied for a Conditional Use Permit. This CUP would 
have allowed Petitioner to build its concrete batch plant up to a height of 7 5'. As per the Area of 
Impact agreement, the application was presented first to the Driggs P & Z on July 11, 2007. 
Driggs P & Z found the additional 30' to be acceptable, and thus recommended the application to 
the Teton County Board of Commissioners for final approval. R. p. 4. Petitioner's application, 
ciated October 4, 2007 did not express a hardship on Petitioner if the CUP was denied, but only 
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that the height allowance would allow Petitioner to store more equipment and use different 
methods to mix the concrete. R. p. 47-49. In the October 11, 2007 hearing before the Board, 
Mr. Bums stated that the "plant will have a 7,000 sq.ft. footprint with a 45' tower." R.p.71. 
There was no mention of the 30' height allowance during the rezone portion of the hearing. On 
November 15, 2007, the Board held a public hearing for Petitioner's CUP application. R. p. 116. 
At this time, the Board decided to deny the CUP application for a failure to conform under 
Criteria #2 and #3 of the Commission Evaluation standards. R.p. 119. The reason for the denial 
were discussed by the Board and transcribed into the official minutes, which were then made 
available. After the denial of the CUP, Petitioner filed for Judicial Review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Teton County Board of Commissioners met the requirement for written findings of 
fact or a written statement explaining the criteria and standards used to evaluate the 
application, as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, by the use of recorded and published 
meeting and hearing minutes. 
The findings of fact and conclusions adopted by the Board complied with the county 
ordinance and provisions of LC. § 67-6535 because all relevant material provided by the board 
was included and referenced during the decision-making process. By the recording and 
publishing of the minutes from the hearing, Petitioner was provided with a written, reasoned 
statement for the denial of its CUP application. Approval or denial of a land use application 
must explain the relevant criteria and standards, relevant contested facts, and the rationale behind 
the decision. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 80, 73 P.3d 84, 93 (2003). These 
conclusions must also be based upon applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan and 
relevant ordinances. Id. Standards and criteria used in the evaluation of the application must be 
set forth in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances, or other appropriate ordinance or 
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regulation of the city or county. LC. § 67-6535(a). One decision provided that due process 
requirements need written record and conclusions to be viable. Gay v. County Comm 'rs of 
Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626,628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 1982). Recently, the court 
has held that the informal, quasi-judicial nature of these hearings make verbatim reporting 
difficult, and where there has been notice for the hearings, the hearings are tape recorded and the 
exhibits preserved, there has been no violation of due process. Rural Kootenai Organization Inc. 
v. Board of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 844, 993 P.2d 596, 607 (1999). Rural Kootenai 
distinguished the burden of a county board from providing a formal written statement to 
providing records of the proceedings. Id 
In this case, the 45' height restriction is explicitly included in Driggs' City Ordinance 
281-07. Under the Idaho Code, city ordinances are to be followed by the Board in planning and 
zoning questions. After considering relevant standards and criteria, the Board is required by LC. 
§ 67-6535 to provide a reasoned statement that explains what was used in reaching its 
conclusion. Additionally, Teton County Ordinance 8-6-1-B-l 1, in decisions on conditional use 
permits, provides that "a record of hearings, findings made and actions taken shall be made." 
Furthermore, Teton County Ordinance 9-3-4-D, which deals with land use applications, provides 
that "[w]ritten findings are not necessary where the public documents or records of the public 
meeting already provide a written record." In the case at hand, there were public hearings and 
meetings whereby the verbatim record could be listened to on tape, and where the written 
minutes accurately reflect the rationale used in denying the application. This requirement was 
met by the Board in the following recorded and transcribed statement: 
Motion to deny the CUP based on a lack of conformance to Driggs' standards for 
condition evaluation of CUP criteria 2 and 3, and that M-1 zone change was granted 
based on a specific proposal that had no mention of a 75' high building and, in fact, 
clearly indicated a 45' height. ---November 15, Page 32, Lines 1-19---
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This statement meets the requirement of County Ordinance 9-3-4-D as a clear, valid 
reason as to why it was denying Petitioner's CUP application. While Title 9 is in reference to 
subdivision regulations, Petitioner fails to state a compelling reason as to why the official record 
should be good enough for hopeful subdivision developers but not for Conditional Use Permit 
applicants. Furthermore, there is no explicit language in the Teton County Code requiring 
written findings. The only requirement placed on the Board is that a record of hearings, findings 
made and actions taken shall be made. 8-6-1-B-ll. Under I.C. §67-6535(c), the intent of the 
legislature that decisions made should be founded upon sound reason and practical application of 
recognized principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts are directed to consider the 
proceedings as a whole and evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light 
of practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of 
reasoned decision-making. Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm 
or violation of fundamental rights shall be entitled to a reversal of a decision. I.C. § 67-6535. 
(Emphasis added). Petitioner has failed to prove that the denial of the CUP has caused actual 
harm or caused a violation of its fundamental rights. 
Because the Board applied proper City ordinances in rev1ewmg and denying the 
Petitioner's application, provided a written reasoning that explained what criteria was applied 
and was considered relevant, and Petitioner has failed to show any actual harm or fundamental 
right violation stemming directly from the denial of its application, the Board has fully complied 
with the requirements set forth in LC. § 67-6535. Thus the decision of the Board should be 
upheld. 
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II. 
The Board's reference and use of Criteria #2 and #3 as the reasoning and basis for 
denying the CUP was proper under Idaho Code§ 67-6519. 
Driggs' Standards for Commission Evaluation of a CUP criteria #2 states that a building 
"will be harmonious with and in accordance with the general objective or with any specific 
objective of the Comprehensive Plan and/or the Zoning Ordinance. Criteria #3 states that a 
building "will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to be harmonious and 
appropriate in appearance with the existing or intended character of the general vicinity and that 
such use will not change the essential character of the same area". These two criteria have their 
foundations in the Driggs' city ordinances. By utilizing the evaluation criteria, the Board was 
within acceptable authority when it made its decision to deny Petitioner's CUP application. 
By applying Driggs' city ordinance 281-07 and the goals enumerated in the Teton County 
comprehensive plan, the Board used proper legal standards when it considered Petitioner's 
application for a CUP. The allowance of a conditional use permit is discretionary with the 
Commission and may be granted only in the best interest of the general public. The Commission 
may approve, conditionally approve, or deny a special use permit. Davisco Foods Intern, Inc. v. 
Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 788 118 P.3d 116, 120 (2005). 
What is significant about Petitioner's CUP application is that it was not looking to 
modify the zoning of the site, but rather to modify the allowable height of the building on the 
site. Under Teton County Zoning Regulations, a modification of the requirements of this title as 
to height of buildings is defined as a variance. Teton County Ordinance 8-6-3-A. A variance 
shall not be considered a right of special privilege, but may only be granted to an application 
only upon showing of undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that the variance 
is not in conflict with the public interest. Teton County Ordinance 8-6-3-B. Without a 
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demonstration of hardship and physical constraint by the applying party, a variance may not be 
granted. By contrast, a CUP requires only that Petitioner show conformance with existing 
comprehensive plans, city ordinances, and other relevant authority. Teton County Ordinance 8-6-
1-B-7. The granting of a conditional use permit or exception permits a use contemplated by the 
zoning ordinance; a variance permits a use not contemplated by the ordinance except where 
necessary to avoid hardship. Archdiocese of Portland v. Washington County, 254 Or. 77, 83-84, 
458 P.2d 682, 685 (Or. 1969), citing Gaylord, Zoning: Variances, Exceptions, and Conditional 
Use Permits in California, 5 UCLA L.Review 179 at 194 (1958). Petitioner failed to 
demonstrate how the 30 additional feet conforms to existing regulations and ordinances. 
Petitioner also failed to establish that the 45' height restriction is an imposition of undue 
hardship. They are still allowed to build the concrete batch plant according to their site's M-1 
zoning guidelines. Petitioner contended in the hearings that without the 75' height grant, the 
batch plant would be required to run longer hours of operation. The Board's decision should be 
upheld because Petitioner failed to demonstrate conformance to existing legal precedent, and the 
Board considered proper legal precedent in considering Petitioner's application for a Conditional 
Use Permit. 
m. 
The Board was correct in taking the Comprehensive Plan under advisement in its 
decision, and did not utilize it as the sole basis for denying the CUP application. 
The Board is required to base application decisions on all applicable provision in the 
comprehensive plan, as well as city and county regulations and ordinances. Standards and 
criteria used in the evaluation of the application must be set forth in the comprehensive plan, 
zoning ordinances, or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county. LC. § 67-
6535(a). Under this section of the Idaho Code, city ordinances are to be followed by the Board in 
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planning and zoning questions. Driggs zoning ordinances are statutorily required to comply with 
the Comprehensive plan under LLUP A. This statute does not require that zoning decisions to 
strictly conform to land use designations, however, the comprehensive plan may not be ignored 
by either the Planning and Zoning Commission or the Board of Commissioners. It must be said 
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary 
and umeasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general 
welfare. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526,528, 37 S. Ct. 190, 191 (1917), Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31, 25 S. Ct. 358, 363, (1905). These provisions are 
applicable to land use and zoning actions. Gay v'. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103 
Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (1982). In this case, the 45' height restriction is explicitly 
included in Driggs' City Ordinance 281-07. 
The Board of County Commissioners was not the first body to consider the 75' height 
difference as a threat to scenic aesthetic views as a weighing mechanism. Driggs' Planning and 
Zoning took scenic views of the Teton Range into account when making their determination on 
the CUP as well, and asked whether or not the proposed 75' tall building compatible with 
surrounding properties and uses, including scenic views from Highway 33. The Driggs P & Z 
Commission concluded that an allowance of 75' would not cause a significant impact over a 45' 
building. This conclusion, however, was not the final decision, but rather a recommendation to 
the County of what P & Z concluded would be a statutorily compliant final decision. 
Considering the deference given to the City ordinances as required by State Law, as well as the 
recognition of the importance of the Scenic overlay, the Board did not err by taking the aesthetic 
values present in the Comprehensive Plan into account in its denial of the Conditional Use 
Permit requested by Petitioner. 
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Petitioner relies heavily on Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (S. Ct. 
2000) for its contention that the Board elevated the Comprehensive Plan to legally controlling 
law. However, Urrutia is distinguishable from the instant case because it involved the approval 
of a subdivision plat, not a re-zoning use. The land to be developed in Urrutia was zoned 
agricultural, and the main contention in the comprehensive plan was that the PUD was not 
similar to the 20-acre lots with single-family homes provided for in the zoning ordinances. In 
the instant case, the land had been rezoned specifically for the concrete batch plant. The rezoned 
plat was deemed compatible with the construction of the batch plant requested by Petitioner. 
The "exception" desired by Petitioner was not part of the zone change conditions, were not 
presented during the rezoning hearing, and were not given to the Board for consideration. The 
language in Urrutia cited by Petitioner is not applicable in this case, wherein a rezone was 
granted for the batch plant. Granting the rezone is not an invitation to petitioner to build 
whatever he wants, but rather to build what was requested in the application. Further, the holding 
in Urrutia was that the Board could not use a comprehensive plan as the sole basis for denying 
an application. (Emphasis added). The function of the comprehensive plan is to serve as a guide 
and advise the government agencies in charge of zoning decisions. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 
134 Idaho 353, 357-358, 2 P.3d 738, 742-743 (S. Ct. 2000). In Petitioner's case, the 
comprehensive plan was merely considered as a factor in the denial of the application. The 
reasons cited in the denial by the Board were CUP Criteria #2 and 3, not failure to comply with 
the county comprehensive plan. The Board gave consideration, not deference, to the 
Comprehensive Plan. 
In matters outside of city limits but within the impact zone, Driggs P & Z has 
recommending power with their decisions. The County Board is the entity that has the final say 
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on what does and does not fulfill the area of impact agreement. This role as final decision-maker 
is indicative of the dynamic between the city and county zoning decisions. When the permit in 
question is within the area of impact, the county will have the final say on the conditional use 
permit, and are not obligated to follow the decision by the city commission in their official 
decision. The city's power is restricted to a recommending body, and not as a final authority. 
The Board's role is to ensure that the application is in conformity with the goals as outlined in 
the comprehensive plan. It did not err by using the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and its 
goals as criteria to evaluate whether or not a CUP should be issued. They are required to take it 
into account as a matter of statutory regulation. For an ordinance to be declared unconstitutional, 
the provision must be clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, have no substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 
528, 37 S. Ct. 190, 191 (1917). Village of Euclid, Ohio, et al. v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365, 395 (1926). Both the city ordinance and the comprehensive plan are in accordance with 
general laws, and thus are above the standard for arbitrary and capricious. By adhering to these 
plans, the Board properly used ordinances and is in compliance with the Idaho Code and other 
statutory provisions. 
IV. 
The Board specified the criteria used to evaluate the CUP application, and provided 
the reasons for the denial, all of which were based upon existing Driggs' zoning ordinances. 
As previously set forth, the Board relied on the criteria used in the City of Driggs 
Ordinance in denying the CUP application. Specifically, Criteria #2 and #3 as referenced in the 
CUP application merely restate Driggs City Ordinance 281-07 criteria that the use must not be in 
"conflict with the comprehensive plan" and that "if the proposed conditional use cannot 
adequately meet the conditions necessary to ensure protection and compatibility with the 
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surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood, the planning commission will not approve the 
proposed use." The record clearly reflects that the Board concluded that the proposed use would 
not be harmonious with the surrounding uses, and aesthetics. It should be noted that petitioner 
conceded in its opening statement at the November 15 hearing that the purpose for the CUP was 
for permission to exceed the 45' height restriction and to ensure that the proposed facility would 
be harmonious with the surrounding uses. Nov. 15 Transcript pp. 5-8. The Board ruled on 
precisely that issue, and based it upon criteria contained within the ordinance, as further 
articulated in the CUP application form. The request for the zone change was based on the 
premise that the building would be in the 45 foot range, and approval was granted based upon 
findings that such a use would be compatible with neighboring uses. To switch the concept, 
especially in the context of a zone change request, only necessitates that the Board closely 
observe the effect such would have on other uses within the zone. The Board decision is clearly 
ordinance-based, and it does specify the standards used in the evaluation process. 
V. 
The Board was within its jurisdiction to approve, deny, remand, or approve with 
conditions when it correctly upheld the 45' height restriction present in the city ordinances 
and denied Petitioner's CUP application. 
The Board has jurisdiction to approve, approve with conditions, deny, or remand 
decisions by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. There is a presumption that a local 
zoning board's action is valid when interpreting and applying it's own zoning ordinances. Evans 
v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003). Regardless of this presumption in 
favor of the P & Z, the Board has the authority to be the final issuer of the permit. Davisco 
Foods Intern, Inc v. Gooding County, 141 ldaho 784, 788; 118 P.3d 116, 120 (2005). 
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InArchdiocese of Portlandv. Washington County, 254 Or. 77, 82,458 P.2d 682, 684-685 
(Or. 1969), the court held that a council, upon an application for a special use permit, acts as an 
administrative agency and that it's action is presumed to be regular. More specifically, its action 
will be presumed valid, reasonable, correct, taken in knowledge of material facts justified by the 
facts, made upon full hearing or after giving all interested parties a reasonable opportunity to be 
heard and upon appropriate evidence duly considered and properly applied. Milwaukie Co of 
Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 292, 330 P.2d 5, 11 (Or. 1958). By reason of the 
presumption of validity that attends legislative and official action, one who alleges unreasonable 
discrimination must carry the burden of showing it. Milwaukie Co of Jehovah's Witnesses v. 
Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 292, 330 P.2d 5, 11 (Or. 1958), citing Concordia Fire Ins. Co v. People of 
State of Illinois, 292 US 535, 547, 54 S. Ct. 830, 835 (1934). 
Zone changes are commonly made simply because the change is requested and no one in 
the neighborhood has an objection to it. Archdiocese of Portland v. Washington County, 254 Or. 
77, 83-84, 458 P.2d 682, 685 (Or. 1969). The same considerations do not obtain, however when 
the governing board passes upon an application for a conditional use. Id. The original ordinance 
itself expressly provides for the specified conditional uses that might be made in the zone. Id In 
this sense, the granting of an application for a conditional use does not constitute a deviation 
from the ordinance but is in compliance with it. Id. Further, it may be observed that generally 
the conditional uses specified as permissible in a specific zone are uses that are compatible with 
the purposes of the zone. Exceptions fulfill the practical recognition that certain uses of property 
are compatible with the essential design of a particular zone although the use is contrary to the 
restrictions imposed on them. Id. 
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VI. 
Was the Board within its authority to allow, deny, remand, or allow with conditions 
when it denied Petitioner's CUP application? 
The Board followed Driggs ordinance by denying the CUP application. Conditional Use 
Permits are addressed in City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance 281-07, Chapter 4, Section 2 (A)(l): 
"The Planning Commission may, following the notice and hearing procedures provided under 
Section 67-6509, Idaho Code, permit conditional uses where the uses are not in conflict with the 
comprehensive plan nor the zoning ordinance. If the proposed conditional use cannot adequately 
meet the conditions necessary to ensure protection and compatibility with the surrounding 
properties, uses and neighborhood, the planning commission will not approve the proposed use." 
281-07, Chapter 4, §2 (A)(2) lists the types of conditions that may be attached to a conditional 
CUP approval. Petitioner contends that the Board was required by law to impose a condition on 
the approved CUP in lieu of its denial. Petitioner also claims that the Board acted without 
authority and thus without reasonable basis in fact or law, and cites Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah 
County, 172 P.3d 1081, 1084 (2007) for authority. What Petitioner neglects to recognize is that 
the Board's authority allows it to approve, deny, remand, or allow with conditions under the 
authority of Teton County Code 8-6-1-B. It is not required to approve all applications and then 
limit that approval with conditions; that is merely one of the options available to the Board in 
rendering a decision about a conditional use permit. Teton County Ordinance 8-6-1-B-9. 
Furthermore, under the rules of statutory construction, the presence of the word "May", as 
opposed to "Must", in the ordinance, means that the Board is not required by law to approve 
conditional use permits. Had the ordinance read "The Planning Commission "must", ... permit 
conditional uses where the uses are not in conflict with the comprehensive plan", then 
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Petitioner's contention that the Board was required to facilitate the approval of the CUP would 
have merit. Under the current ordinance, however, it does not. 
Just as the Board's denial of the CUP did not violate Driggs' Ordinance 281-07, the 
Board's denial of Petitioner's CUP application did not violate LC. §67-652l(d). 
The power to approve an application within an impact zone resides exclusively with the 
county. Blaha v. Board of Ada County Commissioners, 134 Idaho 770, 778; 9 P.3d 1236, 1244 
(Idaho 2000). In Blaha, the district court held that the sole purpose of the city regarding 
subdivisions located outside the city limits is to make a recommendation to the county with 
respect to whether the application is in conformance with relevant city codes. Id. Finding the 
City's role to be merely advisory and not governed by the Local Land Use Planning Act 
(LLUP A), the district court concluded that the City acted within its discretion in recommending 
approval of the final subdivided plat to the County. Blaha v. Board of Ada County 
Commissioners, 134 Idaho 770, 776; 9 p.3d 1236, 1241 (Idaho 2000). Even though Blaha can be 
distinguished from the instant case because it regards subdivision approval, the court's holding is 
analogous to establish authority in an impact zone. The language establishes a hierarchy 
between the city to recommend and the county authority to approve building projects that lie 
within impact zones. 
In Davisco Foods v. Gooding County, the Court held that in the absence of an explicit 
statement outlining the standard of review to be used by the Board in reviewing P & Z decisions, 
the Board could interpret the ordinance in a reasonable manner considering the review process. 
The Gooding County Board interpreted its ordinance as allowing it to engage in a de novo 
review of an appeal from the P & Z decision. The court decided that this interpretation was 
reasonable, as the ordinance permitted the Board to "uphold, uphold with conditions, or overrule 
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the Commission." The court went on to state that if a Board upholds a P & z decision with 
additional conditions imposed on the permit, the Board is in fact granting a different special use 
permit than was approved by P & Z. The board's decision is not remanded to the P & Z for 
approval on the conditions. The Board is the final issuer of the permit. The Board's de novo 
review of the appeal from the P & Z's decision was proper. Davisco Foods Intern, Inc v. 
Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 788, 118 P.3d 116, 120 (2005). The Gooding County case is 
analogous to this issue because Teton County also lacks specific language establishing a standard 
of review for the Board of County Commissioners. For the Teton County Board to interpret it's 
own ordinances, the interpretation is required to be reasonable. Similarly, decisions made under 
a reasonable interpretation of a standard of review should be upheld. 
VII. 
The Board's consideration of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and other criteria set 
forth in the CUP application, as well as the Driggs City Ordinances and Regulations, was 
appropriate under due process regulations guaranteed by the Idaho and United States 
Constitution. 
The Board did not err by taking the Teton County Comprehensive Plan into account 
when determining whether or not to issue the subject Conditional Use Permit. A Comprehensive 
Plan is not a legally controlling zoning law, but serves as a guide to local government agencies 
charged with making zoning decisions. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76; 73 P.3d 84, 89 
(Idaho 2003). Under Driggs City Ordinance 8-3-6(c)(l)-(2), the approval or denial of the 
application shall be based upon standards and criteria set forth in the comprehensive plan. The 
comprehensive plan is considered for compliance and conformance with the goals, policies, and 
objectives of the county. The final decisions should be based on these goals, as well as evidence 
gathered through the public hearing process. Any application provided for in LLUP A shall be 
based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the comprehensive plan, zoning 
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ordinance, or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county. I.C. § 67-6535. 
Furthermore, Teton County ordinance 8-3-3 requires that the comprehensive plan should be 
treated as a guide and adhered to, except when deviation can be justified for reasons of public 
safety, health, and welfare reasons. After considering the Comprehensive Plan, the planning and 
zoning commission may recommend, and the Board of County Commissioners may accept or 
deny, an amendment to the zoning ordinance. I.C. § 67-651 l(b), Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 
Idaho 844, 849, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1984), Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 
84, 89 (Idaho 2003). 
The Teton County Board of Commissioners followed established guidelines by taking the 
Comprehensive Plan into account in making their decision. Since Planning and Zoning is 
responsible for implementing and reviewing the Comprehensive Plan (I.C. § 67-6508), and the 
county is also held to the same standard when dealing with similar decisions, the Board was 
justified in taking the Teton County Comprehensive Plan into account when it chose to reject the 
75' Conditional Use Permit. 
vm. 
Did the Board take impacting factors, such as compatibility with the comprehensive 
plan, into consideration in determining whether to approve or deny Petitioner's CUP 
application? 
The Board used the appropriate Comprehensive Plan while rev1ewmg Petitioner's 
application for a CUP by referencing the Teton County Comprehensive Plan. Under Driggs' 
Ordinance 8-2-1, the Board of County Commissioners, in total or in part, adopts a 
Comprehensive Plan that includes all the land within the Board's jurisdiction. The plan itself is 
to be based on the components outlined in LLUP A. If a particular ordinance is not used, its 
omission must be justified by use of the Comprehensive Plan. Driggs Ordinance 8-2-1. 
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IX. 
Petitioner is not eligible to receive attorneys fees under LC. § 12-117 because the Board 
was acting within the scope of its authority when it denied Petitioner's CUP application. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 states that a court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. I.C. § 12-117(1). 
Petitioner requests attorneys fees under the argument that the Board was acting outside of the 
scope of its authority when it denied Petitioner's CUP application, and thus had no reasonable 
basis in fact or law. The two requirements that must be met to qualify for attorneys fees are: 
first, that the court found in favor of the party requesting attorneys fees, and second that the state 
agency acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Mooseman v. Idaho Horse Racing 
Commission, 117 Idaho 949, 954, 793 P.2d 181, 186 (1990). Petitioner's argument is based on 
Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, a case that lacks a comparative factual basis with which to 
compare to the instant case. The facts in Naylor are defined by an ambiguous ordinance and a 
county Board of Commissioners who knew that they were testing a legal area with little 
controlling law. Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 172 P.3d 1081, 1086 (2007). All CUP 
applications that are recommended by the Driggs P & Z are not required to be approved by the 
Board, and can be legally denied. If all CUP applications were guaranteed, then the only 
authority that would have been granted to the Board in statutory language would be the ability to 
impose conditions at the hearings. Petitioner's CUP was denied under the authority of the Teton 
County Board of Commissioners through the use of a plain ordinance. Petitioner's argument that 
the Board had no authority to deny the CUP application, and thus denied it without reasonable 
basis in fact or law, is not accurate, and its request for attorneys fees should be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner claims that the Board failed to adopt written findings, failed to state the 
standards upon which the denial was based, failed to provide a reasoned statement in support of 
its decision, and failed to tell Petitioner how it could acquire the CUP after the denial. All four 
of these contentions are a misrepresentation of the facts and events surrounding the Conditional 
Use Permit application process. The written findings were provided to Petitioner in the meeting 
minutes. The standards that Petitioner was required to meet in order to obtain a CUP were 
present on the application, and specifically referenced in the Board's decision to deny the 
application. These Criteria #2 and #3 were based upon local ordinances with which Petitioner 
needed to meet in order to gain approval from the Board. The reasoned statement was carefully 
worded by the Board in the motion to deny the application, as transcribed in the hearing minutes 
and made available to the public to read. Finally, the Board is not required by law to help 
Petitioner get approval, because conditional use permits are not guaranteed just because a CUP 
application is submitted to the Board. The ordinance clearly states, and Petitioner's introductory 
remarks on record affirm, that the CUP application was to "exceed the 45' height limit". The 
additional 30' requested by Petitioner are not guaranteed, and the Board was acting within its 
authority when it decided to deny the application. For the reasons established above, the Board's 
decision to deny Petitioner's Application for a Conditional Use Permit should be upheld. 
st£ 
Dated this ___ day of August, 2008. / d_ 
11/r /;1/1 
Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney 
21 - RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this!'.:}_ day of August, 2008, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, by causing a copy thereof to be hand-delivered or by 
causing to be placed a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Dale Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
22 RESPONDENT'S BRJEF 
[ X ] Mail [ ] Hand [ ] Fax 
Barton J. Birch, Attorney at Law 
Dale W. Scorer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
' 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BlJRNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
CO:tvffiS NOW, the Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, and submits the following 
Memorandum Brief in response to Respondent's Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Merely Keeping a Transcribeable Record and Minutes of the Proceedings Before 
the Board Does Not Satisfy Idaho Code§ 67-6535. 
Respondent asserts that by keeping a transcribeable record and "recording and 
publishing the minutes from the meeting," it satisfied the requirements of LC. § 67-6535. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 6. In making that assertion, Respondents fails to understand the 
difference between the mere ministerial act of keeping a record of the proceedings, either 
through a tape recording or keeping minutes of the proceedings, and the deliberative process 
associated with identifying and weighing relevant factual considerations and articulating a 
rationale for the agency's ultimate decision. More importantly, in the absence of findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, meaningful judicial review is impossible. In Workman 
Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 P.2d 926 (S. Ct. 1982), the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained the function and need for adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
If there is to be any meaningful judicial scrutiny of the activities 
of an administrative agency- not for the purpose of substituting 
judicial judgment for administrative judgment but for the 
purpose of requiring the administrative agency to demonstrate 
that it has applied the criteria prescribed by the statute and by its 
own regulations and has not acted arbitrarily on an ad hoc basis 
- we must require that its order clearly and precisely state what 
it found to be the facts and fully explain why those facts lead it 
to the conclusion it makes. Brevity is not always a virtue. 
We wish to make clear that by insisting on adequate 
findings of fact we are not simply imposing legalistic notations 
of proper form, or setting an empty exercise for local 
2 - PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF 
governments to follow. No particular form is required and no 
magic words need be employed. What is needed for adequate 
judicial review is a clear statement of what, specifically, the 
decision making body believes, after hearing and considering all 
the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon which 
its decision is based. Conclusions are not sufficient. 
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho at 37,655 P.2d at 931. (Italics 
in original). See also Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 80, 73 P.3d 84, 93 (2003). Idaho 
Code § 67-6535 requires that approvals or denials "shall be in writing and accompanied by 
a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and standards considered relevant, states the 
relevant contested facts relied upon and explains the rationale for the decision based on the 
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and statutory provisions, 
pertinent constitutional principles and factual information contained in the record." 
(Emphasis added). 
Starkly missing from the agency record and the clerk's minutes here is any clear 
explanation of what facts the Board considered to be significant, any form of reasoned 
analysis explaining its decision and citation to the particular section or sections of the 
ordinance, comprehensive plan or statutory provisions deemed applicable. The agency 
record contains only the bald, unsupported assertion that Bums' CUP application "did not 
comport with the Comprehensive Plan," without any explanation whatsoever of the factual 
basis upon which that conclusion was reached and without any citation to which section in 
the ninety-eight (98) page Comprehensive Plan was not satisfied by Bums' CUP application. 
The Court and the Petitioner herein, are left completely in the dark as to the County 
Commissioners' reasoning and the standards used to evaluate the CUP application. 
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Meaningful judicial review in this case is entirely impossible because the Board did not 
provide any clue as to what it deemed to be the relevant facts and what particular facet of 
Bums' CUP application was deemed inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Merely 
turning on the tape recorder does not satisfy the clear mandate of these two statutes. 
Respondent further attempts justify its failure to issue written findings of fact by citing 
to Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 993 P.2d 596 
(1999). However, Rural Kootenai actually supports Petitioner's contention that the Board 
here failed to fulfil its statutory duties. In Rural Kootenai, the board of county 
commissioners held a public hearing and then afterward issued a written "Order ofDecision" 
which included specific findings and conclusions. Id. at 835, 993 P.2d at 598. More 
importantly, in Rural Kootenai, the Supreme Court found only that the transcript of the 
hearing was adequate, despite the existence of numerous inaudible omissions. 133 Idaho at 
844, 993 P.2d at 607. The Court did not hold that the transcript alone was sufficient to 
comply with LC. § 67-6535. In this case, unlike the Rural Kootenai case, the Board issued 
no "reasoned" statement or findings of fact at all. In fact, the Supreme Court in Rural 
Kootenai actually rejected as non-compliant with LC.§ 67-6535 certain of the county board's 
enumerated findings. Id. The Court only upheld those findings where "the Board clearly set 
forth the ultimate facts relevant to its decision, and the facts are supported by the record." Id. 
Thus, like the factually deficient findings in Rural Kootenai, the Board's brief, conclusionary 
discussion on the record here does not comply with the requirements ofl.C. § 67-6535. 
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Incredibly, Respondent asserts that despite the Board's failure to comply with the 
provisions ofl.C. § 67-6535(a) and (b), Petitioner cannot claim relief under this section for 
failure to state "actual harm" as required by LC.§ 67-6535(c). Respondent's Brief, p. 8. If 
being deprived of its right to meaningful judicial review and of its statutory right to an 
explanation of the basis of the Board's decision, thereby being subjected to arbitrary, ad hoc 
decision-making, do not constitute "actual harm", then it would be impossible to think of 
anything that would. Being deprived of the .right to use its property as expressly allowed by 
the Driggs CUP ordinance, is most certainly no trivial matter. 
In sum, the Teton County Board of Commissioners did not provide a reasoned 
statement explaining the specific legal standards it was applying, the facts it considered 
relevant to its determination and the rationale it used to reach its decision. Like the City of 
Twin Falls in the Workman case, the Board acted "arbitrarily and on an ad hoc basis." 
Because the Board did not comply with the statutory requirements of§ 67-6535, the Board's 
decision should be reversed and the matter should be remanded with an order directing the 
Board to make a reasoned statement of facts and to set forth a reasoned analysis supporting 
its conclusions. 
II. 
A Broad, Conclusory Reference to the Comprehensive Plan Does Not Satisfy the 
Mandate of Idaho Code § 67-6519. 
Idaho Code § 67-6519 requires that whenever a governing board grants or denies a 
permit it must specify the ordinance and standards it used in evaluating the application, the 
reasons for approval or denial and the actions which the applicant could take to obtain a 
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permit. Respondent apparently contends that by merely referring to the Comprehensive Plan 
as a whole, without citing to any particular provision thereof, it satisfied its burden. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. Respondents further asserts that its citation to the application form, 
rather than the ordinance, also satisfied that duty. Id. Finally, Respondent fails to explain 
in any respect its failure to set forth the actions that Bums could take to obtain a permit. 
The motion adopted by the Board was as follows: 
Commissioner Stevenson: Yeah. Sure. One more time. 
The Clerk: Chairman Young motioned to deny the CUP due to a lack of conformance 
to Driggs' standards for condition evaluation of a CUP criteria No. 2 and No. 3, and 
the fact that the M-1 zone change was granted based on a specific proposal that had 
no mention of a 75-foot high building, and, in fact, clearly indicated a 45-foot 
maximum height. 
* * * * 
Mr. Birch: Is that your motion, Larry? 
Mr. Chairman: Yes. That motion has been seconded. And I called for those in favor. 
Commissioner Stevenson: Aye. 
Mr. Chairman: Aye. Opposed? 
Commissioner Trupp: Aye. 
Mr. Chairman: Motion carries. The conditional use permit is denied ... " 
CUP Tr., Vol III, p. 31, L. 21 through p. 33, L. 4. Aside from the Board's failure to adopt 
written findings of fact as required by § 67-6519, the Board's motion is devoid of any 
guidance as to what provision in the Comprehensive Plan was deemed inconsistent with 
Bums' application, what facts upon which the Board based its conclusion and what reasoning 
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the Board applied in reaching its conclusion. In effect, Respondent is telling the Court and 
Petitioner to "Go read the Comprehensive Plan and try to figure out what we did." Clearly 
such cavalier attitude does not satisfy in any meaningful way the Board's duty under Idaho 
Code§§ 67-6519 and 67-6535. 
Finally, Respondent completely fails to answer or otherwise address Petitioner's 
contention that the Board misconstrued its earlier decision in the M-1 zone change. As noted 
in Petitioner's earlier brief, the Board's denial of the CUP was in error because it was 
premised upon Commissioner Young's erroneous recollection that the M-1 zone change was 
specifically limited to a forty-five ( 45) foot maximum height requirement. Petitioner's Brief, 
pp. 20 through 23. Contrary to Commissioner Young's recollection, the Board's motion in 
the earlier rezone proceeding was made conditional only upon the adoption of a mutually 
agreeable Development Agreement and upon the further condition that if the project did not 
come to fruition, the M-1 zoning would automatically revert to the C-3 zone. Ibid, p. 21. 1 
By failing to address Petitioner's contention, Respondent effectively admits the 
Board's error in this regard. Contrary to Commissioner Young's recollection, the earlier M-1 
zone change did not "clearly indicate[d] a forty-five (45) foot maximum height." The 
Board's decision in that regard is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
III. 
The Board's Use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan to Deny Burns' CUP 
Application Unlawfully Elevated the Comprehensive Plan to the Level of Legally 
Controlling Zoning Law. 
1 
As noted earlier, this condition was also violative oflC. § 67-6519 which requires notice and hearing before property can be 
rezoned. Automatic rezoning without such notice and hearing clearly do not comply with this statute. 
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A. Use of a Comprehensive Plan as Legally Controlling Regulatory Law Is Improper. 
Respondent accurately points out that the Board in part premised its denial of the 
Burns' CUP permit upon the alleged premise that the application did not comport with the 
Driggs Comprehensive Plan. CUP Tr. Vol. III, p. 31, L. 21 throughp. 33, L. 4. Respondent 
goes on to argue that "the Comprehensive Plan may not be ignored by either the Planning and 
Zoning Commission or the Board of Commissioners." Respondent's Brief, p. 11. Petitioner 
does not take issue with this general proposition-provided the matter under consideration 
is a rezoning or other legislative matter such as an amendment to the zoning ordinance itself 
However Respondent fails to justify its use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory 
ordinance to determine project compliance with the zoning ordinance, in direct contradiction 
of the holdings in Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2P.3d 738 (2000); Sanders 
Orchardv. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2000) and Evans v. Teton County, 139 
Idaho 731 , 73 P .3d 84 (2003). In all of these cases, the Supreme Court uniformly held that 
the Comprehensive Plan is not appropriately used to determine project compliance nor does 
it operate as legally controlling zoning law. See Petitioner's Brief, pp. 13 through 17. 
Specifically, as noted in Urrutia, the use of a comprehensive plan as regulatory law "affords 
the Board unbounded discretion" in examining an application and would in effect allow a 
board to effectively rezone land based on the general language in the Comprehensive Plan. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho at 358, 2 P.2d at 743. Such is exactly the result here. 
In the earlier M-1 rezoning proceeding, the Board effectively made a finding, as 
required by Idaho Code § 67-6511, that Burns' rezone was "in accordance with the 
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Comprehensive Plan." Necessarily included within such finding was a recognition that all 
of the uses, absolute or conditional, allowed in the M-1 zone, were consistent with the 
Comprehensive Plan. As Petitioner noted earlier, building heights in excess of 45 feet, were 
specifically allowed as a permitted use in that zone, provided appropriate conditions were 
met. Yet, a mere four (4) months later, the Board effectively reversed itself and held that the 
possibility of a building with a height in excess of forty-five ( 45) feet was not in accordance 
with the Comprehensive Plan. The latter decision was made without any factual findings, 
without any specific reference to any particular provision of the Comprehensive Plan and 
flew in the face of the earlier recommendation by the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission and Teton County's own Planning and Zoning Administrator. Nowhere does 
Respondent justify its use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance.2 
Interestingly the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission found that the Petitioner's project 
was "appropriate at the requested location for the intended use and would not cause 
significant impact over that which would be caused by a building with the allowable height." 
R. p. 3-4. Despite the Planning and Zoning Commission's specific finding, the Board did 
not identify any surrounding properties with which it was comparing Petitioner's project. 
Nor did the Board identify the essential character of the area or indicate how Petitioner's 
project would be incompatible therewith. In the absence of findings of fact relevant to 
2Respondent somewhat disingenuously argues that "The reason cited in the denial by the Board were CUP criteria # 2 
and 3, not failure to comply with the County Comprehensive Plan." Respondent's Brie:f:. p. 12. Contrary to this assertion, 
criteria #2 in fact required a finding that the application was "in accordance with the general objective[s] or any specific 
objective[s] of the Comprehensive Plan." See R. p. 5. 
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Criteria No. #3, the Board cannot rely upon the mere conclusory statement that the CUP 
application did not conform to Criteria No. #3. 
B. The Board's Reliance upon Criteria Other Than the Comprehensive Plan Was Equally 
Inappropriate. 
Respondent argues that it only used the Comprehensive Plan "as a factor" in its 
decision and did not utilize it as the sole basis for denying Bums' CUP application. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 10, 12. Respondent is technically correct that the Board did not 
premise its denial solely upon non-compliance with Comprehensive Plan. It also premised 
its decision upon Mr. Young's erroneous recollection that the earlier rezone was made 
conditional upon a maximum forty-five (45) foot height restriction. As noted above, that 
recollection was totally in error. 
The Board also relied upon the so-called "Criteria #3 11 , as articulated in the Driggs 
application form which required that the CUP "be designed, constructed, operated and 
maintained in the harmony with an appropriate in appearance with the existing or intended 
character in the general vicinity ... " However as noted above, the Board failed to adopt 
written findings of fact setting forth the basis for its conclusion that the CUP application was 
not harmonious with other uses in the general vicinity. Specifically it made no findings with 
respect to the characteristics of the general area surrounding Bums' property and made no 
findings as to the specific reason why the concrete plant as designed was inconsistent with 
the surrounding industrial, manufacturing and commercial uses.3 
3Respondent states a number of times in its Brief that the Board took "aesthetic values" into account in its denial of the 
CUP permit. That statement is nowhere supported by the record, nor are there any written findings adopted by the Board to 
support that assertion. Further, the record also clearly reflects that Bums' property was located outside the scenic corridor 
adopted by the County along and parallel with State Highway 33. CUP Tr. Vol. ill, p. 3, L. 19 through p. 22; p. 16, pp 3 through 10. 
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In summary, the Board's use of the Comprehensive Plan as controlling regulatory law 
was clearly inconsistent with well established Idaho case law and its reliance upon other 
erroneous and faulty conclusions, does not mitigate the Board's use of the Comprehensive 
Plan as regulatory law. 
IV. 
Petitioner's Application Was Properly Considered as a CUP Application Rather 
Than as a Variance and the Board Abused its Discretion by Denying the Permit 
Without Evaluating Possible Conditions under Which the Plant Could Be Allowed to 
Operate. 
A. A Conditional Use Permit, Not a Variance, Was the Proper Vehicle for Considering 
Petitioner's Application. 
Petitioner filed a CUP application because that is exactly what the Driggs ordinance 
required. Specifically, the Driggs ClJP ordinance required all buildings with a height in 
excess of forty-five feet be approved as a conditional use. Bums' use of a building with a 
height greater than forty-five ( 45) feet was necessary to realize its goal of "provid[ing] a 
pleasant, harmonious and attractive exterior; facilitat[ing] [efficient] production of concrete 
and mitigat[ing] sound, dust and vibration." R. p.126-27. Initially in its Reply Brief, 
Respondent conceded that filing a ClJP application "was the proper course of action for 
Petitioner to have taken .... " Respondent's Brief, p .2. However, Respondent later suggests 
that Petitioner should have applied for a variance, rather than a CUP, with the additional 
burden of showing "undue hardship." Respondent's Brief, p. 9. Respondent relies on several 
Teton County ordinances for this contention. However, Teton County ordinances are not the 
controlling law in this case. It is undisputed that the property in question is located within the 
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Driggs City Area oflmpact and that "[p ]ursuant to the agreement between the City of Driggs 
and the County, the Driggs City Ordinances are in effect in the Impact Area." Rezone Tr. 
p.16, L.18-24. Because, as the Board noted, "the Driggs ordinances apply," CUP Tr., Vol. 
II, p.37, L.11-14, the Teton County ordinances that Respondent cites in its Reply Brief do 
not govern this case. 
According to the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance, buildings higher than forty-five ( 4 5) 
feet are a permitted use in a M-1 Zone, provided they are approved by a conditional use 
permit. Driggs City Ordinance 247-07, Ch. 2, § 13(C). Thus, the Driggs Ordinance 
specifically requires applicants who wish to construct a building higher than forty-five ( 45) 
feet in the M-1 Zone to obtain a conditional use permit, not a variance. Respondent obviously 
does not understand the difference between a variance and a conditional use permit. A 
variance is a means by which an applicant is granted an exception or "modification" to the 
requirements of an ordinance, based upon some unusual site condition or exceptional 
circumstance. See I. C. § 67-6516. Conversely, a conditional use is a specifically permitted 
use that is allowed with appropriate conditions. See I. C. § 67-6512. Unlike a variance, a 
conditional use does not involve an exception to the ordinance requirements, rather it is 
merely another form of a permitted use. Because it is an expressly permitted use under the 
ordinance, no showing of exceptional circumstances or undue hardship is necessary. 
Because Petitioner was not required to obtain a variance, Petitioner likewise was not 
required to make a showing of"undue hardship." Rather, Petitioner merely had to meet the 
requirements for a conditional use permit, as set forth in the ordinance. 
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B. The Board Abused its Discretion Because it Failed to Consider Conditions or Actions 
Which Petitioner Could Take to Obtain a Permit. 
Respondent asserts that the Board has authority to "approve, deny, remand, or allow 
with conditions" a CUP application. Respondent's Brief, p. 16. Petitioner takes no issue 
with that broad, general statement. In fact, Petitioners never argued, and do not here argue, 
that the Board was without authority to approve, deny or formulate conditions appropriate 
to ensure Burns' CUP application was harmonious with the surrounding industrial and 
manufacturing uses. What the Petitioner does argue is that Board failed to follow its own 
ordinance. As was noted in Petitioner's earlier Brief, the Driggs CUP ordinance contains a 
listing of potential conditions that might be attached to the CUP as necessary to minimize 
adverse impact on surrounding uses, control the sequence, timing and duration of 
development and ensure proper maintenance. See Appendix B, Driggs Zoning Ordinance, 
Ch. 4, § 2, at p. 4 7. See also Petitioner's Brief, pp. 23 through 25. The Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance further provides guidance to the Board as to the very limited circumstance where 
it is appropriate to deny a CUP application: "If the proposed conditional use cannot 
adequately meet the conditions necessary to assure protection and compatibility with the 
surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood, the Planning and Zoning Commission will 
not approve the proposed use." Ibid.4 
Here, the Board simply ignored the applicable CUP Ordinance. Specifically, it made 
no effort whatsoever to consider appropriate conditions to ensure harmony and compatibility 
4
Because Bums property was located in the Area of Impact, the agency in charge of applying the CUP ordinance was the Board of 
County Commissioners, rather than the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission. 
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with surrounding uses. Further, it failed to gauge or assess Bums' capability of complying 
with such conditions and then totally ignored the requirement in the Ordinance that the use 
could be denied only upon a finding that the applicant could not meet those conditions. In 
effect, the Board completely missed the purpose of the hearing. In its haste to deny the 
application, the Board relapsed into what was effectively a reconsideration of its earlier 
zoning hearing and a reversal of its decision therein, notwithstanding the passage of the 
applicable appeal period. 
The case should be remanded to the Board, with an order to assess appropriate 
conditions to ensure harmony with the surrounding industrial and manufacturing uses and 
to assess Bums' ability to comply with those conditions. The Board should further be 
instructed that it may deny the permit only upon an express finding that Bums is without the 
ability to meet such appropriate conditions. The Board should further be instructed that 
aesthetic considerations are appropriate only to the extent necessary to harmonize with the 
surrounding industrial and manufacturing uses and that consideration of subjective "scenic" 
values is not appropriate since the property is located outside the scenic corridor. 
V. 
The Board Abused its Discretion by Re-visiting the Issue of Consistency with the 
Comprehensive Plan, Notwithstanding the Passage of the Applicable Appeal Period. 
Some nine months prior to the CUP hearing in November, 2007, the Board changed 
the zoning designation of Petitioner's land from C-3 to M-1. The M-1 zone allowed any 
"[m ]anufacturing, assembling, fabricating, processing, packing, repairing, or storage uses 
which have not been declared a nuisance by statute." Driggs City Ordinance 27 4-07, Chapter 
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2, Section 13(A)(l ). The Board specifically found that a concrete batch plant was an 
appropriate use under an M-1 zone. Rezone Tr. p.36, L.24 through p.37, L.7. And, as noted 
above, buildings higher than forty-five ( 45) feet are expressly permitted as conditional uses 
in the M-1 zone. Driggs City Ordinance, Chapter 2, Section 13(C). By the time of the 
November 15, 2007, CUP hearing, the appeal period for the M-1 rezoning (i.e. twenty-eight 
(28) days) had long since passed. See Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4). 
Whenever a board of county commissioners approves a zoning change it must find 
that the change is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. LC.§ 67-6511; Evans v. Teton 
County, 139 Idaho 71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003). If a county board approves a zoning 
change that is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, such action constitutes invalid spot 
zoning. Id. Therefore, by approving the change from C-3 to M-1 in this case, the Board 
necessarily found that all permitted uses, including the conditionally permitted uses in the M-
l zone, were in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. More specifically, the Board's 
approval of the zoning change necessarily established that all permitted uses in the M-1 zone, 
including buildings over forty-five (45) feet in height, were compatible with the 
Comprehensive Plan, provided the applicant complies with appropriate conditions to assure 
harmony with the surrounding industrial and commercial uses. 
Whenever a board is confronted with a land use decision which has previously been 
before it, "[T]he board's liberal discretion ... is limited" in situations where the governing 
board has previously made a determination related to the same parcel now under 
consideration. Haines v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals a/Town a/Oxford, 26 Conn.App. 187, 191-
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92, 599 A.2d 399, 402 (Ct.App. 1991 ). Specifically, the governing board "is prohibited from 
reversing a previous decision unless the facts and circumstances have materially changed so 
as to affect the reason for the original decision." Id. See also Schlehuser v. City of Seymour, 
674 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (Ind.App. 1996) (noting that because the function of a governing 
board is "quasi judicial, it generally has no inherent power to review and vacate, rescind or 
alter its decision after it has been made"). Further, Idaho Code § 67-6519 establishes an 
appeal period of twenty-eight (28) days and any effort to rescind or alter a decision after the 
appeal has run, would be a clear violation of this statute. Here, the Board made no finding 
that there had been a change of facts and circumstances such as would have justified 
reconsideration of its earlier rezoning decision. Further, even assuming there had been a 
material change in the circumstances such as might have justified a reversion to the C-3 zone, 
the proper procedure would have been to conduct a new hearing, with notice to the applicant 
of the Board's intent to reconsider the zoning of the parcel. See Idaho Code§§ 67-6511 and 
67-6509. Had such been the Board's intent, Bums would have therefore been afforded 
advance notice of the Board's intent to reconsider the earlier rezoning, consistent with the 
principles outlined in the Comprehensive Plan. 5 No such notice was given to Bums. Instead, 
the Commissioners effectively "back-doored" Bums by refusing consideration of a 
conditional use that was expressly permitted undertheM-1 zone and byrefusingto consider 
any conditions that might have been appropriate to assure compatibility with the adjoining 
industrial and manufacturing uses. 
5It should be noted however that such intended rezoning would have been in violation of the four ( 4) year provision of 
Idaho Code§ 67-651l(d). 
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In sum, the Board improperly revisited the issue of general compatibility with the 
comprehensive plan, all in violation of I. C. § 67-6519. Instead of making a good faith effort 
to consider appropriate conditions to assure compatibility of Bums' concrete plant with the 
surrounding industrial uses, the Board embarked upon an ad hoc quest to find some visionary 
goal or value buried somewhere in the Comprehensive Plan upon which they could predicate 
a justification for their arbitrary denial. By so doing, the Board abused its discretion, much 
in the same fashion as predicted in Workman, supra. The Board's decision should be 
reversed and the matter remanded with appropriate instructions to the Board to confine its 
consideration to the specific requirements of the Driggs CUP ordinance .. 
VI. 
The Board's Decision to Deny the Application Based on Non-conformance with 
the Comprehensive Plan Violated Petitioner's Due Process Rights. 
As Respondent concedes, "comprehensive plans do not themselves operate as legally 
controlling zoning law." Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052 
(1984); Respondent's Brief, p.18. This case illustrates precisely the problem with making 
land use decisions based on comprehensive plans rather than relying upon objective standards 
set forth in zoning or subdivision ordinances. "A comprehensive plan reflects the 'desirable 
goals and objectives, or desirable future situations' for the land within a jurisdiction." 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000) (quoting LC. § 67-
6508). A comprehensive plan does not function as and should not be used as a regulatory 
ordinance. Bone, supra. The Driggs Comprehensive Plan6 sets forth ninety-eight (98) pages 
6Appendix C to Petitioner's Brief 
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of various community values, policies, restrictions, conditions, and goals necessary to 
implement Driggs' "Community Vision." To deny a land use pemtit based on general non-
compliance with the comprehensive plan violates due process because such policies, values, 
or goals are simply too broad and visionary to be used to determine project compliance. 
Such determinations should more appropriately be made under the zoning ordinance or 
subdivision which contain more objective, definable standards. 
Because it lacks specific, objective standards, using the comprehensive plan as a basis 
for denying a permit gives the board unbridled discretion, thereby allowing the board to act 
arbitrarily. See Drake v. Craven, 105 Idaho 734, 738-39, 672 P.2d 1064, 1068-69 (Ct.App. 
1983) (noting the importance of "sufficiently clear standards to guide the governing board 
in zoning requests, and sufficient procedures to guard against the exercise of uncontrolled 
discretion by the board"). Because the ninety-eight (98) page comprehensive plan at issue 
here is such a wide-ranging, visionary document, it establishes no specific standards by 
which the Board could measure the Bums' application. Without objective criteria, use of the 
comprehensive plan as a regulatory measure results in a process "so vague that men and 
women of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application, [which] violates the first essential of due process of law." Anderson v. City of 
Issaquah, 70 Wash.App. 64, 75,851 P.2d 744,751 (1993); See also Drake, 105 Idaho at 738, 
672 P.2d at 1068. In such a state of affairs, the applicant is left to the complete mercy and 
unbridled whims of the Board. 
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In this case, the Board also based its denial on "CUP criteria No.2." CUP Tr., Vol. III, 
p.32, L.1-7. Criterion No. 2 requires the proposed project to be "harmonious with and in 
accordance with the general objective or any specific objective of the Comprehensive Plan 
and/ or the Zoning Ordinance." R.p.5 (emphasis added). As noted in Section II, supra, 
although the Board also pointed to CUP Criterion No. 3 as a reason for the denial, the Board 
made no finding of fact regarding the "appearance" or "character of the general vicinity," or 
any specific aspect of Petitioner's proposed project it deemed inconsistent with the 
surrounding uses. Instead it relied upon its mistaken recollection regarding the existing 
Development Agreement which purportedly limited Petitioner's construction of a building 
higher than a forty-five ( 45) feet. Further, the Board did not identify any specific objective 
of the Comprehensive Plan or the Driggs CUP ordinance with which Petitioner's proposed 
project was inconsistent. Thus, even though the Board articulated other reasons for its denial, 
those reasons were clearly erroneous, with the result that the Board effectively based its 
denial solely on the fact that Petitioner's project was not "harmonious" with a "general 
objective" of the Comprehensive Plan. 
In Anderson, supra, the court found that using terms such as "harmonious," 
"appropriate," and "compatible" violated due process because those terms were 
"unconstitutionally vague." 70 Wash.App. at 75-77, 851 P.2d 751-52. The court found that 
such terms "do not give effective or meaningful guidance to applicants, to design 
professionals, or to the public officials ... who are responsible for enforcing the code." Id. 
at 7 6, 8 51 P .2d at 7 51. Although the vague language in that case was found in the code itself 
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and not a comprehensive plan, Anderson clearly illustrates why the use of broad and 
visionary standards of a comprehensive plan deprives an applicant of a fair hearing and due 
process. Such broad language provides no standards, affords the board unbridled discretion, 
and gives the applicant no indication what he should do to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. In short, basing a denial on the comprehensive plan violates 
fundamental due process. 
Respondent also asserts that it was proper for the Board to consider aesthetic 
considerations when evaluating Petitioner's permit. Respondent's Brief, p.11. However, 
Petitioner's Brief however points to no findings of fact by the Board where aesthetic 
considerations were discussed or articulated as a basis for denial. Even assuming arguendo 
that such were used as a basis for denial, the use of aesthetic considerations ostensibly found 
in the comprehensive plan, would similarly be devoid of an objectively definable standard 
and violative of due process. This underscores why the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act 
requires that all denials be based on specific, objective provisions of an ordinance. See LC. 
§ 67-6519. 
In this case, the Board denied the Petitioner's application because, they felt the 
building was too high. However, the Board could not articulate any valid, objective legal 
standard upon which they based that decision-that is they did not state how high was.too 
high nor did it define the baseline upon which it based that determination. The Board did not 
identify any objective standard from the Driggs comprehensive plan stating that seventy-five 
(75) feet high buildings are entirely impermissible-in fact the Driggs CUP ordinance clearly 
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suggests otherwise.7 The Board noted that the Driggs Comprehensive Plan expresses a 
"desire for an attractive north entry into Driggs and that larger metal buildings reduce that 
attractiveness." CUP Tr., Vol. III, p.17, L.13-15 (emphasis added). Like the language at 
issue in Anderson, these visionary terms, although perhaps appropriate for use ina legislative 
context where no specific parcel of property is under consideration, provide the Board with 
no identifiable objective standards to use when evaluating an application and are thus an 
"unconstitutionally vague" basis upon which to make a land use decision. 70 Wash.App. at 
77, 851 P.2d at 752. In this case, the Board did not identify what constitutes "attractiveness," 
how such "desire" could be fulfilled, or what the dimensions of a "larger" building are. In 
Anderson, the court stated "[b ]ecause the commissioners themselves had no objective 
guidelines to follow, they necessarily had to resort to their own subjective' feelings.'" Id. In 
this case too, Board members had no objective criteria upon which to base the denial and so 
had to resort to their own subjective feelings. Commissioner Stevenson expressly stated, "I 
don't/eel that [Petitioner's project] meets the criteria established by the City of Driggs for 
the approval. I know that the planning & zoning commission said it did, but I disagree." CUP 
Tr., Vol. III, p.21, L.24 through p.22, L.2 (emphasis added). Just as in Anderson, for the 
Board in this case to resort to subjective feelings "is the very epitome of discretionary, 
arbitrary enforcement of the law." 70 Wash.App. at 78, 851 P.2d at 752. 
7
In searching for some objective basis for its denial, the Board also mentioned the Scenic Corridor Overlay, but then 
acknowledged that the property is "not ... technically within the scenic corridor." CUP Tr., Vol. III, p.16, L. 7. Moreover, the 
Board does not state what additional restrictive standards would apply even if the building were within the corridor. The Board 
does not refer to any objective provisions for the Scenic Corridor Overlay Provisions that bar a seventy-five (75) feet high 
building located outside the corridor. 
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Because the Board did not use any identifiable objective standards when denying 
Petitioner's application, the Board violated the Petitioner's Constitutional due process rights. 
The Board's decision should be reversed and the matter remanded for reconsideration 
consistent with the objective standards contained with the Driggs CUP ordinance. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board here failed to afford Bums. a fundamentally fair hearing, devoid of 
arbitrary, ad hoc decision making. It provided Bums and the Court here with no written 
explanation of the basis for its decision and failed to follow the mandate of Cooper v. Board 
of Ada County Commissioners, a decision that has been in place since the early 1980's. They 
ignored their own ordinance and substituted their own "feelings" without even making a 
token effort to consider appropriate conditions for the proposed conditional use, as required 
by the applicable ordinance. 
The matter should be remanded with instructions to consider appropriate conditions 
to assure compatibility with the surrounding industrial and commercial uses. The Board 
should be ordered to cease using the visionary goals in the Comprehensive Plan as regulatory 
criteria and to cease using subjective "aesthetic" standards. Petitioner should be awarded its 
reasonable attorneys fees, given the Board's failure to follow well-established case precedent 
and clear statutory mandates. 
11, 
DATED this d,S day of August, 2008. ou{j~ 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Burns Holdings, LLC vs. Board of County Commissioners of Teton County 
All Items 
Hearing type: Hearing Minutes date: 10/21/2008 
Assigned judge: Jon J Shindurling Start time: 02:43 PM 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow End time: 02:43 PM 
Minutes clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN Audio tape number: 
Prosecutor: [none] 
Tape Counter: 238 
Tape Counter: 240 
Tape Counter: 242 
Tape Counter: 246 
Tape Counter: 247 
Tape Counter: 255 
J calls case; ids those present 
oral argument regarding appeal 
PA - Dale Storer, Dan Dansie 
appeal of denial of CUP by county commissioners 
J - major assertions is Board failed tomake appropriate written findings 
remedy would be to remand for rehearing or remediation from the Board 
J bifurcate the argument and will hear the remaining issues at later date 
PA - plain and simple, the County did not do it 
says took tape recordings and have minutes 
that will not do 
devoid of any indication of how they got there 
DA - asseert there is a written record 
not asserting the tape recording satisfies reequirement argue - no prescribed form or 
format so long as there is a basis that shows the factual reasons for denial 
evry single deliberation has to be done in public format 
written minutes satisfy that requirement 
PA - our argument is not that there was no record made; simply not having written findings 
simply did not satisfy the statute 
J - 75-6535(b) no question been raised that not proceeding under that chapter 
inn order to make adequate effort on review - provide parties due process but adequate 
basis to determine fctors on which decision was based 
at public hearing a lot of things happen that are irrelevant 
difficult to figure out what commission may have been seeing as appropriate or not 
apporpriate 
distill legal basis for decision 
third benefit - parties ability to see how decision arrived; ability to inderstand the decision 
and rationale for the decision 
forced the body to discipline themselves so they arenot arbitray and capricious 
order formal written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
will remand to the commission for the preparation of F of F, Con of Law 
Storer to prepare Order 
PA - want to raise issue of attorneys fees 
urge court consider that since requirement for written findings have been around since 
the 1980's 
• - c:,_ .•• , .. , •h~ """rt::, fpp rP.nuest and cost bill 
OCT/31/2008/FR I l l: 27 AM BOt\1111 v COURTS P. 009/01 l 
IN 1HE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
-v. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
ORDER 
FILED IN CHAMBERS 
AT IDAHO FALLS 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JON J. SHIN DURLING 
DATE )1)/~ 
TIME= ! ' 
DEPU1Y CLERK:0 ~ :~ 
Tbis matter came before·the Court for hearing on October 21, 2008, pursuant to the 
Court's prior Scheduling Order. The Court has considered the briefs submitted by both 
parties and the oral arguments submitted by counsel at the hearing. Based thereupon, the 
Court makes the following order: 
1. The Court finds that Respondent, Teton County failed to prepare ....-vritten 
findings and a reasoned statement as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, thereby 
frustrating the ability of the Court to perform an ap·propriate judicial review of the 
proceedings below. Accordingly, the matter is hereby remanded to the Teton County 
Board of County Commissioners and the Court further directs said Board to forthwith 
prepare and issue written findings and conclusions consistent with such code section. 
2. The Court is advised by counsel for the parties that a new hearing is not 
desired and accordingly the Court hereby directs that the Board of County Cormnissioners 
OCT/31/2008/FRI 11:27 AM BO~~ a Y COURTS FAX No. 20852 P.Ol0/011 
issue written findings and conclusions, based upon the testimony and evidence presented 
at the hearing b_efore the Board on November 17, 2007. 
3. In the event Petitioner desires further judicial review of such written 
findings and conclusions, Petitioner shall file an amended petition for judicial review 
within the ti.roe frames set forth in Idaho Code § 67-6521 ( d), failing which the Findings 
and Conclusions of the Board shall be deemed final. 
DATED this __!jv day of October, 2008. 
District Judge 
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I hereby certify that I served a true copy ofth.e foregoing document upon the 
following this ill day of Octobe1·, 2008, by mailing, with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto. 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Dale W. Storer ( ) Mail 
Holden, IGdwell, Hahn & Crapo. P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Barton J. Birch 
Teton County Prosecut01·'s Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
3 ORDER 
( K.) Courthouse Box 
( X) Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: ~tu~a.. Wa cttzu 
Deputy Clerk 
JAN-20-09 10:30AM FROM-HOLDEN Kl HAHN £ CRAPO 20B-523-9518 T-827 P.002/006 F-013 
Dale W. Storer, (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAI-ill & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, ldabo 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Anorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH ITJDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
lNRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COlJNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
JlJDIClAL REVIE\V 
Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial 
Review pursuant to tbe provisions of Idaho Code§§ 67-5270 and 67-6521 and Rule 84 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of such Petition, Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is ru1 Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business located in Idaho Falls, Idal10. 
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2_ Respondent, the Ternn County Board of County Commissioners (the ''Board"), 
is a. political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Venue of this Petition is properundenhe provjsions ofldaho Code§ 67-5272. 
4_ On or about June 14, 2007, Petitioner filed ru1 Application for a Conditional 
Use Permit ("CUP") with the City of Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission, seeking to 
obtain a conditional use permit allowing the Applicant IO exceed the forty-five (45) foot 
height limit applicable \~,1itl1 respect IO the M.., 1 Zone) as established by the Zoning Ordinance 
of the City ofDriggs, Idaho_ The subject property was described as Lot lb, Block II, and the 
eastern 11 O' of Lot 1 a, Teton Peaks View Subdivision and is located within the Area of 
Impact identified by the Teton County and City of Driggs Area of Impact Ordinances, 
Agreements and Map. Because the subject property was located within the Area ofimpact, 
the application was brought pursuant to § 2) Chapter 4, of the Zoning Ordinance of the City 
of Driggs, which zoning ordinance was, by virtue of the Area of Impact ordinances and 
agreement, made applicable to all properties located within the Area of Impact. 
5. The application was heard by the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission on. 
July 11, 2007, at the conclusion of which the Driggs Plai.ming and Zoning Commission 
granted the application. On or about July 23, 2007, Mr. John N. Bach, filed a" Notice of 
Appeal" of the decision of the Commission witb the Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners. On or about September 13, 2007, the County Commissioners eon.ducted a 
hearing, at the conclusion of which it determined to hear the matter de novo, rather than as 
an appeal. 
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6. On November 15, 2007, the Teton County Board ofConunis.sioners conducted 
a hearing for the purpose of considering the CUP application, ar the conclusion of which the 
Board denied tl1e CUP application. 
7. On or about D eccmber 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petit.ion for J udici.al Review 
in this case. At the conclusion of the hearing on such Petidon, the Court vacated the 
November 15, 2007, Decision of the Board and remanded the matter to the Board for tl1e 
purpose of preparing and issuing written findings and conclusions, setting forth the basis for 
the November 15, 2007, Decision. On or about December 22, 2008, the Board adopted 
written Findings and Conclusions, pursuant to the Coun's Order. In such Findings and 
Conclusion, the Board again denied the CUP Application. 
8. The earlier proceedings before the Commission and the Board were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the Teton 
County Board of Comity Commissioners and 1he Clerk of the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 'The Agency Record and Agency Transcript were duly filed with this Court in 
conj.unction with the original Petition for Judicial Review filed by tl1e Petitioner in this 
action. The proceedings before the Board on December 22, 2009, were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is also in the possession of the County CJ.erk. 
9. Petitioner will file a Statement of the Issues for Judicial Review within 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Amended Petition. 
10. Petitioner :6..u-ther requests that the Clerks of the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission and the Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, exhibits and 
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other documents filed or considered jn conjunction with the December 22, 2008) 
proceedings, together wi1h a transcript of the proceedings before the Board on such date. 
11. Petitioner further requests that it be awarded its reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 a11d 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as folJows: 
1. For judicial review of the Board's decisions in this matter, pursuai1t to Idaho 
Code § 67-6521. 
2. For an order reversing the decision of the Board issued on December 22, 2008, 
and ordering and directing thal 1he CUP Application be gra11ted as a matter of law, or 
a]ternatively for an order remanding the matter IO the Board for reconsideration consistent 
with the Court's direction. 
3 _ For an order awarding Petitioner its reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuanttoidaho Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
.,-fh, 
DATEDthis /4 dayofJanuary,2009. 
Dale W. Storer, 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATll:ON 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, and that: 
1. That service of this Amended Petition has been made upon the Teton County 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the Teton County Board of Commissioners, and or 





Teton County Prosecmor's Office 
81 N. Ma.in Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Teton County Planning 
& Zoning Administrator 
Teton County Courthouse 
89N. Main 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Douglas Self 
Driggs Planning & Zoning Administrator 
City Hall 
P.O. Box 48 
Driggs, ID 83422 
( ~il 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Fa~simile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( ~ail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( _)_Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
2. That the clerk of Teton County has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the 1Tanscripts requested above. 
3. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the agency record. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L. C. 
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HOLDEN, KlDWELL, BAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Jdaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys fo:r Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH J(JDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Perm.it to Exceed 
4 5 1 Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMIS SJONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
AMENDED PETITION FOR 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, respectfully submits this Petition for Judicial 
Review pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code§§ 67-5270 and 67-6521 and Rule 84 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of such Petition, Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is rui Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business located in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
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2. Respondent, the Teton County Board of Cm.:mty Commissioners (the ccBoarcf')1 
is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Venue ofthls Petition is properunderthe provisions ofldaho Code§ 67-5272. 
4. On or about June 14, 2007, Petitioner filed an Application for a Conditional 
Use Permit ("CUP") with tlle City of Driggs Planning and Zoning Cor.nmission, seeking to 
obtain a conditional use permit allowing the Applicant to exceed the forty-five (45) fo0t 
height limit applicable ,vith respect to the M-1 Zone, as established by the Zoning Ordinance 
of the City of Driggs> Idaho. The subject property was described as Lot 1 b1 Block II, and the 
eastern 1101 of Lot la., Teton Pealcs View Subdivision and is located within the Area of 
Impact identified by the Teton County and City of Driggs Area of Impact Ordinances, 
Agreements and Map. Because the subject property was located within the Area ofimpact, 
the application was brought pursuant to§ 2, Chapter 4, of the Zornng Ordinance of the City 
of Drj ggs, which zoning ordinance was, by virrue of tl1e Area of Impact ordinances and 
agreemeJ.1t, made applicable to all prope1ties located within the Area of Impact. 
5. The application was heard by the Driggs l.,lanning and Zoning Com.mission on 
July 11, 2007, at the conclusion of which tl1e Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission 
granted the application. On or about July 23, 2007, Mr. John N. Bach, filed a" Notice of 
Appear' of tl1e decision of the Commission with the Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners. On or about September 13, 2007, the County Commissioners c-onducted a 
hearing> at fae conclus10n of which it determined to hear the matter de nova, rather than as 
an appeal. 
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6. On November 15) 2007) the Teton County Board of Commissioners conducted 
a hearing for the purpose of considering the CUP application) at the conclusion of which the 
Board denied the CUP application. 
7. On or about December 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
in tl1is case. At the conclusion of the hearing on such Petition, the Court vacated the 
November 15, 2007, Decision of the Board and remanded the matter to the Board for the 
purpose of preparing and issuing written findings and conclusions, setting forth the basis for 
1he November 15) 2007, Decision. On or about December 22, 2008) the Board adopted 
written Findings and Conclusions, pursuant to the Court's Order. In such Findings and 
Conclusion, the Board again denied the CUP App]ication. 
8. The earlier proceedings before the Commi.ssion and the Board were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the Teton 
County Board of County Commissione.rs and the Clerk of the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission. The Agency Record and Agency Transcript were duly filed with 1:his Court in 
conjunction with the original Petition for Judicial Review filed by the Petitioner in this 
action. The proceedings before the Board on December 22, 2009, were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is also in the possession of the Co1mty Clerk. 
9. Petitiouer will file a Statement of the Issues for Judicial Review v,,ithin 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Amended Petition. 
10. Petitioner further requests tlrnt the Clerks of the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Corn.mission and the Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, exhibits and 
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other documents filed or considered in conjunction with tl1e December 22} 2008} 
proceedings, together with a transcript of the proceedings before the Board on such date. 
11. Petitioner :further requests that it be awarded its reasonable attorneys fees and 
costs pursuant to Idal10 Code§§ 12-117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. For judicial review of the Board's decisions in this matter, pursuant to Idaho 
Code§ 67-6521. 
2. For an orderreversing the decision of the Board issued on December 22, 2008, 
and ordering an.d directing that tl1e CUP Application be granted as a matter of law, or 
alternatively for an order remanding the matter to the Board for reconsideration consistent 
with the Court's direction. 
3 For an order awarding Petitioner its reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-117~ 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
4. For such other rellef as the Court deems just and proper. 
.,11, 
DATED this ; l/ day of January, 2009. 
~) ' ,,.-/.<-i-x ' 
rl.. __ /(t,.,(U ~j ?[7 c,,,{/1,,/ 
Dale W. Storer, 
Atto1ney for the Petitioner 
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CER1'D1CATION 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, and that: 
1. That service of this Amended Petition has been made upon the Teton County 
Planning and Zoning Commission and the Teton County Board of Commissioners, and or 





Teton Countv Prosecutor's Office ., 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Teton County Planning 
& Zoning Adrrunistrator 
Teton County Courthouse 
89 N. Main 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Douglas Self 
Drjggs Planning & Zon.ing Administrator 
City Hall 
P.O. Box 48 
Driggs, ID 83422 
( ---)~il 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courr:honse Box 
( -rN.!ail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( _)Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
2. That the clerk of Teton County has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of tbe transcripts requested above. 
3. That th.e clerk of th.e agency has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the agency record. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden~ Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie, Esq. (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Burns Holding, LLC, and submits the following 
Statement ofissues for Judicial Review, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 84(d) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The issues for which Petitioner will seek Judicial Review include, without 
limitation, the following: 
vt11G,NAL 
0111 
a. Did the Findings of Fact and Conclusions adopted by the Board on 
December 22, 2008 comply with the provisions of Idaho Code§ 67-
6535? 
b. Did the Board err in concluding that its earlier rezone of Petitioner's 
property did not allow construction of a structure exceeding forty-
five foot ( 45') in height? 
c. Did the Board err in considering esthetic values when it denied the 
Conditional Use Permit, given that the subject property was located 
outside the scenic corridor adopted by Teton County and the City of 
Driggs? 
d. Did the Board err in considering the February 2007 rezone of the 
property as a basis for denying the Conditional Use Permit? 
e. Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights in considering 
evidence outside the CUP hearing and in failing to make all ex parte 
contact with members of the Board a matter of public record? 
f. Did the Board err in using the Teton County Comprehensive Plan, 
and the broad goals articulated therein, as a regulatory standard for 
determining whether or not to issue the subject CUP? 
g. Does the use of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and the broad, 
general goals stated therein, as regulatory criteria for evaluating and 
considering the issuance of conditional use permits, violate 
2 - AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Petitioner's due process rights under the Idaho and United States 
Constitution? 
h. Did the Board erroneously use the Teton County Comprehensive 
Plan rather than the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, in evaluating and 
considering Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use Permit? 
1. Do principles of res judicata bar the Board from finding the CUP 
application does not comport with the County Zoning Ordinance? 
J. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the 
Conditional Use Permit? 
,f,-.. 
DATED this S day of February, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
3 - AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
fl 1 : 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of 
and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following 
described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing 





Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
89 N. Main Street, #5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
( ~Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C. 
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BURNS HOLDING, LLC CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
County of Teton 




IN RE: Bums Concrete CUP 
175-185 North State Highway 33 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . Burns Holding, LLC desires to operate a concrete batch plant within the City 
of Driggs Area of Impact in Teton County, Idaho. 
2. The City of Driggs approved M-1 Light Industrial zoning for the subject 
parcels, Lot lB and the eastern 110 feet of Lot lA, Block 2, Teton Peaks 
View Subdivision, a County subdivision. 
3. The proposed concrete batch plant is in excess of forty-five ( 45) feet, the 
maximum height limit allowed in the M-1 zoning district. 
4. Burns Holdings, LLC submitted an application with the City of Driggs for a 
conditional use permit (CUP) for a height of seventy-five (75) feet, a 
conditional use permit being the method for a height variance in the M-1 
zoning district in the City of Driggs. 
5. The City of Driggs Planning & Zoning Commission recommended to Teton 
County approval of the CUP with a maximum of seventy-five (75) feet 
height. 
6. Burns Holdings, LLC submitted a CUP application with Teton County to 
operate a temporary concrete batch plant with a height of seventy-five (75) 
feet on the subject parcels. 
011-5 
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7. After proper notifications, the Teton Board of County Commissioners 
(Board), held public hearings on September 13, 2007, October 11, 2007, and 
November 15, 2008 for the Burns Concrete CUP application. 
8. On November 15, 2007, after hearing and testimony, the Board denied the 
CUP request due to lack of conformance to CUP conditions number 2 and 3 
and due to the fact that the M-1 zone change was granted based on a specific 
proposal that had no mention of a 75' high building and in fact clearly 
indicated a 45' height. 
9. CUP Condition number 2 states tha the proposed use "will be harmonious 
with and in accordance with the general objective or with any specific 
objective of the Comprehensive Plan and/or Zoning Ordinance". 
10. CUP Condition number 3 states "will be designed, constructed, 
operated and maintained to be harmonious and appropriate in appearance 
with the existing or intended character of the general vicinity and that such 
use will not change the essential character of the same area". 
11. The written minutes of the November 15, 2007 Board meeting at 
which the Bums Holdings, LLC CUP request was denied were memorialized 
by the Board on December 13, 2007. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter was remanded from the District Court with instructions to 
issue written findings of fact and conclusions of law, which articulate in writing 
the board's basis for denial. In examining the transcript of the November 
hearing, the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Teton hereby 
finds as follows: 
3 
1) That City of Driggs Ordinance 281-07, § 13(c) states that "any 
building or structure of portion thereof hereafter erected shall not 
exceed forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use 
permit" for any structure to be located in an M-1 light industrial zone. 
2) That the proposed concrete batch plant, as set forth by Burns Concrete 
requests permission for a 75' height allowance. The applicant has 
acknowledged that they need special permission to build to a height of 
75 feet. 
3) Teton County has the final authority to approve such permits since the 
proposed location falls within the Driggs City area of Impact, and the 
County BOCC has the authority to approve, disapprove, or remand 
CUP applications according to Teton County Ordinance 8-6-1-B. 
4) That Applicant previously requested a zone change for the subject 
property, and that zone change was based upon the Board of County 
Commissioners' understanding that a concrete batch plant would be 
located on the property, but that the height of any structures would be 
in conformance with the 45' height restriction. That this Board would 
likely not have granted the zone change if the representations were for 
a 75' height structure for the concrete batch plant. 
4 
5) That Criteria for the allowance of any Conditional Use Permit is set 
forth in the application for a conditional use permit, and that those 
criteria do reflect the criteria set forth in Driggs City ordinance. 
6) That Criteria No. 2 of the application states that the conditional use 
"will be harmonious with and in accordance with the general objective 
or with any specific objective of the comprehensive Plan and/or the 
zoning Ordinance." 
7) That Criteria No. 3 of the application provides that the Conditional 
Use "will be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to be 
harmonious and appropriate in appearance with the existing or 
intended character of the general vicinity and that such use will not 
change the essential character of the same area." 
8) That we conclude that Criteria #2 and #3 reflect Driggs' City 
Ordinance 281-07, which provides that the use must not be in 
"conflict with the comprehensive plan" and that "if the proposed 
conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to 
ensure protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, 




9) That based upon evidence received at the hearing, we conclude that a 
75 height could not be allowed with or without conditions to ensure 
protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses, 
and neighborhood." Specifically, the proposed use is located just off 
of a scenic corridor, and views of the Teton Mountain Range would 
be obstructed by such a building, and evidence, including public 
comment, was presented that surrounding neighbors would have their 
views of the mountains obstructed. We conclude further, that the 75' 
height allowance would not be in conformance with the 
comprehensive plan for this portion of scenic corridor. 
10) That additional evidence was introduced concerning operating hours, 
dust, and traffic safety, but that the primary purpose of the conditional 
use permit application was for special permission regarding height. 
11) That there was public comment that the zone change to M-1 may have 
been met with more resistance had the concept for the proposed use 
included a 75' high structure, but the community's understanding was 
that the zone change would allow for a 45' high dry plant, and not a 
7 5' high wet plant. 
{"\ .. . ~ (\ 
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12) That we as a board of County Commissioners conclude that the zone 
change application would have resulted differently if the applicant had 
represented a 75' batch plant as the proposed use in the new zone. 
CONCLUSION 
That based upon the staff report, planning and zoning 
recommendations, and public comment received, we deny the request for the 
Conditional Use Permit, which would allow Burns Concrete to exceed the 
45' height restriction placed upon them in the M-1 light manufacturing zone. 
We conclude further that the original zone change was premised upon a 45' 
height restriction, and that was our understanding during the course of the 
zone change process. We conclude further that the excessive height would 
be in conflict with the Comprehensive Plan, specifically an exceedingly high 
structure would be located along the scenic corridor. 
We also conclude that the height allowance could not be conditioned 
to ensure the protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, 
uses, and neighborhood. Property owners have relied upon zoning that 
would protect their views, and such a height allowance would change the 
essential character of the neighborhood. 
n10n 
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premised upon a 45' height restriction, and that was our understanding during the course 
of the zone change process. We conclude further that the excessive height would be in 
conflict with the Comprehensive Plan, specifically an exceedingly high structure would 
be located along the scenic corridor. 
We also conclude that the height allowance could not be conditioned to ensure the 
protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses, and neighborhood. 
Property owners have relied upon zoning that would protect their views, and such a 
height allowance would change the essential character of the neighborhood. 
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Larry Young, -Chairman Date· 
Mark Trupp, Commissioner 
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
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1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P .0. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
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Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEF 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Bums Holding, LLC ("Bums"), and submits this 
Supplemental Brief in support of Petitioner's Amended Petition for Judicial Review. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a petition for judicial review of the November 15, 2007 decision of the Teton 
County Board of Commissioners (the "County" or the "Board") denying Bums' request for 
ORIGINAL 
a conditional use permit ("CUP") to construct a concrete batch plant. The same matter was 
previously before the Court at the conclusion of which the Court remanded it to the Board 
with the directive to prepare appropriate written findings and conclusions. The Board 
subsequently issued such required findings and conclusions, without conducting any further 
evidentiary hearings. Such findings have now been filed with the Court and the matter is 
now before the Court for consideration of Burns' original Petition for Judicial Review. The 
factual record and transcripts already lodged with the Court in this case, together with 
parties' briefs, appendices, and the Court's orders, establish the following facts and course 
of proceedings. 1 
Factual Background 
The property on which Burns' planned to construct the batch plant is located in Teton 
County within the Driggs City Area of Impact. The property on which the batch plant will 
be constructed is outside of Teton County's Scenic Corridor Overlay. The property was 
initially zoned C-3, a commercial zone. However, in February 2007, the Board approved 
Burns' request to rezone the property to M-1, an industrial zone. While the Board did attach 
certain conditions to its approval, none of those conditions related to the height of buildings 
which would be constructed on the property. No one, including Burns, appealed the Board's 
decision granting the rezone. 
1 Petitioner submitted a CD-ROM with its opening brief filed in conjunction with the first hearing in this matter. The 
CD contains PDF versions of the relevant ordinances and documents in effect at the time Petitioner filed its CUP application, 
including: the City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance; the City of Driggs Comprehensive Plan; the Teton County/ Driggs Area of 
Impact Ordinances; and the Teton County Zoning Ordinance. The CD also contains a Bates-stamped copy of the agency record. 
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During the summer of 2007, Burns submitted a CUP application to the City of Driggs, 
as is required under the County's Area of Impact Agreement with Driggs. The conditional 
use permit was necessary because the design for Burns' batch plant exceeded the height limit 
for buildings in the M-1 zone - forty-five feet (45'). The design of Burns' batch plant 
incorporated many features which would result in a quieter, cleaner, and more energy 
efficient structure. However, in order to incorporate these environmental advantages, the 
lowest possible design was seventy-five feet (75'). The Driggs planning and zoning staff 
recommended approval of the CUP. On July 11, 2007, the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission held a hearing on Burns' CUP application. At the conclusion of the hearing they 
voted to approve the application. CUP Tr. Vol. IV, p.27 L.18 through p.28, L.9.2 
The Driggs Area oflmpact Agreement states that the Board of County Commissioners 
must approve or deny any land use application approved by the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission. Thus, on November 15, 5007, the Board held a hearing on Burns' CUP 
application. At the hearing the Board received testimony in favor of, and opposed to, the 
plant. Although the batch plant was not located within the Scenic Corridor Overlay, the 
Board heard testimonyregardingthe plant's impact on the view of the Teton Peaks mountain 
range. Bums submitted engineering drawings showing that the batch plant would have much 
less of a visual impact than would a forty-five foot (45') building located within the Scenic 
2 When citing to transcripts, this Supplemental Brief uses the same nomenclature adopted by Petitioner's opening 
brief: "CUP Tr." with reference to the CUP proceedings; and "Rezone Tr." with respect to the earlier rezone proceedings in 
February, 2007. As the Court's file will reflect, the Agency transcript for the CUP application was supplemented with the 
transcript of the earlier rewne proceedings, following the lodging of the CUP proceedings transcript in this action. The 
references "Vol I", "Vol II" and "Vol III" will refer respectively to the transcripts of the two CUP hearings denominated CD I, 
CD 2, and CD 3. Vol. IV refers to the transcript of the July 11, 2007 CUP hearing before the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission. 
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Corridor Overlay. Nevertheless, the Board expressed concern that the batch plant would 
"impair the views" of the community. Ultimately the Board voted to deny Bums' CUP 
application. The Board based its decision on nonconformance with a purported "specific 
proposal" presented at the February 2007 rezone which "clearly indicated a 45-foot height." 
CUP Tr. Vol. III, p. 32, LL 1-19. The Board also alleged "lack of conformance to Driggs 
standards for condition evaluation of a CUP criteria No. 2 and No. 3." Id. The Board did 
not indicate what those criteria were, or how Bums' proposed facility failed to comply with 
those criteria. The Board did not produce written findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Procedural History of the Petition for Judicial Review 
Bums filed the instant Petition for Judicial Review on December 11, 2007. Among 
other things, Bums' argued that the Board violated provisions of the Idaho Code by failing 
to make a written statement of the factual basis and reasons for denying the CUP application; 
that the board erred in failing to specify proper legal standards upon which it based its denial 
of the permit; that the board erred by improperly relying on the February 2007 rezone as a 
basis for denying the CUP application; that the Board failed to comply the procedures of the 
governing local ordinance when denying the CUP application; and that the Board's failure 
to employ specific standards when denying the CUP application violated Bums' due process 
rights. All of these arguments were detailed extensively in the Bums' original briefs filed 
prior to the first hearing on the matter. 
On October 21, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on the matter. At the Court's 
request, oral argument focused exclusively on the issue of the adequacy, vel non, of the 
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Board's "findings." The County argued that the transcribed record of the November 15, 
2007, hearing satisfied the Idaho Code's requirement for a written decision. Burns disagreed 
and argued that the Board failed to comply with statute because they failed to set forth, in 
writing, the specific legal standards used to evaluate the CUP application, the facts they 
found to be significant, and the reasoning which led to their conclusion. The Court agreed 
with Burns and, in an Order dated October 3 0, 200 8, required the Board "to forthwith prepare 
and issue written findings and conclusions" consistent with I.C. § 67-6535. The Court's 
Order also indicated that Bums could file "an amended petition for judicial review" in the 
event that "Petitioner desires further judicial review of such written findings and 
conclusions." 
After the Court's October 30, 2008, Order, discussed below, the Board submitted 
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the "Findings") dated December 22, 2008. 
The Findings focus on the batch plant's height. The Board acknowledged that the plant will 
not be constructed within the Scenic Corridor Over lay, but nevertheless asserted that "the 7 5' 
height allowance will not be in conformance with the comprehensive plan for this portion of 
the scenic corridor." However, the Board again did not explain why such a height does not 
conform to the comprehensive plan's goals for an industrial zone located outside the Scenic 
Overlay Corridor. 3 In the Findings, the Board also based its denial of the CUP application 
on what it believes was "the community's understanding ... that the [February 2007] zone 
change would allow for a 45' high dry plant, and not a 75' high wet plant." The Board again 
3 As argued below, Petitioner asserts that conformance to the Comprehensive Plan is not relevant at this stage of the 
proceedings; that issue was already decided at the time of the original rezone. 
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failed to articulate specific facts upon which it based its conclusion that the CUP application 
did not conform to the Comprehensive Plan and that it was not compatible with the 
surrounding industrial uses. The Board also did not cite to specific provisions in the 
Comprehensive Plan which were allegedly not met by the CUP application. 
The County lodged the December 22, 2008, findings with the Court on February 10, 
2009. In response to the written Findings, Bums filed an Amended Statement of Issues on 
Judicial Review and now files this Supplemental Brief in support of its Amended Petition 
for Judicial Review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Except as supplemented below, Bums asserts that the arguments raised in its opening 
brief and reply brief retain vitality and apply with equal force to the new Findings now before 
the Court. Bums hereby incorporates the arguments made in those briefs by reference and 
respectfully urges this Court to give those arguments due consideration. Bums also asserts 
that the County's new Findings are inadequate under the Idaho Local Land Use Planning Act 
because Board has not specifically identified any provisions of the County's zoning laws 
used to evaluate the CUP application nor explained how a seventy-five foot (75 ') building 
would be inconsistent with adjoining industrial uses. Finally, Bums asserts that the written 
Findings' reliance on an alleged "understanding" or agreement that Bums' plant would be 
limited to forty-five feet (45'), purportedly made at the time of the earlier rezone, is 
erroneous as a matter of law. Simply stated, the record clearly shows there was no such 
"understanding." 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The County Has Still Not Complied with the Provisions ofldaho Code§ 67-6535. 
At the October 21, 2008, hearing on this matter, Bums asserted that the County had 
not complied with the requirements of the Local Land Use Planning Act because it had not 
prepared written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. See Idaho Code§ 67-6535. In the 
case of Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
'"We must require that [a local government body's] order clearly and precisely state what it 
found to be the facts and fully explain why those facts lead it to the decision it makes."' 104 
Idaho 32, 37, 655 P.2d 926, 931 (1982) (quoting South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League 
v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 280 Or. 3,569 P.2d 1063 (1977)). The court continued: 
What is needed for adequate judicial review is a clear statement 
of what, specifically, the decisionmaking body believes, after 
hearing and considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and 
important facts upon which its decision is based. Conclusions 
are not sufficient. 
Id. At the earlier hearing in this case, the Court rejected the County's argument that the 
transcript of the November 15, 2007, hearing before the Board, complied with the Idaho 
Code§ 67-6535, as interpreted by Worhnan Family Partnership. The Court disagreed and 
instructed the Board to "forthwith prepare and issue written findings and conclusions 
consistent with such code section." 
Although the County has now prepared written Findings, those Findings still do not 
meetthe requirements ofldaho Code§ 67-6535 and Workman Family Partnership any better 
than the hearing transcript. Specifically, the Findings commit the very sin which Workman 
7 - PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Family Partnership warned against: they do not explain what the County found to be the 
facts and why those facts lead to a certain conclusion. Despite the Supreme Court's explicit 
instructions, the Findings amount to little more than broad, unsupported legal conclusions 
without any specific reference to the particular legal standard of issue and without any 
specific reference to the facts relied upon in reaching such conclusion of law. 
The Findings state that one criterion which the Board used to evaluate the CUP 
application was whether the conditional use "will be harmonious with the general objective 
or with any specific objective of the Comprehensive Plan and/or the zoning Ordinance."4 
Findings at p. 3. First, it should be noted that the County continues to use the Comprehensive 
Plan as a regulatory measure in violation of the holding in Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 
Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (S. Ct. 2000). See Petitioner's Reply Brief at p. 13. Similarly, the 
County's use ofbroadly stated goals, objectives and community values in the Comprehensive 
Plan as regulatory provisions also violates Petitioner's due process rights. See Petitioner's 
Brief at p. 25. Aside from those fundamental short comings, the Findings do not identify 
which general or specific objectives of the Comprehensive Plan or Zoning Ordinance the 
Board used to evaluate the CUP application. Nor do the findings state which facts the 
County relied upon in reaching the conclusion that the CUP application does not comport 
with the Comprehensive Plan. Specifically, with one limited exception noted below, the 
Findings fail to identify which provision in the ninety-eight (98) page Comprehensive Plan 
was not met by Petitioner's CUP Application. 
4 See Petitioner's Br. at 9-12 for Burns' argument that the County applied the wrong legal standard when evaluating 
the CUP application. 
8 - PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Nor do the Findings identify any specific fact or facts supporting their conclusion that 
"a seventy-five foot (75') height could not be allowed with or without conditions to ensure 
protection and capability with the surrounding uses and neighborhood." See Findings No. 
9, p. 4. Specifically, the Findings fail to describe the adjoining industrial uses, and fail to 
state specific facts supporting their conclusion that the view of the Teton Mountain Range 
would be obscured. In fact, the line of sight diagrams Bums introduced into evidence at the 
hearing show that due to the location of the batch plant outside the scenic corridor and the 
lengthy distance between Highway 33 and the location of the batch plant, the view of the 
Tetons would not be obscured. Further, the Findings fail to address why a "view of the 
Tetons" would be important with respect to property located within an industrial zone outside 
the scenic corridor. Nor did the Findings set forth a factual finding explaining why the 
proposed CUP would not be in harmony with adjacent industrial uses. The Findings do 
assert that height of seventy-five feet (7 5 ') would be inconsistent with Comprehensive Plan's 
scenic corridor provision. Findings No. 9, p. 4. However, as the Findings acknowledge, the 
proposed conditional use is "off of a [sic] scenic corridor." Id. Clearly, the County appears 
to be engaging in an ad hoc modification of the comprehensive plan to extend the boundaries 
of the scenic corridor beyond areas currently designated as scenic corridor. In any event, the 
County merely offers the conclusory statement that a seventy-five foot (75 ') building would 
be inconsistent with the scenic corridor provisions of the Comprehensive Plan. However, 
the County does not specifically identify any of those provisions nor does the county explain 
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why a seventy-five foot (75') building would be inconsistent with them.5 
As noted in Petitioner's initial brief, when the County rezoned the property to M-1 
(Light Industrial), they implicitly and necessarily made a finding that all permitted uses in 
the M-1 zone were consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. 6 See Petitioner's Reply Brief, 
p. 14-17. Uses having a height in excess of forty-five feet (45') are specifically permitted 
conditional uses in the M-1 zone and the County's finding in this case that such uses are 
inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan now flies squarely in the face of their earlier 
conclusions at the time the property was rezoned to M-1. See Petitioner's Brief p. 22-23. 
In effect, the County is now attempting to down zone Petitioner's property, without 
conducting the required notice and hearing process under the Local Planning Act. 
As was also noted in Petitioner's earlier briefs, the County simply ignored the Driggs 
Zoning Ordinance and instead used the convenient fall-back of concluding that the CUP 
Permit was not in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan, without any supporting facts or 
without reference to any specific legal criteria. Petitioner's Brief at 13-18. Instead of 
considering or imposing operational conditions or developmental conditions necessary to 
mitigate impact upon adjoining industrial uses, the County simply makes an unsupported 
conclusion that a "view of the Teton Mountain Range" is somehow important or necessary 
for the adjoining industrial uses, even though Petitioner's property is located outside the 
5 The Findings make the conclusory statement that "views of the Teton Mountain Range would be obstructed by such a 
building, and evidence, including public comment, was presented that surrounding neighbors would have their views of the 
mountains obstructed." Findings at p. 4. Assuming, arguendo, that the building would impact some of the neighbors' view, the 
County does not explain how a building outside the scenic corridor would violate any provision of the zoning ordinance or 
comprehensive plan. 
6 All rezonings must be in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. LC. § 67-6511. 
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scenic corridor. Clearly, the County failed to follow the Driggs Zoning Ordinance when it 
failed to consider appropriate operational conditions designed to minimize adverse effect on 
adjoining industrial properties. Instead the Board simply reverted to the subterfuge of using 
a "view of the Tetons" as the criteria for concluding that it was impossible to impose 
operational or development" condition necessary to ensure protection and compatibility with 
surroundingproperties . .. " See Driggs Zoning Ordinance Section 281.07, Section 2. See 
also Petitioner's Brief, p. 23. 
In short, though the County has now prepared written Findings, the County has not 
complied with this Court's Order that it submit findings consistent with Idaho Code § 67-
6535. The County has not "clearly and precisely stated what found to be the facts," the 
County has not specifically identified the relevant legal standards, nor has the County 
explained how it applied the facts to those legal standards to reach a conclusion. Because 
the County has not complied with Idaho Code§ 67-6535, the Court should again remand the 
matter to the County with explicit and direct instructions to focus strictly upon operational 
or development conditions "necessary to ensure protection and compatibility of surrounding 
properties, as required by the Driggs Zoning Ordinance." (Italics added). The Court should 
further specifically instruct the County to fairly and fully consider the possibility of such 
conditions and to explicitly document why it is impossible to impose conditions such as will 
assure compatibility with surrounding properties, if that is the conclusion they ultimately 
reach. The Court should expressly instruct the County that legal conclusions without such 
factual support and findings do not meet the Workman Family Partnership Standard and that 
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their failure to comport with that standard may result in an imposition of attorneys fees or 
other sanctions of the Court. 
II. 
The County Erred in Basing its Denial of the Cup Application on the February 
2007 Rezone. 
Although Bums contends that the Findings are statutorily deficient, the Findings do 
show that the County denied Bums' Conditional Use Permit based on the erroneous 
conclusion that the February 2007 rezone was conditioned on a forty-five foot ( 45 ') high 
concrete batch plant. Contrary to the Board's written Findings, the motion granting the 
earlier rezone was as follows: 
Commissioner Stevenson: I wasn't sure if you already had. Okay. 
I'd like to make a motion that we approve this zone change from C-3 to M-1 as 
requested - do we need to go through all - okay- with the condition that- conditions 
that the development agreement to be worked out with City and County Planning and 
Zoning Administrators address issues, such as noise, dust, truck traffic, landscaping, 
downlighting, hours of operation, building design, access improvements to perhaps 
include the road on the east side, and, also, that this zone change is specifically for the 
proposed Concrete Batch Plant. And, so, that if this project does not come to fruition, 
it would revert to C-3. 
Rezone Tr., p. 36, L. 18 throughp. 37, L. 7. As can be seen from this motion, the conditions 
to be imposed were to be included within a development agreement addressing things such 
as "noise, dust, truck traffic, landscaping, downlighting, hours of operation, building design, 
access and roads." No height limitation was imposed in the development agreement 
subsequently approved by the County. R. pp.75-82. The Board's decision is erroneous for 
two reasons: first, the record does not support the conclusion that the rezone was conditioned 
on any height limitations, and second, the County lacks power to enforce conditions which 
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are not clearly expressed in the record or allowed under the zoning ordinance. 
A. The County's Finding That February 2007 Rezone Was Contingent on a Forty-
.five Foot (45) Concrete Plant Is Clearly Erroneous. 
The Findings specifically indicate that the Board believed it's decision to grant the 
February2007 rezone "was based upon the Board's understanding that a concrete batch plant 
would be in conformance with the 45' height limitation." Findings at 3. Elsewhere the 
Board affirms its belief that the rezone was conditioned on "a 45' high dry plant, and not a 
7 5' high wet plant." Id. at 4. As noted in Petitioner's opening brief, a careful review of the 
record in the earlier rezone proceedings indicates that this finding has no support whatsoever 
in the Board's earlier decision. See Petitioner's Br. at 20-22. 
At the earlier rezone hearing in February, the parties discussed the height of the 
proposed concrete plant. While at that time Bums hoped to be able to engineer the plant to 
fit within that forty-five foot ( 45') limitation, Kirk Bums clearly indicated that it likely would 
not meet the height limitation: 
CHAIRMAN YOUNG: So, you're talking about a rectangular building of 
what square footage and what height? 
MR. KIRK BURNS: We don't have that completely worked out. We're 
shooting to get the 45 foot limit. Concrete plants are difficult on that. We 
discussed a.five and ten foot possible variance. 
Rezone Tr. p. 52, L. 7-13 (emphasis added). 
Even though as it turned out the plant required more than a ten foot ( 10 ') variance, the 
likelihood of that the building would be at least fifty-five feet (55 ') high was clearly 
discussed at the hearing. There is nothing in the record indicating that the Board granted the 
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rezone with the understanding that the concrete plant would not exceed forty-five feet ( 45 '). 
The Board's finding that the previous rezone limited the building height to forty-five feet 
( 45') or less is patently incorrect and clearly erroneous. This Court should give that finding 
no deference. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 180 P .3d 487 (2008) (holding that 
the court is not bound by the agency's findings of fact where they are clearly erroneous). 
B. Conditions Which Are Not Clearly Stated in the Record Are Not Enforceable. 
Assuming arguendo, that the County had the power to impose conditions as part of 
the rezone process,7 those conditions should have been clearly stated in the record in order 
for them to be binding on Bums. Zoning conditions are only effective when they are 
expressed with sufficient clarity to inform the applicant and nearby land owners of the 
limitations on the use of the land. 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning§ 883. Conditions must be clearly 
and specifically stated in the record; they "cannot incorporate by reference statements made 
by an applicant at the hearing." Id. "Conditions that are not stated on the permit may not be 
imposed on the permittee." In re Alfred Kostenblatt, 161 Vt. 292, 640 A.2d 39 (1994). 
The Board did not issue written findings or a written decision in connection with the 
February 2007 rezone. As noted above, there were no express height conditions specifically 
expressed by the Board at the rezone hearing. While it is true that Kirk Bums expressed his 
hope that the plant could be engineered to meet the height restriction, his comments cannot 
form the basis of enforceable conditions on the use of the property. There is quite simply 
7 
Bums alleges that any height limitation would have been in any event an ultra vires action on the part of the Board 
because the zoning ordinance specifically allows buildings higher that forty-five feet ( 45 ') as conditional uses. See Petitioner's 
Br. at 22-23. 
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nothing in the record which indicates that the February 2007 rezone was made contingent 
upon a forty-five foot ( 45 ') height limitation. Because there was no express height limitation 
in the record for the earlier rezone, such a limitation is not enforceable against Burns. It was 
improper for the Board to premise its denial of the CUP application on its purported 
"understanding" that the concrete plant would be limited to forty-five feet (45'). 
Bums' original briefs detail many other shortcomings and errors committed by the 
County during the course of the November 15, 2007, hearing. Those arguments will not here 
be repeated and the Court is referred to those briefs which apply with equal vitality to the 
County's new Findings. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the arguments set forth in Petitioner's original brief are equally applicable to 
the Board's newly adopted written Findings and the County's latest decision should be set 
aside for the reasons stated therein. The Board made no attempt to impose operational or 
development conditions designed to ensure compatibility with adjoining industrial uses, as 
was required by the Driggs Zoning Ordinance. Further, the Board made no finding, as 
required by the Zoning Ordinance, that it was impossible to adopt any set of operational or 
developmental conditions that would assure neighborhood compatibility. Instead, the Board 
relied upon a very vague "view of the Teton Mountain Range" as its sole criteria, despite the 
fact that the plant is located outside the scenic corridor. It failed to recite any facts 
explaining why "view of the Teton Mountain Range" was necessary to assure compatibility 
with the adjoining industrial and commercial uses. The Board cited no ordinance provision 
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supporting their "view of the mountains" provision nor did they point to any provision in the 
Comprehensive Plan requiring such view for properties outside the scenic corridor. 
Petitioner's fundamental due process rights have been violated, rather blatantly, in this 
case, and the Board's decision should be again reversed with specific and express directions 
to follow the Driggs Zoning Ordinance as written, and to cease using the Comprehensive 
Plan as a regulatory measure, in violation of the Urrutia case noted above. The Court should 
award attorneys fees in this case and further admonish the County that their failure to follow 
the Court's direction may warrant the imposition of attorneys fees and other sanctions . 
.1l 
DATED this .1{ day of May, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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RE: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~tlZ£lA1,.. 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 6:[D M 
*********************** 
• ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF CASES FROM 
JUDGE BRENT J. MOSS TO JUDGE GREGORY W. 
MOELLER; 
• ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF TETON 
COUNTY CASES FROM JUDGE JON J. 
SHINDURLING TO JUDGE GREGORY W. MOELLER 
• ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFER OF JEFFERSON 
COUNTY CIVIL CASES FROM JUDGE GREGORY 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all cases previously assigned to Brent J. Moss in the 
Seventh Judicial District are transferred to Judge Gregory W. Moeller, EXCEPT for cases in 
Lemhi, Custer and Butte counties that were assigned to Judge Joel E. Tingey pursuant to 
Administrative Order 2009-03-30; all closed or inactive cases previously assigned to Judge Brent 
J. Moss in the remaining counties will now be assigned to Judge Gregory W. Moeller. This 
order is effective April 24, 2009. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Teton County cases assigned to Judge Jon J. 
Shindurling are transferred to Judge Gregory W. Moeller; all closed or inactive Teton cases 
previously assigned to Judge Jon J. Shindurling or Judge Brent J. Moss shall be assigned to 
Judge Gregory W. Moeller; effective May 20, 2009 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Jefferson County cases assigned to Judge Brent J. 
Moss and all civil cases assigned to Judge Gregory S. Anderson are transferred to Judge Gregory 
W. Moeller; all closed or inactive civil Jefferson County cases previously assigned to Judge 
Brent J. Moss or Gregory S. Anderson shall be assigned to Judge Gregory W. Moeller; unless 
specifically retained by the presiding judges; effective May 20, 2009. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order shall be filed by the Clerk of the 
Court in each pending case and a copy sent to each attorney/party of record; effective May 20, 
2009. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrative District Judge may determine on a 
case by case basis that a matter be retained by the previously assigned Judge for purposes of 
judicial efficiency; effective May 20, 2009. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that parties in these actions shall file all original pleadings, 
briefs, affidavits, or other documents with the District Court Clerk in the County of original 
jurisdiction, and FURTHER_MORE, counsel and parties are to comply with I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(F) 
and Idaho Criminal Rule 3.2 by lodging copies of filed documents with the Judge at resident 
chambers. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. ( A 
DA TED THIS 4DA Y OF"-/1;_-L-L.:.:.._th~,V:!.J-j --~:..______;'--, 2009. 
Distribution: 
Seventh Judicial District Bar 
Seventh Judicial District Elected Clerks 
Seventh Judicial District Prosecutor's Office 
Seventh Judicial District Public Defender's Office 
Honorable Gregory W. Moeller 
Honorable Gregory S. Anderson 
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
Honorable Joel Tingey 
Honorable Darren B. Simpson 
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This Supplemental Brief is submitted by Respondents Board of Commissioners of 
Teton County, Idaho ("County"). This brief responds to the Petitioner's Supplemental 
Brief dated May 21, 2009. 
I. SUMMARY OF .ARGUMENT 
This is a strange case. I call it strange because many people seem to be arguing 
over a pig when in fact there is a cow before us. The pig is the conditional use permit 
("CUP") applied for by Burns Holdings, LLC to exceed the 45' height limit for the 
Drigg's area of impact M-1 zone. The cow is the variance procedure that should have 
been followed in order to modify the ordinance's height requirement. According to § 67-
6516 of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA") a variance must be obtained before 
one can modify the height of a building. Contrary to LLUP A, Section 13 C of the City of 
Driggs' Ordinance 281-07 (attached as Exhibit "A") states that "[a]ny building or 
structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height 
unless approved by conditional use permit." This sentence conflicts not only with 
LLUPA but with the Driggs' Ordinances themselves. Section 3 of the City of Driggs 
Ordinance 274-07 (attached as Exhibit "B") parrots LLUPA stating that "[a] variance is a 
modification of the requirements of this ordinance as to ... height of buildings ... " The 
ordinance goes on to distinguish a variance from a CUP by stating "[a] variance does not 
include a change of authorized land use." If you cannot obtain a variance for what is a 
change of use then the converse is true and you cannot obtain a change of use for what is 
a variance. Even if the Driggs' ordinances did not agree with LLUP A, LLUP A controls. 
"A local ordinance that conflicts with a state law or is preempted by state regulation of 
the subject matter, is void." Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854, 862, 993 P.2d 
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617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 112 
Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987); see also Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 
104 Idaho 615, 617, 661 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1983) (holding that proposed initiative to 
adopt zoning ordinance conflicted with procedures under LLUP A for adoption of 
planning and zoning ordinances and, therefore, the district court properly enjoined the 
initiative election). 
Because it is clear, both in Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act and in the 
Driggs' City Ordinances that a variance must be obtained in order to modify the height 
restrictions of a particular zone Petitioner should have applied for a variance and not a 
CUP. Because all the guidance and law surrounding how a CUP is approved or denied 
are inapplicable to what is in reality a variance request, the County was unable to grant 
the CUP. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. You CAN CALLA Cow A PIG BUT IT IS STILL A Cow. 
The manner in which a zoning decision may be made is the exclusive function of 
the legislative branch of government. The procedural steps which the legislature puts in 
place for processing particular land-use restrictions are mandatory, regardless of the 
characterization of the proceedings. Gay v. County Commissioners of Bonneville County, 
103 Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (Idaho App.1982). In Gay, Simplot applied for 
and obtained a variance to construct a fertilizer storage and blending facility that was not 
a permitted use in their A-1 zone. In determining the standard of review to apply to the 
action the Court stated: 
Although the county's action here has been characterized as the granting of a 
"variance," it was in reality a change of authorized land use for a particular 
parcel of property ..... The statute defines a variance as follows: 
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Id. 
a modification of the requirements of the [ zoning] ordinance 
as to lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, side yard, 
rear yard, setbacks, parking space, height of buildings, or other ordinance 
provision affecting the size or shape of a structure 
or the placement of the structure upon lots, or the size of lots. 
A variance, as so defined, does not include a change of authorized land use. 
Rather, it is limited to adjustment of certain regulations concerning the 
physical characteristics of the subject property. 
Driggs, m one phrase of its ordinances, characterizes as a CUP what is in reality a 
variance. Just as a variance does not include a change of authorized land use, a 
conditional use permit does not include the adjustment of regulations concerning the 
physical characteristics of a property, this is clearly defined as a variance under LLUPA. 
It is apparent from the Idaho Code and the Drigg' s Ordinances that a CUP and a variance 
are "dissimilar, are not one and the same and that the provisions for each are not to be 
construed together as reciprocal parts of an integrated ordinance.". One Hundred Two 
Glenstone, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of City of Springfield, 572 S.W. 2d 891, 893 (Mo. 
App. 1978). 
In One Hundred Two Glenstone the Plaintiff was erroneously issued a building 
permit for a loading dock that was in violation of the City's setback ordinance. When the 
zoning violation was discovered a stop work order was issued by the City and Plaintiff 
applied for a "special exception" which is synonymous with a conditional use permit or 
special use permit. Id. The Springfield Board denied the request for a special exception. 
The Court in its review of the matter stated: 
In short, what plaintiff actually needed was a variance. However, it erroneously and 
repeatedly assured the board that it sought only a special exception to which, in our 
opinion, it was not entitled. Therefore, as there was no application before the board 
for or a hearing held on a variance, we cannot say that the board or the circuit court 
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erred in not granting, sua sponte, a variance or in denying the specific and limited 
request for a special exception. 
Id. at 894; citing Waeckerle v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 525 S.W.2d 351, 358 
(Mo.App.1975). As in the present case, the plaintiff needed a variance and not a special 
use permit and thus the Board was justified in denying the application. 
Petitioner raises several arguments in its briefs, all of which center around the 
County's improper evaluation of the CUP application. The briefs are somewhat difficult 
to interpret because of the pig/cow problem. All of Petitioner's arguments and 
supporting authority talk about conditional uses and are thus inapplicable to the height 
modification requested. LLUP A and the Driggs ordinances clearly require that an 
applicant obtain a variance for a height modification. Idaho Code § 67-6516. So the pig, 
the CUP, needs to be recognized as a cow, a variance, and the correct application and 
procedure followed. 
B. THE COUNTY WAS UNABLE TO GRANT THE PETITIONER THE CUP 
BECAUSE PETITIONER NEEDS AV ARIANCE 
Petitioner argues that the County failed to provide specific criteria as to why the 
County denied their application for a CUP. A CUP application is not analogous to a 
variance and therefore the application could not be granted. One Hundred Two 
Glenstones, Inc., 572 S. W. 2d at 894. LLUP A provides the standards for determining the 
validity of a conditional use permit: 
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions 
pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of 
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the 
proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a). 
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Section 2 of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07 (attached as Exhibit C) also addresses 
conditional use permit procedures, offering criteria similar to the above and adding that 
there must be conditions imposed upon the use that assure protection and compatibility 
with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood. Thus an applicant may obtain a 
CUP in the Driggs impact area if: 1) the use is listed as conditionally allowed; 2) 
conditions are imposed pursuant to the specific provisions of the ordinance; 3) the 
approval is subject to the ability of political subdivisions, including school districts, to 
provide services for the use; 4) there is a finding that the use does not conflict with the 
comprehensive plan; and 5) conditions are imposed upon the use that assure protection 
and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood. Following is 
a detailed discussion of these requirements in relation to this application. 
1. The CUP could not be granted because the proposed use is not listed as 
conditionally allowed. 
Subsection B of Section 13 (see Exhibit "A") lists the ten (10) "Conditional Uses 
Permitted" in the M-1 zone (kennel, sawmill, etc.). All ten of these conditional uses are 
in fact uses and a height of 75 feet is not among them. It is possible that one of the listed 
uses could have a 75 foot high structure, but only if they obtained a variance. If a use is 
not listed in the zoning ordinance then the listed uses are reviewed to determine whether 
the proposed use is similar to any of those listed. A modification of the height of a 
building is not only absent from the list of permitted conditional uses, it is not similar to 
any of the 10 permitted uses. Respondent understands that the ordinance is confusing 
since Subsection C does state that any building or structure "shall not exceed forty-five 
(45) feet in height unless approved by a conditional use permit." (Emphasis added.) The 
wording of the ordinance is unfortunate but it should have been recognized that what was 
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being suggested is that an applicant who wishes to exceed maximum height limit may 
apply to do so and that Idaho law requires that a variance be obtained for a height 
modification. 
2. The CUP could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed in 
the ordinance because they are applicable only to changes in use. 
The Driggs' ordinance that addresses conditional use permit procedures also lists 
conditions that could be attached to the granting of a permit: 
a. Minimizing adverse impact on other development; 
b. Controlling the sequence and timing of development; 
c. Controlling the duration of development; 
d. Assuring the development is maintained properly; 
e. Designating the exact location and nature of development; 
f. Requiring the provision for on-site facilities or services; and 
g. Requiring more restrictive standards than those generally required in this 
ordinance. 
Section 2 (A) (2) of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07 (attached as Exhibit C). 
Petitioner complains that the County failed to impose any of the conditions listed in the 
ordinance (Petitioner's Brief p.24). But, none of these conditions are applicable to a 
request to build a structure 35 feet higher than a 45 foot maximum. 
3. Criteria #3 is applicable only to changes in use. 
The ability of political subdivisions to provide services is immaterial to a height 
variance. 
4. The CUP could not be granted because the County found that the "use" 
was in conflict with the comprehensive plan. 
Section III of Respondent's initial brief complains that the County relied upon the 
comprehensive plan in its denial of the application, yet LLUPA and the Driggs ordinance 
both require a finding that the proposed use is not in conflict with the comprehensive 
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plan. Throughout the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan the area North of Driggs is referred to 
as a "gateway". Section 9.3 of the Plan lists gateways at the North and South entrance to 
Driggs as a "need". The Plan's 'Vision' for Community Design states: 
The Vision for Hwy 33 outside of downtown is as an attractive, functional, 
and memorable gateway into the community. The sense of arrival at each 
end of the community should be dramatic, but in keeping with the beauty of 
Teton Valley and the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be 
setback from the highway, with ample landscaping, concealed parking and 
architecture that draws on the western and agricultural vernaculars ... 
Driggs' Comprehensive Plan, Section 9.4, Page 61 (emphasis added). One of the stated 
actions under Section 9 .4 is to "[ c ]reate and maintain attractive gateways to Driggs on 
Highway 33 (South and North) and on Ski Hill Road." The County found that the 
application conflicted with the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan because it almost doubled 
the allowable height of the zone. 
5. The County could not grant the CUP because it was unable to impose 
conditions upon the use that assured protection and compatibility with the 
surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood. 
Because the use of the property was not at issue Gust the height of a structure on 
the property) it was not possible for the County to impose conditions on the use at the 
CUP hearing. The Driggs' Ordinance notably states that the Planning Commission "will 
not approve" the proposed use if such conditions cannot be met. Section 2 (A) (1) of the 
City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07 (attached as Exhibit C). The Driggs Planning 
Commission thus should have denied the conditional use permit, never sending it to the 
County. 
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C. PETITIONER MOST LIKELY COULD NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
A VARIANCE AND CANNOT OBTAIN ONE BY GOING THROUGH AN EASIER 
PROCESS. 
It is doubtful that Petitioner could obtain approval for a height variance because 
their need for a height modification has nothing to do with the characteristics of the site. 
The Idaho Code and the Driggs' Ordinance both state (inside the parenthetical is the 
Driggs' Ordinance's only addition to Idaho Code§ 67-6516): 
A variance shall not be considered a right or special privilege, but may be 
granted to an applicant only upon a showing of undue hardship because of 
characteristics of the site and that the variance is not in conflict with the public 
interest [ nor the general land or conditions of the neighborhood]. 
Idaho Code § 67-6516 and Section 3(A)(2) of the City of Driggs Ordinance 274-07 
(attached as Exhibit "B") 
The criteria for a variance are not only completely different than those for a CUP, they 
are also much tougher to meet. For example, undue hardship is not a prerequisite to the 
granting of a conditional use permit, whereas a showing of undue hardship is a 
prerequisite to obtaining a variance, and the undue hardship has to be caused by the 
peculiarities of the site. Because the criteria for a variance are different and stricter than 
that for a CUP, Petitioner cannot effectively obtain a height variance by going through 
the easier, less restrictive, CUP process. 
III. CONCLUSION 
You can call a cow a pig, but it is still a cow. Rather than changing the nature of 
the height restriction, the Driggs' Ordinance merely states the obvious - that in order to 
exceed the maximum height limit you have to get permission. It does not matter that 
Driggs mistakenly says you need a conditional use permit; LLUPA is clear, the 
modification of the height of building requires a variance. 
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If it walks like a cow and talks like a cow it is a cow. 
Moooo. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 2009 
Respectfully submitted, 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this $ctay of July, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Respondent's Brief, by causing a copy thereof to be hand-
delivered or by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
Dale Storer [ X ) Mail [ ) Hand [ ] Fax 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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EXHIBIT A 
Section 13. M-1 (Light Industrial) 
The purpose of the M-1 Light Industrial Zone is to provide for and encourage the 
grouping of light industrial uses. Uses must be capable of operating in a location 
where appearance of buildings and the treatment of the land about them will be 
unobtrusive and not detrimental to surrounding commercial or residential uses. 
A. Uses Allowed: 
1. Manufacturing, assembling, fabricating, processing, packing, 
repairing, or storage uses which have not been declared a nuisance 
by statute, resolution or any court of competent jurisdiction and 
provided these uses shall not cause: 
a. Unreasonable dust, smoke, gas, fumes, noise, vibration, or odor 
beyond the boundaries of the site on which such use is conducted; 
nor 
b. Hazard of fire, explosion, or other physical damage to any 
adjacent building or vegetation; 
2. Wholesaling, warehousing, storage, and distribution; 
3. Storage of contracting equipment, maintenance or operating 
equipment of public agencies or public utilities or materials and 
equipment of a similar nature; 
4. Food processing; and 
5. Industrial laundry and dry cleaning. 
6. Grain elevator and bulk storage such as for potatoes, hay, and other 
similar uses; 
7. Radio or television studio; 
8. Auction establishment; 
9. Auto gas/service station; 
10. Auto sales and service; 
11. Trailer sales and rentals; 
12. Commercial or private off-street parking lot; 
13. Auto body and paint shop; 
14. Truck repair/service station; 
15. Business services, as defined in Chapter 4, Section 5; 
16. Crafts shop; 
17. Cottage industry 
18. Bottling and distribution plant; 
19. Contractor's shop; 
20. Sale of hay, grain, seed and related supplies; 
21. Sale of heavy building material and machinery; 
22. Sale of salvaged goods within an enclosed building; 
23. Sheet metal, roofing or sign painting shop; 
24. Storage warehouse; 
25. Trade or industrial school; and 
26. Temporary building as necessary for construction purposes, and for a 
period not to exceed one year. 








Conditional Uses Permitted: 
1. Kennel; 
2. Broadcasting tower for radio or television; 
3. Storage for wholesale or for distribution in bulk of any flammable 
liquid above or below ground; 
4. Sawmill or log production facility; 
5. Impound yard or any similar safe storage facility; 
6. Micro-brewery; 
7. Animal hospital/ vet clinic; 
8. Private amusement park, ball park, race track or similar uses; 
9. Transit or trucking terminal; and 
10. Public utility installation. 
Height Regulations: 
Any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed 
forty-five (45) feet in height unless approved bycooditionaLus.e.pennit. 
Setback Requirements: 
1. Front yard: 
The front yard setback shall be a minimum of twenty (20) feet when a 
lot abuts, touches, adjoins, or is across the street from a residential 
zone; otherwise, no front yard setback is required. 
2. Side yard: 
The side yard shall be a minimum of twenty (20) feet when a lot abuts, 
touches, or adjoins a residential zone; otherwise, no side yard setback 
is required. 
3. Rear yard: 
The rear yard shall be a minimum of twenty (20) feet when a lot abuts, 
touches, or adjoins a residential zone; otherwise, no rear yard setback 
is required. 
Area Requirements: 
There shall be no minimum lot size. 
Accessory Buildings: 
Accessory buildings shall not be placed in front yard and shall meet the same 
setback requirements as principal buildings. An accessory building or group 
of accessory buildings with a residential use shall not cover more than thirty 
(30) percent of the rear yard. Accessory buildings under 120 square feet in 
size shall not be required to meet rear and side yard setback requirements. 
Off-Street Parking Requirements: 
All off-street parking shall be governed by Chapter 2, Section 2. 
Signs: 
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The erection of signs is regulated by the current Sign Ordinance adopted by 
the City of Driggs. 
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Section 3. Variance Procedures 
A. The Following Section Shall Apply to Variances: 
1. A variance is a modification of the requirements of this ordinance as to 
lot size, lot coverage, width, depth, front yard, rear yard, setbacks, 
parking space, height of buildings, size of lots, or other ordinance 
provisions affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement 
of the structure upon the lot. A variance does not include a change of 
authorized land use. 
2. A variance shall not be considered a right or special privilege, but may 
be granted to an applicant only upon showing of undue hardship 
because of characteristics of the site and that variance is not in conflict 
with the public interest nor the general land or conditions in tl1e 
neighborhood. 
3. Applications for a variance shall be filed with the City on forms 
prescribed by the City accompanied by such data and information 
necessary to assure the fullest presentation of facts and evaluation by 
the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
4. A filing fee set by resolution shall be submitted by the property owner 
or owner's representative at the time of filing an application for a 
variance. 
5. A record of hearings, findings made and actions taken shall be 
maintained. 
6. Prior to granting or denying a variance, at least one (1) public hearing 
in which interested persons shall have an opportunity to be heard shall 
be held. At least fifteen (15) days prior to the hearing, notice of the 
time and place, and a summary of the proposed variance shall be 
published in the official newspaper or paper of general circulation 
within the jurisdiction. 
7. Notice of the hearing shall be provided to property owners and 
purchasers of record adjoining the parcel under consideration. Notice 
shall also be posted on the premises or property not less than one (1) 
week prior to the hearing. 
8. Upon granting or denying a variance, the Planning Commission shall 
specify: 
a. The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application; 
b. The reasons for approval or denial; and 
c. The procedural actions, if any, that the applicant could take to 
obtain a permit for a variance. 
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9. Any owner or purchaser of record within a two hundred (200) foot 
radius of the exterior boundaries of the subject property may appeal 
the decision of the Planning Commission, provided written notice of 
the appeal is filed with the City Clerk within five (5) working days after 
the decision of the Planning Commission. 
10. In reviewing an appeal, the City Council shall hold a public hearing 
following the same procedures as the Planning Commission and may 
approve, disapprove, or modify the action of the Planning Commission. 
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Section 2. Conditional Use Permit Procedures 
A. The Following Provisions Shall Apply to conditional use permits: 
1. The Planning Commission may, following the notice and hearing 
procedures provided under Section 67-6509, Idaho Code, permit 
conditional uses where the uses are not in conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan nor the zoning ordinance. If the proposed 
conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to 
assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, 
uses and neighborhood, the Planning Commission will not approve the 
proposed use. 
2. Upon the granting of a conditional use permit, conditions may be 
attached including, but not limited to, those: 
a. Minimizing adverse impact on other development; 
b. Controlling the sequence and timing of development; 
c. Controlling the duration of development; 
d. Assuring the development is maintained properly; 
e. Designating the exact location and nature of development; 
f. Requiring the provision for on-site facilities or services; and 
g. Requiring more restrictive standards than those generally required 
in this ordinance. 
3. Prior to granting or denying a conditional use, studies may be required 
of the social, economic, fiscal and environmental effect of the 
proposed conditional use. A conditional use is not transferable from 
one parcel of land to another. 
4. Upon granting or denying a conditional use permit, the Planning 
Commission shall specify: 
a. The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application; 
b. The reason for approval or denial; and 
c. The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a permit. 
5. An applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision may within 
sixty (60) days after all remedies have been exhausted under this 
ordinance, seek judicial review under the procedures provided by 
Sections 67-5215 (b) through 67-5216, Idaho Code. 
6. Application for conditional use permit shall be filed with the City on 
forms prescribed by the city accompanied by such data and 
information necessary to assure the fullest presentation of facts and 
evaluation by the Planning and Zoning Commission. 
7. A filing fee set by resolution shall be submitted by the property owner 
or owner's representative at the time of filing an application for a 
conditional use permit. 
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8. A record of hearings, findings made and actions taken shall be 
maintained. 
9. Any owner or purchaser of record within a three hundred (300) foot 
radius of the exterior boundaries of the subject conditional use 
property may appeal the decision of the Planning Commission, 
provided written notice of the appeal is filed with the City Clerk within 
five (5) working days after the decision of the Planning Commission. 
10. In reviewing an appeal, the City Council shall hold a public hearing 
following the same procedures as the Planning Commission and may 
approve, disapprove, or modify the action of the Planning Commission. 
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT CO1JRT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
PETITIONER'S SECOND REPLY 
BRIEF 
CO1\1ES NOW Petitioner, Burns Holding, LLC ("Bums"), and submits the following 
Second Reply Briefin response to the Respondent's Supplemental Brief dated July 16, 2009. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Petitioner has filed three briefs in this action prior to the instant brief, to wit: 
Petitioner's initial Brief dated July 11, 2008, a Reply Brief dated August 26, 2008, and a 
Supplemental Brief dated May 26, 2009. Following the initial argument of this case before 
n 1 ,_ 2 11RIGINAL 
Judge Shindurling, the Court ordered Teton County to prepare written findings of fact and 
conclusions as required by Idaho Code § 67-6535. See Order dated October 30, 2008. 
Following such remand, the County then adopted new Findings of Pact and a written decision 
and Petitioner thereafter filed an Amended Petition for Judicial Review, once again 
challenging the County's written Findings for precisely the same reasons that it had earlier 
challenged the County's verbal decision. Concurrently with the filing of its Amended 
Petition for Judicial Review, Bums also filed a Supplemental Brief dated May 26, 2009. In 
that Brief, Bums noted once again that the County's written decision suffered from the same 
shortcomings, deficiencies and problems exhibited in its earlier verbal decision. On July 16, 
2009, Teton County filed its Supplemental Brief in response to Petitioner's Supplemental 
Brief. This Brief now responds to Teton County's Supplemental Brief dated July 16, 2009. 
I. 
Teton County's SupplementaJ Brief Fails to Address the Issues Raised in this 
Petition for Judicial Review and Raises New Issues on AppeaJ for the First Time. 
A. Failure to Address Issues Raised on Appeal. 
In its initial Brief dated July 11, 2008, Bums raised the following issues in its 
Statement of Issues for Review: 
1. Did the Board err in failing to adopt a written statement setting forth the factual 
basis for its decision and a reasoned statement explaining the Board's denial 
of Petitioner's CUP application, in violation of LC. § 67-6535? 
2. Did the Board err by failing to specify the reasoning, standards and criteria 
used to deny the CUP, in violation ofI.C. § 67-6519(4)? 
3. Did the Board err in using the Driggs CUP Application Form as the basis for 
its denial of the CUP, rather than the Driggs Zoning Ordinance? 
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4. Did the Board err in using the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, as a regulatory 
measure for determining whether or not to issue the subject CUP? 
5. Did the Board incorrectly deny Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use 
Permit on the mistaken assumption that the February, 2007, rezone did not 
allow construction of a structure exceeding forty-five feet ( 45') in height? 
6. Did the Board's use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan and the broad, 
visionary goals stated therein, as criteria for evaluating and considering the 
issuance of conditional use permits, violate Petitioner's due process rights 
under the Idaho and United States Constitution? Did the Board's failure to 
specify the standards and criteria it used in denying the permit also violate 
Petitioner's due process rights? 
7. Did the Board fail to comply with the Driggs Zoning Ordinance by failing to 
set appropriate conditions governing the proposed conditional use and by 
failing to make a finding that Petitioner was unable to meet those conditions. 
8. Was the Board's decision in the rezone proceeding res judicata as to the 
Board's subsequent effort to reconsider the compatibility of the conditional 
uses permitted in the M-1 zone, with the Comprehensive Plan? 
In its Supplemental Brief dated July 16, 2009, Teton County failed to address any of 
these issues. Petitioner will not here, re-argue those issues and the Court is simply referred 
to the Petitioner's three previous Briefs, for a discussion of those issues. Suffice it to say that 
all of those arguments remain unrefuted, and the County's last written decision should be set 
aside for all of the reasons set forth in those Briefs. 
B. Raising Issues for the First Time on Appeal. 
Teton County has asserted for the first time on appeal that Bums' Application should 
not have been processed as a Conditional Use Permit, rather it should have been processed 
as a variance. See pp. 4-10, Respondent's Supplemental Brief. This argument merits little 
response. 
3 - PETITIONER'S SECOND REPLY BRIEF 
Teton County's argument was never raised in the proceedings below nor was it a basis 
for the County's denial of the CUP. It is well established that review on appeal is limited to 
those issues raised before the administrative tribunal. Balser v. Kootenai County Board of 
Commissioners, 110 Idaho 3 7, 40, 714 P .2d 6, 9. "An appellant court will not decide issues 
presented for the first time on appeal." Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 916, 204 P .2d 
1127, 1131 (2009). Here, the County attempts to shift the target by putting forth, for the first 
time, a new ground for denying the CUP a ground that was not raised in either the 
County's verbal decision or its subsequent written decision. Raising an issue for the first 
time on appeal is not permissible under the case authorities cited above and Teton County's 
arguments should not therefore be considered. 
II. 
The Driggs Zoning Ordinance Expressly Allows the Issuance of Conditional Use 
Permits for Structures Exceeding Forty-five Feet ( 45') in Height. 
Teton County argues that Bums should have applied for a variance, rather than a CUP. 
See Respondent's Supplemental Brief, p. 6. In doing so, the County ignores the express 
terms of the applicable ordinance. Section 13 of City of Driggs Ordinance No. 274-07, 
subsection C, expressly allows buildings exceeding forty-five feet ( 45') in height in the M-1 
Zone:1 
C. Height Regulations: 
Any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter 
erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height unless 
approved by a Conditional Use Permit. 
1The Driggs Zoning Ordinance is applicable because the property is located within the Driggs area of impact. 
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Chapter 2, Section 13C, Ordinance No. 274-07, Driggs Zoning Ordinance atp. 26 (emphasis 
added). Chapter 4, Section 2 of the Driggs Zoning Ordinance sets forth the procedure for 
granting those conditional use permits. Specifically, section 2A of Chapter 4 allows denial 
of the CUP only if it is impossible to set adequate conditions to assure protection and 
compatibility with surrounding properties: 
Section 2. Condition Use Permit Procedures. 
A. The Following Provisions Shall Apply to Conditional 
Use Permits: 
1. The Planning Commission may, following the 
notice of hearing procedures provided under 
section 67-6509, Idaho Code, permit conditional 
uses were the uses are not in conflict with the 
Comprehensive Plan nor the Zoning Ordinance. 
If the proposed conditional use cannot adequately 
meet the conditions necessary to assure 
protection and compatibility with the surrounding 
properties, uses and neighborhood, the Planning 
Commission will not approve the proposed use. 
Teton County made no finding of an inability to establish conditions that would assure 
compatibility of Burns' proposed use with the surrounding industrial uses. Rather the ruling 
was premised solely upon a vague, reference to the Comprehensive Plan without any findings 
whatsoever indicating which of the numerous provisions in the Comprehensive Plan upon 
which the County premised its determination. (See Issue No. 2 of Bums' Statement oflssues 
on appeal regarding the inadequacy of the County's findings in that regard). 
Petitioner's argument that the County could not grant the CUP because of an inability 
to impose appropriate conditions (Seep. 9, Respondent's Supplemental Brief) has no basis 
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whatsoever in the County's written decision. The County has set forth no facts or reasoning 
supporting that premise and such conclusionary finding does not comply with the 
requirements of LC.§§ 67-6535 and 67-6519(4) nor the applicable standards set forth in 
Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 37, 655 P.2d 926, 931 
(1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Teton County, when faced with the compelling arguments set forth in Petitioner's 
earlier Briefs, shifts the target by now arguing for the first time on appeal that a CUP 
application was not the appropriate vehicle for Bums to follow. Teton County's 
Supplemental Brief fails to address any of Bums' arguments and instead puts forth an 
argument that ignores the express terms of the applicable ordinance. 
For all the reasons set forth in Petitioner's earlier Briefs, the Petition for Judicial 
Review should be granted and the matter remanded to the Teton County Commissioners for 
reconsideration. Specifically, the matter should be remanded to the Teton County Board of 
Commissioners with express instructions to reconsider the matter on the basis of the record 
presented at the initial hearing. In particular, the Board should be ordered to specify the 
reasoning, standards and criteria used to consider the CUP Application, as required by Idaho 
Code§ 67-6519(4) and should refrain from using the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory 
measure for determining whether or not to issue the CUP. Further, the Board should be 
expressly instructed that, contrary to its findings and conclusions, the previous February 26, 
2007, rezone did not forbid the construction of a structure in excess of forty-five feet (45') 
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in height and that such was not and should not be a proper basis for denial of the CUP. 
Further, the Board should be instructed that use of the Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory 
measure violates Petitioner's due process rights and that the Board should confine its 
deliberations to the record and to the standards and criteria set forth in the Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance. 
Petitioner should also be awarded its reasonable attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 
12-117, since the County failed to respond to any of the issues raised by Petitioner in its 
Petition for Judicial Review. The County's argument is clearly an effort to raise new issues 
on appeal in violation of the Balser and Johnson cases cited above. The County's arguments 
are clearly without any basis in law or fact. 
~ 
DATED this ..50 day of July, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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TETON COUNTY BOARD OF ) 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, a political ) 
subdivision of the State of Idaho, ) 
) 
) 
Respondent. ) ___________ ) 
Case No. CV-07-376 
DECISION ON REVrEW 
I. BACKGROUND 
This is a petition for judicial review of the December 22, 2008 decision of the 
Teton County Board of Commissioners ("County"). The County's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law denied Bums Holdings, LLC's ("Bums") application for a 
conditional use permit to construct a 75-foot concrete batch plant. 
Burns owns 6.5 acres north of the City of Driggs, immediately north of the 
airport. The property is located within the Driggs City Area oflmpact. In February 
2007, the County changed the zoning on Bums' property from C-3 (commercial) to M-1 
(light industrial). Driggs' City Ordinance governs the uses allowed in an M-1 zone, 
which include the following: "[m]anufacturing, assembling, fabricating, processing, 
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packing, repairing, or storage uses which have not been declared a nuisance by statute." 1 
Burns is seeking permission to construct a 75-foot high concrete batch plant. 
Because the City Ordinance required a conditional use permit for buildings 
exceeding 45 feet in height,2 Burns submitted its application for a conditional use permit. 
In July 2007 the Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission unanimously approved Burns' 
application. The County then held an evidentiary hearing before the Board of 
Commissioners on November 15, 2007 and issued a verbal denial of the application. 
Burns filed a petition for judicial review of the County's decision in December 
2007, based in part on the lack of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. This 
Court found in Burns' favor and remanded the case back to the County to provide written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court stated: 
[The County] failed to prepare written findings and a reasoned statement 
as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, thereby frustrating the ability of the 
Court to perform an appropriate judicial review of the proceedings below.3 
On remand, the County produced written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, again denying Burns' application. Bums once again seeks judicial review of the 
County's written decision and filed its Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review. 
This Court heard oral argument on August 18, 2009. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON REVIEW 
Petitioner's Amended Statement of Issues on Judicial Review presents the Court 
with the following issues on review: 
a. Did the Findings of Fact and Conclusions adopted by the Board on 
December 22, 2008 comply with the provisions ofidaho Code§ 67-6535? 
b. Did the Board err in concluding that its earlier rezone of Petitioner's 
property did not allow construction of a structure exceeding forty-five foot 
( 4 5 ') in heights? 
1 City Ordinance 274-07, Chapter 2, Section 13(A)(l). 
2 City Ordinance 281-07, § 13(c) (stating "any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected 
shall not exceed forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit"). 
3 Order,~ 1 (Oct. 30, 2008). 
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c. Did the Board err in considering esthetic values when it denied the 
Conditional Use Permit, given that the subject property was located 
outside the scenic corridor adopted by Teton County and the City of 
Driggs? 
d. Did the Board err in considering the February 2007 rezone of the property 
as a basis for denying the Conditional Use Permit? 
e. Did the Board violate Petitioner's due process rights in considering 
evidence outside the CUP hearing and in failing to make all ex parte 
contact with members of the Board a matter of public record? 
f. Did the Board err in using the Teton County Comprehensive Plan, and the 
broad goals articulated therein, as a regulatory standard for determining 
whether or not to issue the subject CUP? 
g. Does the use of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and the broad, 
general goals stated therein, as regulatory criteria for evaluating and 
considering the issuance of conditional use pennits, violate Petitioner's 
due process rights under the Idaho and United States Constitution? 
h. Did the Board erroneously use the Teton County Comprehensive Plan 
rather than the Driggs Comprehensive Plan, in evaluating and considering 
Petitioner's application for a Conditional Use Permit? 
1. Do principles of resjudicata bar the Board from finding the CUP 
application does not comport with the County Zoning Ordinance? 
J. Did the Board act arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the Conditional 
Use Permit? 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) allows an affected person 
aggrieved by a local governing body's decision on a conditional use permit to seek 
judicial review of that decision.4 A court reviewing a local governing body's decision 
bases its review on the record created before the governing body. 5 
Upon review, a court must affirm a local governing body's action unless it 
determines such body's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (1) violate 
4 I.C. § 67-6519(4); I.C. § 652l(d). 
5 I.R.C.P. 84(e)(l). 
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constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) exceed the body's statutory authority; (3) were 
made upon unlawful procedure; ( 4) were not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record; or (5) were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 6 Local governing 
bodies enjoy a strong presumption that their actions, where they have interpreted and 
applied their own zoning and planning ordinances, are valid. 7 
Additionally, a reviewing court will defer to a governing body's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. A governing body's factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous "so long as they are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting, 
evidence."8 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept to support a conclusion; it is more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance."9 
Indeed, a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the governing body as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 10 However, a reviewing court exercises free 
review over questions of law, including whether a governing body violated statutory or 
constitutional provisions. 11 
To prevail, a challenger must show not only that the governing body has erred in a 
manner specified in LC. § 67-5279(3), but also that the challenger's substantial rights 
have been thereby prejudiced. 12 If the court does not affirm the governing body's 
decision, it shall set the decision aside, in whole or in part, and remand the matter to the 
governing body for proceedings as necessary. 13 
6 I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
7 Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003 ); Whitted v. Canyon County Board of 
Com'rs, 137 Idaho 118, 121, 44 P.3d 1173, 1176 (2002). 
8 Evans, 139 Idaho at 74, 73 P.3d at 88; Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196, 
46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002). 
9 Marchbanks v. Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
10 Whitted, 137 Idaho at 121, 44 P.3d at 1176; LC.§ 67-5279(1). 
11 Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. 
12 LC.§ 67-5279(4). 
13 LC.§ 67-5279(3). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
1. The County's written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not 
comply with Idaho law. 
In order for the Court to conduct a meaningful review of the County's decision, 
the Court needs a written decision that (1) adequately states the facts the County relied 
upon and (2) clearly explains how the County applied the law to those facts. For 
example, one basis for reviewing the County's decision set f01ih in Idaho Code§ 67-
5279(3) is whether the County's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 14 Absent an explanation of the contested facts, the facts relied upon, and the 
applicable law, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether substantial evidence 
supp01is the County's decision. 
In order to assure that a reviewing court can do its job (and in order to protect the 
due process rights of a party aggrieved by a local government decision), Idaho statutes 
and case law place certain legal requirements on a governing body's V;Titten decisions. 
a. Idaho law requires that written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
state the relevant law, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale 
supporting the decision. 
Idaho law first requires that the grant or denial of a conditional use permit 
application be in writing. 15 This writing should consist of a concise statement of the 
governing body's decision making process. It should also include the relevant legal 
standard, the relevant contested facts, and the rationale for reaching its decision (the 
application of the law to the facts). Idaho Code§ 67-6535(b) states, 
The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter shall 
be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the 
criteria and standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested 
facts relied upon, and explains the rationale for the decision based on the 
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and 
14 J.C. § 67-5279(3)( d). 
15 J.C.§ 6535(b); LC.§ 67-6519(4). 
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statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual 
information contained in the record. 16 
Idaho Code§ 67-6519(4) states a similar standard and includes the 
requirement that the governing board guide the applicant in obtaining approval, if 
approval is possible: 
Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning 
commission grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: 
a. The ordinance and standards used in evaluating the application; 
b. The reasons for approval or denial; and 
c. The actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a permit. 
The legislature has clearly stated the intent for these requirements: "It is the intent of the 
legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter should be founded upon sound 
reason and practical application ofreco gnized principles oflaw." t? 
Idaho case law has further defined the requirements of an adequate written 
decision. In the 1982 Idaho Supreme Court case WorJ.cman Family Partnership v. City of 
Twin Falls, the Supreme Court found that a governing body must produce a written 
decision that gives a district court enough information to conduct judicial review. "[I]n 
order for there to be effective judicial review of the quasi-judicial actions of zoning 
boards, there must be a record of the proceedings and adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law." 18 The Court clarified what constitutes "adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law" by citing and adopting a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court. 
The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that to prevent ad-hoc or arbitrary 
decisions, the governing body issuing the decision must "clearly and precisely state what 
it found to be the facts and fully explain why those facts lead it to the decision it makes. 
Brevity is not always a virtue." 19 The Oregon Court continued: 
What is needed.for adequate judicial review is a clear statement of what, 
specifically, the decision-making body believes, after hearing and 
16 I.C. § 6535(b). 
17 I.C. § 6535(c). 
18 Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 36, 655 P.2d 926, 930 (1982). 
19 Id., 104 Idaho at 3 7, 655 P.2d at 931 ( citing South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of 
Commissioners, 280 Or. 3,569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 ([977)). 
considering all the evidence, to be the relevant and important facts upon 
which its decision is based. Conclusions are not sufficient. 20 
In Workman the Supreme Court ruled that the district court should remand the 
case in order for the board of commissioners to produce findings of fact and conclusions 
of law sufficient for the district court to perfom1 judicial review. 
In this case, the County initially failed to produce a written decision. This Court 
remanded the case and ordered the County to write its decision. In its October 2008 
order, the Comi found that the County "failed to prepare written findings and a reasoned 
statement as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535." The County's failure to issue a 
reasoned statement frustrated "the ability of the Court to perform an appropriate judicial 
review."21 The Court then directed the County to "issue written findings and 
conclusions, based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing before the 
Board on November 17, 2007."22 The County issued its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in December 2008. The remainder of this decision reviews whether 
the County's written decision comports with Idaho law as stated above. 
b. The County's written decision fails to meet the requirements set by 
Idaho law and is insufficient to allow this Court to perform 
appropriate judicial review. 
Although the County issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
Bums contends that the County's written decision still fails to meet the standard outlined 
by Idaho law. The Court agrees. 
The County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to state the relevant 
contested facts and fail to explain the County's rationale for denying Burns' application. 
Because the County failed to explain upon what facts it relied and why those facts led it 
to the decision it made, the Court is unable to conduct the appropriate analysis required 
under law. 
20 Workman, l 04 Idaho at 37, 655 P.2d at 931 (emphasis in the original). 
21 Order,~ 1 (Oct. 30, 2008). 
22 Id. at~ 2. 
For example, the County's written decision states that Bums' application was 
denied because it failed to meet two criteria from the application for a conditional use 
permit: 
( l) "That Criteria No. 2 of the application states that the conditional use 
'will be harmonious with and in accordance with the general objective or 
with any specific objective of the comprehensive plan and/or the zoning 
ordinance. "23 
(2) "That Criteria No.3 of the application provides that the conditional use 
'will be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to be harmonious 
and appropriate in appearance with the existing or intended character of 
the general vicinity and that such use will not change the essential 
character of the same area.,,24 
According to these two criteria, Burns' 75-foot concrete batch plant must be in harmony 
with the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance, and the plant must be in harmony 
with general vicinity and character of the same area. 
The County cited from Driggs' City Ordinance 281-07 that says that the proposed 
conditional use must not be in "conflict with the comprehensive plan" and that "if the 
proposed conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to ensure 
protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood, the 
planning commission will not approve the proposed use."25 The County's legal basis was 
harmony and compatibility with the surrounding vicinity, as well as harmony and 
compatibility with the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan. 
The County applied the law in the ninth paragraph of its Conclusions of Law. 
Essentially, the County concluded that Bums' proposed conditional use (the 75-foot 
concrete batch plant) would not be in harmony with the surrounding vicinity because it 
would obstruct views of the Teton Mountain Range. The paragraph states, 
That based upon evidence received at the hearing, we conclude that a 75' 
height could not be allowed with or without conditions 'to ensure 
protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses, and 
neighborhood.' Specifically, the proposed use is located just off of a 
23 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ~ 6 (Feb. I 0, 2009). 
24 Id. at~ 7. 
25 Id. at~ 8. 
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scenic corridor, and views of the Teton Mountain Range would be 
obstructed by such a building, and evidence, including public comment, 
was presented that surrounding neighbors would have their views of the 
mountains obstructed. We conclude further, that the 75' height allowance 
would not be in conformance with the comprehensive plan for this portion 
of scenic corridor. 26 
The County's rationale in reaching its decision, the application of law to the facts in this 
case, can be summarized thus: Bums' permit was denied because members of the public 
testified that their views of the Teton Mountain Range would be obstructed. However, 
the substance of the testimony and evidence was never set forth. While this could 
possibly justify denial of a permit, the Court finds that this minimal citation to evidence 
fails to satisfy the standard set by Section 67-6535, 67-6519( 4), and the Supreme Court's 
standard from Workman. 
The County's decision lacks any citation to the relevant contested facts. 
According to the decision, the County held three separate public hearings (September 13, 
2007, October 11, 2007, and November 15, 2007). From these three public hearings, the 
only evidence that found its way into the County's written decision is anonymous public 
comment. Anonymous public comment is insufficient. What is needed are clear, precise 
statements of the facts and a full explanation of why those facts lead to the decision.27 
What is needed are citations to the relevant conflicting facts relied upon. 28 The decision 
lacks any information that would lay a foundation for the credibility of the testimony 
relied upon~who made the public comment and whether they live in the "general 
vicinity" of the proposed plant. The decision lacks any reference to conflicting evidence, 
though it is clear that conflicting evidence was presented. 
The record indicates that Bums presented testimony and line of sight diagrams 
indicating that a 75-foot plant would not obstruct views of the mountains. The County's 
decision fails to cite or weigh this evidence. There was also evidence that the general 
vicinity of the plant is zoned M-1 (light industrial), outside the scenic corridor. The 
26 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ii 9. 
27 Workman, 104 Idaho at 37, 655 P.2d at 931 (citing South a/Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of 
Commissioners, 280 Or. 3, 569 P.2d 1063, 1076-77 (1977)). 
28 l.C. § 67-6535(b). 
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County's decision fails to weigh this evidence. Both the Planning and Zoning 
Commission and the Zoning Administrator recommended that Bums' application be 
approved, yet the County denied it. While the County is free to reach its own decision, 
its decision must be based on reasoned decision making, not anonymous public comment. 
In October this Court remanded this case with the specific direction that the 
County elicit testimony and evidence in its written decision: "[T]he Court hereby directs 
that the Board of County Commissioners issue ,vritten findings and conclusions, based 
upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing before the Board on November 
17, 2007. "29 The County failed to do this. 
In Workman, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a letter to a zoning applicant 
containing a few conclusory statements was insufficient for a district court to conduct 
judicial review. It is this Court's opinion that the County's "Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" is no better than the conclusory letter in Workman. 
While this Court will not reweigh the evidence, upon review this Court must 
decide whether the Board's conclusions were "supported by substantial evidence in the 
record" or whether the Board's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion." The County's written decision must state the facts relied upon, as well as the 
weight given to that evidence, if the Court is to decide whether the County's decision is 
based on "sound reason and practical application ofrecognized principles of law,"30 or 
whether the decision is ad-hoc or arbitrary. By failing to cite the evidence it relied upon, 
failing to cite relevant conflicting evidence, and failing to weigh of the evidence, the 
County has failed to produce a decision upon which this Court can adequately conduct 
judicial review. 
The County suggested at oral argument that the Court should lower the bar for 
Teton County. They argued that a county attorney or county commission from a small, 
rural county should not be held to as high a standard as elsewhere in Idaho. The Court 
rejects the notion that there is a variable standard in Idaho for the competency and 
professionalism of county attorneys, or the county commissions they represent. The 
29 Order,~ 2 (emphasis added). 
30 LC. § 6535(c). 
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Court has great confidence that Teton County and its legal representatives are fully 
capable of meeting the same high standard of professionalism reasonably expected for 
any other county in the state. 
c. Additional concerns 
The Court has two other concerns in addition to those cited above. First, on 
remand the County will need to address several legal arguments raised by Burns, which it 
has not yet considered. Bums argues that the County mistakenly used the Teton County 
Comprehensive Plan rather than the Driggs Comprehensive Plan. Burns also argues that 
regardless of which comprehensive plan the County uses, the comprehensive plan cannot 
serve as a regulatory standard for determining whether or not to issue the conditional use 
permit. Additionally, there is a legal issue about whether the proposed concrete plant's 
proximity to the scenic corridor is a relevant consideration given that the plant is located 
outside the corridor's defined boundary. The County's decision needs to address these 
legal concerns. 
The Court's second concern is that the County's decision treated Burns' permit 
hearing as an opportunity to rehear its February 2007 zoning decision. The County's 
Conclusions of Law eleven and twelve state: 
And: 
That there was public comment that the zone change to M-1 may have 
been met with more resistance had the concept for the proposed use 
included a 75' high structure, but the community's understanding was that 
the zone change would allow for a 45' high dry plant, and not a 75' high 
31 wet plant. 
That we as a board of county commissioners conclude that the zone 
change application would have resulted differently if the applicant had 
represented a 7 5' batch plant as the proposed use in the new zone. 32 
31 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 111. 
32 Id. at 1 12. 
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While these conclusions may be true, they cannot serve as a basis for granting or 
denying a conditional use permit. The County is bound to grant or deny the permit 
according to the criteria in the application. 
2. Burns has established that it had a substantial right prejudiced. 
According to Idaho Code§ 67-5279(4), a petitioner must establish that his 
substantial right was prejudiced to warrant judicial review. Here, Burns has established 
that he has had a substantial right prejudiced. 
Burns has a substantial right to have its conditional use permit application 
reviewed according to Idaho law. Burns has a right to receive a decision that reflects a 
thoughtful analysis of the law and facts. Burns has a right to use its property in a lawful 
maimer. These rights have been prejudiced by the County's failure to produce a written 
decision that complies ,vith Idaho law. 
3. The County's new argument that Burns should have applied for a variance, 
rather than a conditional use permit, is untimely and disingenuous. 
Much of the County's reply brief on this petition for review argued that Burns 
should have pursued its application as a variance, rather than as a conditional use permit. 
It is umeasonable to make this argument at this point in the case. 
First, Burns was directed by the City Ordinance to pursue a conditional use permit 
and the County's decision confin11ed that method as the appropriate course. City 
Ordinance 281-07, § 13(c) specifically directs applicants to apply via a conditional use 
permit: "any building or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed 
forty-five feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit."33 The County 
confinned that Burns needed a conditional use permit in its written Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law~the County stated this decision in the first paragraph of its 
Conclusions of Law. Although the County attorney now concedes this language in the 
33 City Ordinance 281-07, § I 3(c) (emphasis added); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,~ I. 
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City Ordinance was a "poor word choice," that is no reasons to relieve the County from 
the plain language of the ordinance. 
Second, Burns has been pursuing its conditional use permit for nearly two years. 
During that time, Burns has petitioned for review and had the petition remanded once for 
the County's failure to produce written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
County produced written findings of fact and conclusions oflaw again confirming the 
conditional-use-permit method. To argue at this point-after two years of time, expense, 
and effort-that Burns really needed to seek a variance strikes the Court as 
fundamentally unfair and a blatant disregard for the Applicant's right to have his permit 
reviewed according to "sound reason and practical application of recognized principles of 
law."34 
4. The Court grants attorney's fees and costs for Burns for all proceedings 
before this Court on judicial review. 
Idaho Code § 12-117(1) allows for attorney's fees and costs for a prevailing party 
"if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." In this case, Burns is the prevailing party and the 
County has acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
This decision addresses the County's second attempt to produce findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that comport with Idaho law. The Court remanded this case back 
in October 2008 because the County denied Burns' permit without producing written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the words of the Court, 
The Court finds that Respondent, Teton County, failed to prepare written 
findings and a reasoned statement as required by Idaho Code§ 67-6535, 
thereby frustrating the ability of the Court to perform an appropriate 
judicial review of the proceedings below.35 
The County then produced written findings of fact and conclusions of law. As 
discussed above, the County's Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law are insufficient 
34 I.C. §6535(c). 
35 Ord er, ~ 1. 
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because they failed to comply with the standard outlined by Section 67-6535 and 
Workman. As a result, Bums has expended time and money to pursue two consecutive 
petitions for review without reaching the merits of the case. That is an unreasonable and 
inappropriate burden to place upon a party. 
After the first remand, the County had an opportunity to produce a written 
decision that reflected reasoned decision making based on principles of law. It was 
reasonable for the County to have an opportunity to fix its mistake. Had the County 
produced a written decision that comported with Idaho law, Bums would have only had 
to pursue one petition for judicial review. As Bums now stands, it has pursued two 
petitions and both have been remanded. It is unreasonable that Bums has spent time and 
effort for over two years and is right where it originally started. The County has yet to 
produce a written decision that is adequate for an Idaho court to review. 
The County has further acted unreasonably with its legal argument on review. 
The County's argument on review-that Bums has mistakenly pursued a conditional use 
permit when he needed a variance-is two years too late. Bums pursued a conditional 
use permit because the City Ordinance specifically required him to do so. 36 The 
County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law cite the ordinance as its first 
conclusion of law.37 To present such an argument now is unreasonable and capricious. 
For these reasons, the Court awards Burns' reasonable attorney fees and costs on 
the amended petition for judicial review. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that the County's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to 
satisfy the standard as set forth in Idaho Code§§ 67-6535, 67-6519(4), and Workman. 
The inadequacies failed to give this Court sufficient information to conduct judicial 
review. The case is REMANDED and the County is ordered to follow the provisions of 
Idaho Code§§ 67-6535, 67-6519(4), and Workman and submit written findings of fact 
and conclusions of law that comply. Additionally, the Court awards reasonable attorney 
36 City Ordinance 281-07, § 13(c). 
37 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,~ l. 
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fees and costs for the Amended Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-
117. 
So Ordered . 
.}1,.. 
Dated this '-;;) 9 day of September, 2009. 
- 15 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision on 
Review was this '"2-\ day of September, 2009, served upon the following individuals 
via U.S. Mail, v.:,u .... "''"' prepaid, unless otherwise indicated: 
Dale W. Storer 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0130 
Kathy Spitzer 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORi'JEY 
89 N. Main Street 
Driggs, ID 83455 
KATHY SPITZER, ISB #6053 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
89 North Main Street, Suite 5 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Case No. CV-07-376 
Idaho Code §12-117(1) authorizes the award of attorney fees against a county, but only if 
two conditions are met: (l) there must be a prevailing party; and (2) the Court must find that the 
non-prevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Burns Holdings, LLC v. 
Madison County Bd. of County Comrrs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646, 650 (2009); citing Ada 
County Highway Dist. V. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 372, 179 P.3d 323, 
335 (2008). If both conditions cannot be met, the Court is prohibited from awarding attorney 
fees. In the present case, neither condition is met so the Court could not award attorney fees. 
The facts of Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley are very similar to the 
present case. The district court awarded attorney fees against the City of Sun Valley because of 
a perceived injustice and the Supreme Court reversed. In Crown Point, the Court determined 
that Sun Valley's findings of fact did not comply with Idaho law. Crown Point Development, 
Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77 156 P.3d 573, 578 (Idaho 2007). The district court 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
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had ruled that Crown Point was entitled to attorney fees because Sun Valley "acted without 
reasonable basis in fact or law as demonstrated by the numerous errors in the City's revised 
Findings." Id. at 78. The Supreme Court vacated the district court's award of attorney fees, 
stating: "Since the case is being remanded to the City in order for it to make reviewable 
findings of fact, it can no longer be said that Crown Point is the prevailing party. Thus, we 
vacate the district court's award of attorney's fees to Crown Point." Id. (Emphasis added.) The 
facts of the present case are synonymous. The Court remanded to the County to make 
reviewable findings of fact and conclusions of law. Accordingly, the Court did not find in favor 
of a party. The first part of the two part test is not met, thus no attorney fees can be awarded. 
The second part of the test also fails as the Court could not have found that the County 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The petition for judicial review was filed by 
Bums Holdings, LLC challenging Teton County's denial of a conditional use permit (CUP). 
Judicial review of county actions is limited: " ... the Board's actions are not subject to judicial 
review under the IAP A unless there is a statute invoking the judicial review provisions of the 
IAPA." Burns Holdings, LLC v. Madison County Ed. of County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,214 P.3d 
646, 649 (2009). Judicial review of a CUP denial is authorized, but the Court did not make a 
finding that the County acted without reasonable basis in fact or law in the denial of the 
conditional use permit. In the Court's own words, it was unable to make this finding: "[b Jecause 
the County failed to explain upon what facts it relied and why those facts led it to the decision it 
made, the Court is unable to conduct the appropriate analysis required under law." Decision on 
Review, September 29, 2009, page 7. Because the Court could not find that the County acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law in denying the CUP application the second condition of 
an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-117(1) cannot be met and attorney fees are 
unavailable. 
Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
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1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
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Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
IN REGARDING: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
v. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties filed herein, it is hereby ordered that the 
portion of the Court's Memorandum Decision dated September 29, 2009, awarding attorneys 
fees to Petitioner, be and hereby is set aside, without prejudice as to Petitioner's right, if any, 
to assert a claim for attorneys fees and costs, at such time as the matter is completely and 
finally resolved. 
DATED this )7 ~ay of November, 2009. 
2 - ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TlON 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
following this___\]_ day of November, 2009, by mailing, with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto. 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Kathy Sptizer 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(v") Mail 
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( ) Mail 
( ./) Hand Delivery 
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CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie, Esq. (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
SECOND AMENDED PETITION 
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC ("Bums"), respectfully submits this Second 
Amended Petition for Judicial Review pursuant to the provisions ofldaho Code§§ 67-5270 
and 67-6521 and Rule 84 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. In support of this Petition, 
Petitioner alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is an Idaho limited liability company with its principal place of 
business located in Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
ORIGINAL 
2. Respondent, the Teton County Board of County Commissioners (the "Board"), 
is a political subdivision of the state of Idaho. 
3. Venue of this Petition is proper under the provisions ofldaho Code§ 67-5272. 
4. On or about June 14, 2007, Petitioner filed an Application for a Conditional 
Use Permit ("CUP") with the City of Driggs Planning and Zoning Commission (the 
"Commission"), seeking to obtain a CUP allowing the Applicant to exceed the forty-five ( 45) 
foot height limit applicable with respect to the M-1 Zone, as established by the Driggs City 
Zoning Ordinance. The subject property was described as Lot 1 b, Block II, and the eastern 
11 O' of Lot 1 a, Teton Peaks View Subdivision and is located within the Area of Impact 
identified by the Teton County and City of Driggs Area oflmpact Ordinances, Agreements 
and Map. Because the subject property was located within the Area of Impact, the 
application was brought pursuant to § 2, Chapter 4, of the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance, 
which zoning ordinance was, by virtue of the Area of Impact ordinances and agreement, 
made applicable to all properties located within the Area oflmpact. 
5. In late spring or early summer, 2007, Kurt Hibbert, the former Teton County 
Planning and Zoning Administrator, specifically advised Bums that a CUP application -
rather than a variance - was the appropriate vehicle for Bums to proceed with its efforts to 
construct a building higher than forty-five ( 45) feet. 
6. Burns' CUP application was heard by the Commission on July 11, 2007. At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the Commission unanimously found that Bums' CUP 
2 - SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
application met all of the criteria in the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance and therefore 
recommended Burns' CUP application be approved. 
7. On November 15, 2007, the Board conducted a hearing for the purpose of 
considering the CUP application, at the conclusion of which the Board denied the CUP 
application. 
8. On or about December 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Review 
in this case. On October 21, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on the Petition. The Court 
found that the Board had not complied with Idaho Code§ 67-6535 and the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104 Idaho 32, 655 
P .2d 926 (1982). At the conclusion of the hearing on that Petition, the Court vacated the 
November 15, 2007, Decision of the Board and remanded the matter to the Board for the 
purpose of preparing and issuing written findings and conclusions, setting forth the basis for 
its decision as required by such statute and case. 
9. On or about December 22, 2008, the Board adopted written Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (the "First Findings and Conclusions"). In the First Findings and 
Conclusion, the Board again denied the CUP application. 
10. In response to the First Findings and Conclusion, Burns filed an Amended 
Petition for Judicial Review on or about January 20, 2009. 
11. On August 18, 2009, the Court heard oral argument on the Amended Petition 
for Judicial Review. On September 29, 2009, the Court issued a decision on the Amended 
Petition for Judicial Review. Specifically, the Court again found that the First Findings and 
1 - SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Conclusions failed to satisfy Idaho Code§ 67-6535 and Workman Family Partnership. The 
Court also found that the Board had again failed to evaluate the contested facts or apply the 
relevant law to those facts. The Court admonished the County for arguing that Bums should 
have pursued a variance rather than a CUP, noting that the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance 
specifically directs applicants wishing to construct a building higher than forty-five ( 45) feet 
to pursue a CUP application. 
12. Once again, the Court remanded the matter back to the Board for the purpose 
of preparing and issuing written findings and conclusions, consistent with Idaho Code§§ 67-
6535, 67-6519(4) and Workman Family Patnership. 
13. On or about November 9, 2009, the Board issued Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (the "Second Findings and Conclusions"). For the third time the 
Board denied the CUP application. 
14. The Second Findings and Conclusions do not comply with the Court's two 
previous orders: they are inconsistent with both Idaho Code§ 67-6535 and Workman Family 
Partnership; they violate Bums' constitutional rights; and they are arbitrary, capricious, 
and/or an abuse of discretion. Specifically, the Second Findings and Conclusions, inter alia: 
a. deny Bums' CUP application on the grounds that Bums should have 
sought a variance rather than a CUP - a position specifically rejected 
by the Court in its September 29, 2009 decision; 
ovrnNn A MENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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b. fail to set forth the specific contested facts relevant to its decision and 
apply the appropriate law to those facts - as required by Idaho Code § 
67-6535 and by the Court's previous two orders; 
c. deny Bums' CUP based on vaguely articulated policy concerns, rather 
than legal standards set forth in a duly adopted ordinance, as required 
by Idaho Code § 67-6535(a); 
d. misconstrue the proceedings before the Commission in the Board in a 
manner that is completely contrary to the weight of the evidence in the 
record; 
e. rely on "testimony" of incompatibility presented by members of the 
Board, which "testimony" lacks evidentiary support in the record; 
f. deny the CUP based on grounds that were never discussed by the Board 
during the November 15, 2007, hearing and were not mentioned in First 
Findings and Conclusions; 
g. use the Driggs Comprehensive Plan as a regulatory ordinance; and 
h. violate Burns' due process rights under the Idaho Constitution and the 
United States Constitution. 
15. Petitioner will file a Statement of the Issues for Judicial Review within 
fourteen (14) days from the date of the filing of this Second Amended Petition. 
16. The earlier proceedings before the Commission and the Board were recorded 
magnetically and a copy of the tape recording is in the possession of the Clerk of the Board 
.:-i:;-rnNn AMENDED PETITION FOR WDICIAL REVIEW 
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and the Clerk of the Commission. 1l1e Agency Record and Agency Transcript were duly 
filed with this Court in conjunction with the original Petition for Judicial Review filed by the 
Petitioner in this action. 
17. Based on information and belief, the proceedings before the Board that resulted 
in the December 22, 2008, and November 9, 2009, decisions were recorded magnetically and 
a copy of the tape recording is also in the possession of the Clerk of the Court. 
18. Petitioner requests that the Clerks of the Driggs Planning and Zoning 
Commission and the Board prepare and file a complete record of all pleadings, exhibits and 
other documents filed or considered in conjunction with the December 22, 2008, decision (if 
such are not already part of the record), and all pleadings, exhibits, Board minutes, tape 
recordings and other documents filed or considered in conjunction with November 9, 2009, 
decision, together with a transcript of the proceedings before the Board that resulted in said 
decisions. 
19. This Petition for Judicial Review has been pending since December 11, 2007. 
This Court has twice remanded the matter to the County with specific instructions to comply 
with Idaho law. Following each remand, the County has ignored the Court's order and 
responded with findings and conclusions which do not comport with Idaho law and which 
contain no valid, legal basis for denying Burns' CUP application. In each decision, the Board 
has articulated a different basis for denying Burns' CUP, none of which complies with the 
Idaho Local Land Use and Planning Act. Bums has a right to right to speedy resolution of 
this matter under Idaho Cons. Art. I,§ 18. The County's repeated failure to comply with this 
r; - SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Court's order has frustrated Bums' constitutional rights and denied him the right to use its 
property. 
20. Petitioner is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 1 117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
l. For judicial review of the Board's decisions in this matter, pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 67-6521. 
2. For an Order reversing the decision of the Board issued on November 9, 2009, 
and finding that the Board's third denial of the CUP application was arbitrary, capricious 
and/or an abuse of discretion, and directing the Board to approve Petitioner's CUP 
application and to grant such approval forthwith. 
3. For an order awarding Petitioner its reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code§§ I 117, 12-121 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 
4. For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
""' DATED this :!.I) day ofNovember, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer, 
Attorney for the Petitioner 
~FJ:OND AMENDED PETITION FOR JUDiy~.tU, .REVIEW 
I I ,.,,. i .t+ 
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I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, and that: 
1. That service of this Second Amended Petition has been made upon the Court 
and Teton County Planning and Zoning Commission and the Teton County Board of 





Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Teton County Planning 
& Zoning Administrator 
Teton County Courthouse 
89N. Main 
Driggs, ID 83422 
Douglas Self 
Driggs Planning & Zoning Administrator 
City Hall 
P.O. Box48 
Driggs, ID 83422 
( ,...,rMail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
(~ail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( -----1 Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
2. That the clerk of Teton County has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the transcripts requested above. 
3. That the clerk of the agency has been paid the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the agency record. 
4 
DATED this QO day of November, 2009. 
fu~ 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P .L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
IN REGARDING: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COlJNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
SECOND AMENDED STATEMENT 
OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
COMES NOW Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC (Bums), through counsel ofrecord, 
and submits this Second Amended Statement oflssues on Judicial Review pursuant to Rule 
84(d)(5), I.R.C.P. 
Petitioner intends to assert the following issues on judicial review: 
ORIGINAL 
a. Do the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed by the Teton 
County Board of Commissioners (Board) on November 9, 2009, violate the 
provisions of Idaho Code§§ 67-6519 and 67-6535? 
b.. Was the Board's action denying Bums' Conditional Use Pem1it (CUP) 
application - for the reason that Bums did not request a variance - arbitrary, 
capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion? 
c. Was the Board's decision that a conflict existed between the provision in the 
Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when 
approved by a CUP and the Idaho Code arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse 
of discretion? 
d. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to 
interpret "as if it never existed" the provision of the Driggs City Ordinance 
allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when approved by a CUP? 
e. Did the Board's decision to interpret "as if it never existed" that provision of 
the Driggs City Ordinance allowing buildings over forty-five (45) feet when 
approved by a CUP violate Bums' due process rights under the Constitutions 
of the United States and the State of Idaho? 
f. Is the Board's interpretation of the Driggs City Ordinance entitled to any 
deference from this Court onjudicial review? 
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g. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to find 
that a building with a height of more than forty-five (45) feet is not 
conditionally permitted by the Driggs City Ordinance? 
h. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to find 
that there are no conditions which could mitigate the impact of the building for 
which Burns sought the CUP and ensure its compatibility with the surrounding 
properties, uses and neighborhood? 
1. Did the use of the Comprehensive Plan, and the general goals stated therein, 
as a regulatory ordinance for evaluating and considering Bums' CUP 
application violate Bums' due process rights under the Constitutions of the 
United States and the State of Idaho? 
J. Assuming, without admitting, that use of the Driggs Comprehensive Plan was 
proper, is there substantial competent evidence in the record to support the 
Board's finding that the building proposed in Burns' CUP application was in 
conflict with the Driggs Comprehensive Plan? 
k. Is there substantial competent evidence in the record to support the Board's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law? 
1. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or an abuse of discretion for the Board to base 
its decision in part on "testimony" submitted by Board members, which 
testimony lacked evidentiary support in the record? 
--,-~"~ • ~ rn,n'.-r:n C'TATPMPNT nF TSSUES ON mDICIAL REVIEW 
m. Was it arbitrary, capricious, and/or and abuse of discretion for the Board to 
deny the CUP based on grounds that were never discussed by the Board during 
the November 15, 2007, hearing and were not mentioned in the initial Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared by the Board? 
n. Did Kathy Rinaldi's participation in the Board's November 9, 2009, decision 
violate Bums' Constitutional right to an impartial tribunal, where, prior to her 
election to the Board, Ms. Rinaldi appeared in the matter in opposition to 
Bums' CUP application? 
1---
DATED this 00 day of November, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
4 - SECOND AMENDED ST A TEMENT OF ISSUES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that l am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofidaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by 
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Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
SECOND AMENDED STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
( /Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COlJNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY 
RECORD 
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC, and moves the Court for an order 
granting leave to augment the agency record and transcript in the above-entitled action. This 
matter is made pursuant to Idaho Code§ 67-5276(1)(b). 
Petitioner makes this request because of a procedural irregularity associated with the 
decision of the Respondent Teton County Board of Commissioners ("County" or "Board") 
ORIGINAL 
denying Petitioner's CUP application. Specifically, the Board's Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law deny the CUP for the reason that Petitioner filed an application for 
a CUP rather than a variance. This is an issue which was never raised or discussed at the 
CUP hearing before the Board or at any time during the application process. Had the Board 
raised the issue during the CUP hearing, Petitioner would have been able to adduce the 
evidence it now seeks to introduce: that the Board of County Commissioners specifically 
instructed the Petitioner to proceed by filing a CUP. 
If the Court grants the instant motion, Petitioner will introduce an affidavit from the 
former Teton County Planning and Zoning Director, Kurt Hibbert, averring that he was 
expressly instructed by the Board of County Commissioners to instruct Petitioner that a CUP, 
and not a variance, was the appropriate vehicle for Petitioner to pursue in order to gain 
approval for a seventy-five (75) foot building. A copy of the proposed affidavit is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." 
DATED this day of December, 2009. 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
2 MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY RECORD 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and 
with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the following described 
pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand delivering, mailing or by 
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Teton CoW1ty Prosecutor 
89 N. Main Street, #5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY RECORD 
( ~ail 
C)Q Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
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3 MOTION TO AUGMENT AGENCY RECORD 
Dale W. Storer (ISB No. 2166) 
Daniel C. Dansie (ISB No. 7985) 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Burns Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH J( 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE Ci 
Il~ REGARDING: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
TCT 
Teton County Title 
208-354-5050 208-354-5054 Fax 
Case No. CV-07-376 
AFFIDAVIT OF KURT IDBBERT 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMNIISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Fremont ) 
I, KURT RIBBER T, hereby depose and say as follows 
1. During the summer to 2007 I was employed as the Planning and Zoning 
Director of Teton County, Idaho. 
2. My position as Planning and Zoning Director required me to be familiar 
with both the Teton County Zoning Ordinance and the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance. 
I was also familiar with the Driggs City Area of Impact and Associated Impact Area 
Agreement located within Teton County. 
3. Pursuant to an Impact .¼ea Agreement with the City of Driggs, Teton 
County applies the Driggs City Zoning Ordinance to properties located within the 
Driggs City Area of Impact. 
4. In the late spring or early summer of 2007, I had a series of discussions 
with Kirk Bums and other representatives of Bums Concrete regarding a proposal for a 
concrete batch plant which Bums Concrete intended to construct in Teton County. 
The property on which Bums planned to build the facility is located within the Driggs 
City Area of Impact. 
5. Bums Concrete's proposal called for a concrete batch plant with a height 
of between sixty (60) and seventy-five (75) feet. Generally, the Driggs City Ordinance 
requires that buildings be forty-five (45) feet high or less. However, the ordinance 
allows for buildings higher than forty-five (45) feet when approved pursuant to a 
conditional use permit (CUP). 
6. Based on the provisions of the Driggs City Ordinance, and Teton 
County's Impact Area Agreement with the City of Driggs, I discussed with the Teton 
County Board of Commissioners the Bums Concrete proposal and the question of 
whether Bums' application should be processed as a variance or a CUP application. I 
was instructed by the Board that they desired to process the application as a CUP 
application as they wanted to "protect the county" by imposing specific conditions of 
approval. 
7. Based on my discussions with the Commissioners and in the presence of 
said Commissioners, I advised Kirk Bums, a representative of Bums Concrete, that the 
Commissioners' desired him to submit an application for a CUP rather than a variance. 
8. Following my recommendation and the direction given by the 
Commissioners, Bums Concrete did in fact file a request for a CUP to construct a batch 
plant in the summer of 2007. Kirk Bums emphasized several times during the course of 
his several presentations to the Teton County Commissioners that the structures in his 
project would be in a certain range of height, the highest point of which could be in 
the 60 to 75 foot range. This discussion preceded the motion for approval of the 
project via a conditional use permit and was part of the deliberations. 
9. After the public hearing and deliberations on the proposal, the 
commissioners formally decided that they would grant the CUP upon the agreement 
by both parties to a series of conditions which were to be outlined in a development 
agreement which would be made part of the (CUP). The proposal was therefore 
conditionally approved pending the execution of the CUP with the associated 
conditions. A motion was made and passed to approve the CUP with the delineated 
set of conditions. 
10. At this point I was specifically instructed and assigned by the Teton 
County Commissioners to work with the City of Driggs to develop the Conditional 
Use Permit and associated development agreement in conformance to the specific 
conditions outlined by the Commissioners in their meeting. 
11. I subsequently worked with Doug Self, the Planning Administrator at the 
City of Driggs, to specifically address every aspect of the conditions imposed by the 
County Commissioners on the development during their motion of approval. I 
referred to the audio recording of the hearing during this process to assure every 
required component was addressed. There were absolutely no restrictions placed by 
the commissioners on the height of the project structures as part of these conditions. 
12. The City of Driggs approved this development agreement and after their 
formal approval, I delivered the city executed document to County Commission 
Chairman Larry Young. Mr. Young reviewed the document with me at his desk in the 
north-east, corner-room, on the second floor of the courthouse. He carefully reviewed 
with me each component of the agreement. He signed it upon being satisfied to 
completeness and conformance with the specified conditions of approval in my 
presence. 
DATED this 4th day of December, 2009. 
/ 
/ . {,f 
?~ 1/4}/' 
y 
Kiirt L. Hibbert 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of December 2009 
Notary Public_for Idaho \..,huv~ ~, ¥ntxp 
Residing at: ~-f'nt:A,.,T c,~~ CJ 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident 
of and with my office in Idaho Falls, that I served a true and correct copy of the 
following described pleading or document on the attorney listed below by hand 
delivering, mailing or by facsimile, as indicated below, with the correct postage 
1'-
thereon, on this lS day of December. 
DOCUMENT SERVED: AFFIDAVIT OF KURT HIBBERT 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Kathy Spitzer 
Teton County Prosecutor's Office 
81 N. Main Street, #B 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(~il 
(~ Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
G:\WPDATA\DWS\14688- Bums BTolheTS\146&8.000 Bums v. Teton Cou11ty\Petitlon foT Judical Review\Pleadings\Affidavit of Kurt Hlbbert.wpd 
COURT MINUTES 
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eily Of Victor vg J:etdn 5priilgs Golf And Casting Club, LLC, etab 
Hearing type: Motion to Augment Record 
Hearing date: 1/5/2010 
Time: 2:19 pm 
Judge: Gregory W Moeller 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: David Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: PHYLLIS HANSEN 
Tape Number: 
Dale Storer Petitioner/ Appellant 
Kathy Spitzer Respondent 
J calls case; ids those present 
PA - third time before the court 
Brought under statute that allows augmentation of the record 
-
Because of issue belatedly raised by the county - whether or not Burns should have 
filled application for Variance 
Issuance not raised in the issuance of the ruling 
County again takes that very same position 
Burns was directed and advised by commissioners that it should be filed as a CUP 
rather than as a variance 
Affidavit of Hibbert confirms 
Question of judicial estoppel they who instructed Burns to file as CUP 
J - is Hibberts Affidavit necessary 
PA - in absence couldn't make judicial estoppel argument 
224 
Difference between a CUP and a Variance 
Basis for deviating from the ordinance 
Zero evidence in the ordinance that would support the County decision 
That decision was capricious and arbitrary 
Very reason why excess height was required was to make it compatible 
227 
Everything after paragraph 8 does not go to question of judicial estoppel (Affidavit of 
Kirk Hibbert) 
Should be stricken 
Hibbert added to Affidavit unbeknownst to us and urge it be stricken 
J - everything after first sentence of paragraph 8 
J - submit corrected affidavit 
229 
RA responds 
J -wouldn't square one have required additional fact finding 
Conditional use permit is not a guarantee 
J -has been any action taken by the county to correct the ordinance 
RA - ask City to change City of Driggs Code to change ; is in the process 
232 
J - concern - reads from decision 
Think gave pretty clear signal there that that dog was going to hunt 
RA- first hearing was a confusing hearing 
Considerable confusion as to why CUP hearing instead of variance 
J - if government entity has confusion, who should I hold to a higher standard 
For two years Burns pursued this as a CUP; only after appeal before me, was first time 
variance was mentioned 
Commissioners relied upon Hibbert 
Rest of affidavit was very misleading 
237 
J - tell me why you think we shouldn1t have the affidavit 
RA - A two reasons for denial 
Findings of fact had 8 pages 
2- very much was raised 
J - does that argument go against credibility or admissibility 
RA-both 
If out parts that are misleading, who's to say the rest of it is not misleading 
If going to be allowed, would like to produce my own affidavits from the 
commissioners stating what they think happened 
J worried that returning from judicial review to summary judgment motion 
Were no findings or conclusions first time we came in 
Previous prosecutor tried to say written record was enough 
Need to start from the basis that this is the first time we have had something adequate 
to review 
RA - record shows they were confused as to what was a CUP or a variance 
244 
PA - whole issue arises because of the belated manner in which it came up 
If the court were to find it is "too late" then the whole issue goes away 
246 
J - not being asked to decide appeal today, just what the record should show 
Reluctant to enter things in to the record took place after the record was establish 
Have great concerns about whole variance vs CUP issue 
Don't think Affidavit of Kirk Hibbert would have much bearing 
Going to deny the motion 
Serious due process concerns about changing the rules during the course of the game 
More is expected of a government entity 
Other issue are the battleground for this case 
"'"'"r,'. 
KATHY SPITZER, ISB #6053 
TETON COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
89 North Main Street, Suite 5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
(208) 354-2990 
kspitzer@co.teton.id.us 
JAN 1 2 2010 c5r 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 




TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, a political subdivision 
of the State of Idaho, 
Respondent. 
Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law 
Case No. CV-07-376 
... 
Fl LED 
JAN 12 2010 
TIME: :r 
BURNS HOLDING, LLC CUP DENIAL TETONCO.IODISTAICTCOUR 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The following are amended findings of fact and conclusions of law for the denial 
of the Burns Holdings, LLC's Conditional Use Permit application by the Board of 
County Commissioners of Teton County on November 15, 2007. All references to the 
Driggs City Ordinances refer to the January 16, 2007 version. 
1. Conclusion of Law 
Bums Holding, LLC must apply for a variance to exceed the 45 foot height limitation in 
the M-1 zone. Idaho Code§ 67-6516 clearly states that: '·[a] variance is a modification 
of the bulk and placement requirements of the ordinance as to ... height of buildings, or 
other ordinance provision affecting the size or shape of a structure." The applicant 
requests a modification of the height of a building and therefore must apply for a variance 
and not a conditional use permit. The Idaho Constitution, Article XII, § 2, provides, "Any 
county or incoiporated city or town may make and enforce, within its limits, all such 
local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with its charter or with 
the general laws." ·'A local ordinance that conflicts with a state law or is preempted by 
state regulation of the subject matter, is void." Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 
854,862,993 P.2d 617, 625 (Idaho App.2000); citing Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. 
County of Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 689, 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987). Because the County 
cannot act in conflict with State law it reads any ambiguity in the Driggs Ordinance in 
harmony with the Local Land Use Planning Act. 
Finding of Fact 
Chapter 2, Section 13 C of the City of Driggs' Ordinance 281-07 states that "[a]ny 
building or structure or portion tllereofhereafter erected shaJl not exceed forty-five (45) 
feet in height unless approved by conditional use permit." (Emphasis added.) The 
County interprets this section of the ordinance as follows: "[ a]ny building or structure or 
portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in height." Any 
other reading of this section of the Driggs Cjty Ordinance would directly conflict with§ 
67-6516 of the Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUP A") which clearly states that a 
variance and not a conditional use permit must be obtained before one can modify the 
height of a buj]ding. That portion of the Driggs ordinance that could be interpreted so as 
to conflict with State law is void, of no effect, as ifit had never existed. The County finds 
that the applicant did not make the correct application for a height variance and that it is 
not possjble for the County to grant a CUP to Bums Holding, LLC in order to allow them 
to build a structure which is 30 feet higher than the maximum height allowed in the M-1 
zone. A conditional use permit is much easier to obtain than a variance. The applicant 
cannot get around a very clear area of State law by applying for a CUP, even when the 
Driggs code uses the term "conditional use permit", when State law is clear that a 
variance is required. 
References to the need for a "variance" occurred at least twenty times during the 
November 15, 2007 hearing. Some of Chairman Young's first words were: "This is a 
conditional use permit hearing for a height variance." 4:17-18. The first time the 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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applicant himself speaks he states that he is requesting a height variance. 9: 15-16. Sandy 
Mason, representing Valley Advocates for Responsible Development stated: ''V ARD 
does not recommend granting a CUP for this height variance for several reasons." The 
applicant>s attorney, Dale Storer, a renowned local government, planning and zoning 
attomey, 1 was present during the hearing and has represented the applicant during the 
entire process. Mr. Storer failed to clarify the situation or give reasons in the applicant's 
response why a CUP was the correct method for a height variance when the Idaho Code 
is clear that a variance is required for an increased height. Regardless, the County does 
not feel that the applicant was unaware or urunformed of the law. 2 
2. Conclusion of Law 
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) states 
A special use permit may be granted to an applicant if the proposed use is 
conditionally permitted by the terms of the ordinance, subject to conditions 
pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance, subject to the ability of 
political subdivisions, including school districts, to provide services for the 
proposed use, and when it is not in conflict with the plan. 
Section 2 of the City of Driggs' Ordjoance 274-07 also addresses conclitional use permit 
procedures, offering criteria similar to the above and adding that there must be conditions 
imposed upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding 
properties, uses and neighborhood. An applicant must meet all five of these tests in order 
to be granted a CUP. A finding that an applicant does not meet one oftbe five criteria is 
sufficient to deny an application. Even if the County were to analyze the application 
according to the rules governing a conditional use permit, Bums Holding failed to meet 
four of the five of the necessary criteria for approval. 
Finding of Fact 
A The CUP could not be granted because a height of 75 feet is not 
conditionally permitted by the specific terms of the ordinance. 
The Driggs M-1 zoning ordinance lists two categories of uses for the M-1 zone, 
allowed and conditional. Allowed uses are listed under Chapter 2, Section l 3(A) and 
Section 13(B) lists the ten (10) "Conditional Uses Permitted". A height of75 feet is not 
1 Excerpt from firm bio: Mr. Storer has served as the City Anomey for the City of Idaho Falls since l 982 
and he also represents a number of other smaller cities, school districts, counties, electrical utilities and 
private devdopers. He has served three terms as president of the Idaho Municipal Attomeys Association 
and he currently serves on the ~card of directors for the Idaho Municipal Attorneys Association and as the 
Idaho state chairman of the Int~mational Municipal Lawye(s Associa\ion. He has frequently testified 
before the Idaho State Legislat'ure on a variety of issues affecting dties, counties and other public entities. 
' 
2 In the County's initial brief o~ judicial revjew of the CUP denial it states: "What is significant about 
Petitioner's CUP application is rhat it was not looking to modify the zoning of the site, but rathe( to modify 
the allowable height of the building on the site." Respondents Brief, August 5, 2008, page 9. 
Amended Fjndings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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listed under either of these two sections. Because a height of 75 feet is not mentioned in 
Section 13(B) the board finds that the use is not conditionally allowed. 
Even though a height of 75 feet is not specifically listed as conditionally 
permitted anywhere in the ordinance, the County is cognizant of the fact that height 
regulations are mentioned in Section 13(C) of the ordinance which states: "[a]ny building 
or structure or portion thereof hereafter erected shall not exceed forty-five (45) feet in 
height unless approved by conditional use permit.'' The County does not believe that this 
section overrides the specific provisions of Section l 3(B) of the ordinance. If Section 
l 3(C) were interpreted as conditionally pennitting a 7 5 foot high structure then the 
ordjnance would have to be intexpreted as conditionally permitting a building of any 
height and size, skyscrapers included. An ordinance provision cannot be read in isolation 
but must be interpreted in the context of the entire document Chapter l(D) ofDrigg's 
City Ordinance 27 4-07 states as its intent "that this Ordinance be interpreted and 
construed to further the purposes of this Ordinance and the objectives and characteristics 
of the zoning districts." The stated purpose of the Ordinance is to: 
[PJromote pride of ownersmp, health, safety, comfort, convenience and general 
welfare of the residents of the City of Driggs and to achieve the following 
objectives: 
l. To protect property rights and enhance property values. 
2. To provide for the protection and enhancement of the local economy. 
3. To ensure that important environmental features are protected and 
enhanced. 
4. To encourage the protection of prime agricultural lands for the 
production of food. 
5. To avoid undue concentration of population and overcrowding of land. 
6. To ensure that the development ofland is commensurate with the 
physical charactenstics of the land. 
7. To protect life and property in areas subject to natural hazards and 
disasters. 
8. To p-rotect recreation resources. 
9. To avoid undue water and air pollution. 
10. To secure safety from fire and provide adequate open spaces for light 
and air. 
11. To implement the comprehensive plan. 
12. To provide the manner and forrn of preparing and processing 
applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations; 
13. To encourage the proper distribution and compatible integration of 
commercial and industrial uses within. designated areas; and 
14. To insure that additions and alterations to, and/or remodeling of, 
existing buildings or structures are completed in compliance with the 
restrictions and limitations imposed thereunder. 
Chapter 1 ( C) of Ordinance 2 7 4-07 _ 
Allowing structures to far exceed aJlowable height limitations by obtaining a conditional 
use permit is not in keeping with the purpose and intent of the Ordinance and thus the 
height regulation paragraph cannot be read as adding such a "use" to those specifically 
listed in Chapter 2, Section U(B) of the M-1 zoning ordinance. Allowing a structure to 
A.mended Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law 
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so exceed allowable height limitations through a CUP would violate the objectives of the 
ordinance. Specifically, such an interpretation would: 1) fail to protect property rights and 
enhance property values because property owners ~ou]d have no idea how tall a 
neighboring building could be; 2) fail to provide for the protection and enhancement of 
the local economy because economic values in the area are largely dependent upon our 
scenic offerings. Having a "sky's th~ limit" ordinance that could essentially block the 
scenery would not protect this economy; 3) fail to ensure that important environmental 
features are protected and enhanced because our scenic vistas are one of our area's 
important environmental assets; 4) fail to ensure that the development of land is 
commensurate with the physical characteristics of the land because such an interpretation 
does not take physical characteristics of the land into account; 5) fail to protect recreation 
resources and fail to provide adequate open spaces for light and air because these cannot 
be provided without a height limitation, views and a feeling of openness being an integral 
part of much of the Valley's recreation; 6) fail to implement the comprehensive plan as 
explained in paragraph D below; 7) fail to provide the manner and form of preparing and 
processing applications for modification of and variances from zoning regulations 
because it would provide confusion in their processing; and 8) fail to provide for the 
compatible integration of commercial and industrial uses within designated areas because 
it is impossible to assure compatibility without some form of height limitation. 
Furthermore, the County cannot reconcile an application for a conditional use 
permit for 75 foot high structure with the clear meaning of Chapter 4, Section 3(A) of the 
Ordinance. Section 3(A) is very sjmilar to Idaho Code§ 67-6516, and states: 
A variance is a modification of the requirements of this ordinance as to 
... height of buildings, size of lots, or other ordinance 
provisions affecting the size or shape of a structure or the placement 
of the structure upon the lot. A variance does not include a change of 
authorized land use. 
When the County reads the City of Driggs Ordinance 274-07 as a whole it is clear that a 
CUP can only be obtained in an M-1 zone for the uses listed jn Chapter 2, Section 13(B) 
and that a height of75 feet is not amongst those uses. The statement in Chapter 2, 
Section 13(C) that a building or structure may be allowed to exceed forty-five (45) feet in 
height cannot be read in isolation. Additionally, because there are no parameters around 
this height allowance, the County cannot say that a seventy five foot high structure js 
specifically permitted by the tenns of the ordinance. Furthermore, as is explained in the 
next section, a CUP can only be granted subject to conditions pursuant to specific 
provisions of the ordinance, There are no specific provisions listed in Chapter 2, Section 
l 3(C) that suggest how a height modification can be conditioned. 
B. The CUP could not be granted pursuant to specific conditions listed i:o the 
ordinance. 
Idaho Code§ 67-6512(a) also requires that a CUP not be granted unless it will be 
"subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance." There are no 
specific provisions regarding the conditioning of a 30 foot height modification in the 
ordinance. The Driggs' ordinance that addresses conditional use permit procedures states: 
"If the proposed conditional use cannot adequately meet the conditions necessary to 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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assure protection and compatibility with the surrounding properties, uses and 
neighborhood, the Planning Commission will not approve the proposed use." The 
ordinance goes on to suggest the imposition of conditions: 
a. Minimizing adverse impact on other development; 
b. Controlling the sequence and timing of development; 
c. Controlling the duration of development; 
d. Assuring the development is maintained properly; 
e. Designating the exact locatjon and nature of development; 
f. Requiring the provision for on-site facilities or services; and 
g. Requiring more restrictive standards than those generally required in this 
ordinance. 
Chapter 4, Section 2(A)ofthe City of Driggs' Ordinance 274-07. 
While all of these would be applicable to the uses listed in Chapter2, Section 13(B), none 
appear applicable to the height regulation 1n Section I3(C). Idaho Code clearly states 
that a CUP can only be granted "subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of 
the ordinance." The County does not feel that there are any conditions that are specific to 
the height variation provision of Section 13(C). 
When the County does consider conditions a-g listed above, it is clear that the 
applicant failed to show how they could be met. The applicant did not show the County 
how the adverse impact of this height increase could be minimized nor can the County 
determine a way to minimize the impacts of a building that is 30 feet higher than the 45 
foot maximum. The applicant did introduce some "line of sight'' evidence but the County 
had issues with this evidence. Chairman Young explained his skepticism regarding the 
line of sight evidence such as the site angle that was used on pages 40:12 - 41 :11 of the 
November 15, 2007 transcript. The County also finds that it cannot control the sequence, 
timing or duration of the height, once it is allowed it would continue, sequence, timing 
and duration thus cannot be adequately controlled. The maintenance of the extra 30 feet 
of height is equally difficult to condition and the applicant provided no suggestions. 
Maintenance of a development usually refers to trash, weeds, etc., none of which are 
concerns 75 feet up in the air. The exact location and nature of the development could not 
minimize the impact of the additional 30 feet. Even though the applicant suggests that 
placing the structure several feet from the property line would minimize its impact, the 
Commissioners do not agree. Because the applicant needs the building to not only be 75 
feet tall, but 60 feet wide these conditions are impossible to meet; applicant is not asking 
for a 75 foot cell tower - a pencil in the air- but a 60 x 75 foot building. Likewise, the 
County finds that no on-site facilities or services or more restrictive standards could 
minimize the impact of a building this size and the applicant again provided no 
suggestions as to how this condition could be met. The County thus is unable to grant 
the CUP subject to conditions pursuant to specific provisions of the ordinance. 
C. The CUP could not be granted subject to the ability of political subdivisions, 
including school districts to provide services for the proposed use. 
Political subdivisions, including schools, would not be affected by the height 
variation. 
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D. The CUP could not be granted because the County found that the "use" 
was in conflict with the comprehensive plan. 
Throughout the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan the area North of Driggs is referred 
to as a "gateway". Section 9.3 of the Plan lists gateways at the North and South entrance 
to Driggs as a "need". The Plan's Vision for Community Design states: 
The Vision for Hwy 33 outside of downtown is as an attractive, functional, 
and memorable gateway into the commUJJity. The sense of arrival at each end 
of the community should be dramatic, but in keeping with the beauty of Teton 
Valley and the surrounding mountains. New buildings should be setback from 
the highway, with ample landscaping, concealed parking and architecture that 
draws on the western and agricultural vernaculars ... 
Driggs' Comprehensive Plan, Section 9.4, Page 61. One of the stated actions under 
Section 9.4 is to .. [c)reate and maintain attractive gateways to Driggs on Highway 33 
(South and North) and on Ski Hill Road." The County finds that the application conflicts 
with the Driggs' Comprehensive Plan because it creates a large industrial structure that 
cannot be adequately shielded in the area that Driggs would like to see become a 
memorable gateway. 
E. The County cannot grant the CU.? because it is unable to impose 
conditions upon the use that assure protection and compatibility with 
the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood. 
Because a concrete batch plant js a pemritted use in the M-1 zone it is not possible 
for the County to impose conditions on the use of the batch plant. This application is not 
about the uses that ·will be conducted on the property but about the height of the building 
in which the uses will be conducted. When the applicant was granted a conditional zone 
chauge there were moderating conditions such as landscaping imposed, but none of the 
conditions addressed a 75 foot height because it was a zone change process and the 
height of buildings was not at issue. Now the County is presented with this application 
for a conditional use pennit to allow a building that is significantly higher than any other 
in the area. The County has not been presented with any plausible way to mitigate the 
extra 30 feet of height now being requested, nor is it able to craft any conditions that 
would assure surrounding properties, uses and neighborhoods protection and 
compatibility with the additional 30 feet ofheight.3 The County therefore finds that a 75 
foot height is not compatible with the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood 
where a maximum of 45 feet for all structures is maintained and that the protection and 
compatibility of the surrounding properties, uses and neighborhood cannot be assured and 
3 No mitigation to surrounding neighbors was offered. As mentioned earlier, the applicant did present the 
idea mat sening the 75 foot tall by 60 foot wide building back from the edge of the property line would 
mitigate the additional 30 feet ofbeigbt [as viewed from the highway only}, because the sight angle would 
be lower. Commissioner Young pointed out at the hearing that he was not persuaded by the applicant's line 
of sight argument because although the sight angle would be lower, the top of the building would still be so 
high that it would even project above the crest of the Tetons, unlike any existing building in the vicinity_ 
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with Sandy Mason's statement at the November 15, 2007 hearing: "you cannot 
mitigate that height." 
Section 2 (A) (1) of the City ofDriggs' Ordinance 274-07 notably states that the 
Planning Commission "will not approve" the proposed use if such conditions cannot be 
met. For all the reasons stated above, the County finds that the application failed to meet 
one or more of the criteria outlined in the Idaho Code and the Driggs Ordinance, all of 
such criteria being necessary before a County can grant a conditional use permit. For all 





itobert Benedict, Commissioner 
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Dale W. Storer, Esq. (ISB No. 2166) 
DeAnne Casperson, Esq. (ISB No. 6698) 
FILED IN CHA MEERS AT REXBURG, 
MADISON Cul!NTY, IDAHO. 
Date. \ .. ll.-110 
HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO, P.L.L.C. 
1000 Riverwalk Drive, Suite 200 
Time __ ( \:..,.·· \;,..;S:::..--o:..._.rn _ · ___ -:--_ 
~i¥~tl:~u~t'ur By Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0130 
Telephone: (208) 523-0620 
Facsimile: (208) 523-9518 
Attorneys for Petitioner, Bums Holdings, LLC 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TETON 
INRE: 
Application for a CUP Permit to Exceed 
45' Height Limit for M-1 Zone 
BURNS HOLDTI\fGS, LLC, 
Petitioner and Applicant, 
V. 
TETON COUNTY BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-07-376 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT 
Petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record came before the Court for hearing on 
January 5, 2010. The Court has considered the Briefs filed by the parties and oral arguments 
submitted by the parties. Based thereupon, the Court makes the following order: 
ORIGIN.,~ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Augment the Record with the 
Affidavit of Kurt Hibbert be and hereby is denied for the reasons stated by the Court at the 
conclusion of oral argument. 
'1*' 
DATED this l ,'.i"' day of January, 2010. 
1YRT1FR DENYING MOTION TO AUGMENT 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of the foregoing document upon the 
following this \L,, day of January, 2010, by mailing, with the necessary postage affixed 
thereto. 
ATTORNEY SERVED: 
Dale W. Storer 
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 50130 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
Kathy Spitzer 
Teton County Prosecutor 
89 N. Main Street, #5 
Driggs, ID 83422 
( .._,,{Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
( .4ail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Courthouse Box 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By:~w~J 
Deputy erk 
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